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WHAT NEW LOOK IN DEFENSE?

By MALCOLM W. HOAG*

I. The Issues

RECALLING the abrupt changes in American national security policy in 1953 and 1961, we may well ask: What New Look should we expect now? What should we want? Changes will probably emerge more temperately and slowly than they did in those years. To our friends abroad, over-sensitized as they have become to policy modifications, this prospect should be reassuring. Much as they tend to sympathize with dissent within the United States over Vietnam, they realize that our domestic furor over this tragic war threatens to induce a generalized neo-isolationism. Arguments for neo-isolationism have a powerful appeal, but tend to cloud debate about the real issues for long-term security policy choice: what doctrine, military force structure, budgets, and plans?

II. The Old Looks

A backward glance at the New Looks of 1953 and 1961, with stress upon budgetary competition as in 1953, supplies a starting point. Despite pressures in 1953 for continued high military budgets to sustain then current plans for a fast military buildup for NATO, the annual rate of federal spending for national defense, measured in 1958 dollars, fell by no less than $16.5 billion (27 percent) in the two years immediately following General Eisenhower's assumption of office.[1]

A minor budget cut from stockpile reductions was automatic. But the major reduction supposedly reflected the well-known change in national security policy. Because the New Look of 1953 relied primarily but not exclusively (1) upon nuclear weapons and (2) upon retaliation at places and times of our choosing, it removed the rationale by which military planners might otherwise have generated large requirements for conventional capabilities at places and times of an enemy's choosing.[2]

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[1] U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, *The National Income and Product Accounts, 1929-1965* (Washington 1966), 158-59. The decline in Total New Obligational Authority requested for defense spending in his first two budgets was, of course, even greater ($26.1 billion).

[2] Glenn H. Snyder, "The New Look of 1953," in P. Y. Hammond, W. R. Schilling, and G. H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York 1962), 436-37.

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For all the Eisenhower Administration's insistence upon doctrine and National Security Council coordination of policy, the driving force was economic dogma. The budget-cutting began before the doctrine was formulated, not afterward, with predictably chaotic results in the Pentagon. A military planner is trained to guard against adversity. When faced with budget austerity imposed by overriding domestic priorities, he will seek to preserve balance among military capabilities, even if at dangerous levels of risk.

But the 1953 New Look lacked not only clear doctrinal guidance in advance, but also any system for relating such guidance to nonexistent long-term military budgets. Because of divergent views among the military services, it produced a long-term force structure characterized by imbalance among inconsistent capability options. Only the Air Force stood ready to embrace "massive retaliation" wholeheartedly, and to banish sizable conventional capabilities beyond recall. Even in this service a minority stood opposed, in support of a beleaguered Army. The Navy, for its part, somehow contrived to rationalize both a new Polaris system for city-destruction and its older sizable convoy capabilities for sustained (conventional?) high-intensity warfare. Logistic planning did not mesh: "Army planning, for example, was based primarily on a long war of attrition; Air Force planning was based, largely, on a short war of nuclear bombardment."[3]

Would it have been better if our services had struck a balance among their capabilities consistent with the published doctrine during 1953-1960, and thus achieved better "cost-effectiveness," narrowly defined, for the professed policy? Probably it was better that future options were preserved wastefully than not preserved at all. In any event, the unwillingness of our military services to disavow inconsistent doctrines, but instead to compromise with each other, accounts for the central budgetary paradox of the Eisenhower Administration. After the early sharp cut, military outlays remained surprisingly high, because the economies implicit in the professed doctrine were never realized. The military share of the Gross National Product (GNP), once sharply cut from a wartime 13.5 percent to 9.7 percent in those first two years, thereafter fluctuated on a quarterly basis between a high of 10.3 percent and an outgoing low (second quarter, 1960), of 8.2 percent of potential (no recession) GNP. By the same measure, military outlays during calendar 1965 took but 7.0 percent of the potential GNP, at the low

[3] Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security* (New York 1968), 90.

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point of the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations.[4] Prominent contemporary critics who would cut our post-Vietnam military outlays to 5 percent or less of our GNP in the 1970s,[5] would, in effect, take us back all the way to a 1948 standard.[6]

The seeming budgetary austerity of the McNamara era reflects a capitalization upon some multiple-option capabilities that, despite professed Eisenhower doctrine, had been preserved. It was far quicker and cheaper to remove imbalances among capabilities than to replace wholly dissipated capabilities. Restoring racks to carry conventional bombs in airplanes, for example, was much easier than re-creating a tactical air force. Speeding vulnerability-reducing measures for hardened and mobile strategic missile systems that had already been begun was likewise easier than creating new systems. The immediate rise in military outlays under President Kennedy, $5.2 billion in one year in the same constant 1958 dollars (a 10.3 percent increase),[6] sought to remove imbalances quickly, following which the same goal was pursued at steadily diminishing outlay levels until Vietnam.

Such is the budgetary paradox. "Flexible response" and "multiple options" characterize an expensive policy, when coupled as they were in the 1961 New Look with no less ambitious foreign commitments and obligations. In brief, the Eisenhower Administration pursued an inexpensive national security policy expensively, which has direct import for President Nixon. If he seeks an immediate impressive cut in non-Vietnam outlays, as well as an honorable end to the war, he will not be able to start by pitting a five-star military judgment against the four-star collective view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as could President Eisenhower. Neither will he be able to find glaring imbalances among military capabilities that—in contrast to the Kennedy-McNamara measures to restore components in short supply—he might try to rectify by removing components in abundant supply.

III. Policy-Policing Imperatives

The clearest budgetary moral of the contrasting 1953 and 1961 New Looks is that an economizing doctrine supplies a necessary, but by no means sufficient, condition for efficiency in the Pentagon. Beyond a

[4] Department of Commerce, 158-59. By Department of Defense accounts, military outlays took 10.5 percent of actual GNP at the Vietnam-war-related peak in Fiscal 1968, but only 8.8 percent in Fiscal 1969. Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, *Statement on the 1970 Defense Budget and Defense Program for Fiscal Years 1970-74* (Washington 1969), 157.

[5] E.g., Carl Kaysen, "Military Strategy, Military Forces, and Arms Control," in Kermit Gordon, ed., *Agenda for the Nation* (Washington 1968), 582.

[6] Department of Commerce, 158-59.

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doctrine, we need an effective policy-policing system. Secretary McNamara supplied one, and the first step toward improving it is to understand it. The military staffs came to understand it quickly. As one general put it bitterly to this author, recalling the pleasant fiction that an American Congress would never tolerate a unified military service and a "Prussian" general staff: "We have a Unified Commander, and his name is McNamara." Surprisingly, relevant Congressional Committees were slower in comprehending and reacting to the new system. Observers in the international relations community were still slower, waiting in vain for a comprehensive published doctrine. Secretary McNamara's tremendous intellectual ability for solving policy problems quantitatively carried with it an underappreciation of published abstract doctrine ("theology"), which is useful in clarifying and unifying conceptual issues for a vast bureaucracy whose members need coordinating guidance. So the academics would not have found a doctrinal bible for the New Look of 1961, even if they had looked in the right place, the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and they looked in vain for an accepted one from the National Security Council or the Department of State.

The question to test understanding of the McNamara System is: "Define and explain the role and function of Draft Presidential Memoranda (DPMs), trace their annual review cycle, and relate them to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[7] Only those who pass this test qualify to criticize the system, as few outsiders did while Secretary McNamara was in office. Thus it was not until 1968 that the key Senate Committee on strategic preparedness properly emphasized the roles of the DPMs: "In fact, the Draft Presidential Memoranda, which are issued by the Secretary of Defense and which are the basic decisions in the strategic and other military fields, except the one dealing with research and development, are drafted and prepared in the Systems Analysis Office. These control the military budget, *force planning* and procurement."[8]

A bureaucratic revolution occurred in the Pentagon between 1961 and 1968. Its formal Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System (PPBS), which "would be a shell without substance were it not backed by the

[7] For a succinct account, see Howard M. Berger, "Systems Analysis in the Department of Defense," *The Cost-Effectiveness Newsletter*, The Operations Research Society of America, 11 (December 1967), 4-5.

[8] Report by Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (90th Cong., 2nd sess.) on *Status of U.S. Strategic Power* (Washington 1968), 22. Italics added. Also see the Hearings of this Subcommittee, especially Part 1, 127-28, 135.

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full range of analytical support which operations research and other modern management techniques can bring to bear on national security problems," has been overemphasized. The vital change was in managerial philosophy: a public manager "can either act as a judge or a leader."[9] Ex-President of General Motors Charles Wilson, in his tenure as Secretary of Defense, settled the force-planning issues that the Joint Chiefs brought before him only because they could not agree; the ex-President of Ford seized the leadership and initiative in determining force plans. The JSOP remains in the same military hands, with the useful addition that its long-term requirements are ultimately costed. But it became influential under McNamara only as it, and related military studies, altered the DPMs that were drafted and redrafted in the Systems Analysis Office. Thus physical force structure planning—numbers and types of units (e.g., army divisions) and of weapon systems (e.g., Polaris/Poseidon submarines)—was unified for the first time with financial planning for the same units over comparably long planning periods. With such functional unification came centralization (too much?) in mainly civilian hands (too little military professional judgment?), and resultant burning resentment from the Services.

The Systems Analysis Office became the focal point for this resentment, in particular, because it forced the budgetary debates to be conducted in terms uncongenial to the Services. Proponents of new weapons or new forces were required to present reasons for expected greater cost-effectiveness, rather than greater effectiveness alone. They also had to expect that their most persuasive arguments would, in a different context, be used against them. As proposer of a new system, a Service spokesman will tend to reflect glowing estimates of American performance against a future enemy. Yet, more generally, because a military planner deals in risky futures, his intelligence estimates tend to err on the side of predicting high enemy capabilities. One jolting corrective, from the Systems Analysis Office, was to replace an intelligence estimate of a "twelve feet tall" enemy with the "six feet tall" enemy implicit in the "sales brochure" for the new American system. Then the quantitative information supplied by one spokesman for a service would undermine that supplied by another. A more general procedure was to cost the total enemy force posture generated by military intelligence estimates, compare these estimates with reasonable total budgetary limits for the enemy, and request the intelligence community to

[9] Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, *Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget* (Washington 1968), 194 and 193 respectively.

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reduce the incompatibility between the two sets of estimates. To military traditionalists, the entire procedure seemed dangerously fraudulent. They were forced to produce more quantitative information than ever before, fully aware that their numbers might be used in other contexts and might be misused in inexperienced hands. Their intense resentment is easily understandable, and sometimes justified.

A return to uncontested traditional military intelligence estimates, however, is not justifiable. What philosophy about risk should guide long-term military planning? To choose the higher of two competing estimates about future enemy capabilities is to follow a conservative precept that is in order when, but only when, high confidence is required in particular future United States counter-capabilities. To follow this practice at all times is to deny future medium- and low-confidence capabilities of the United States and its allies even a fair hearing, and to allow a conservative precept to generate radical outcomes by default. There can be two such outcomes. First, overestimation of enemy capabilities can, when reciprocated by the enemy, overfuel an action-reaction arms race. Second, overestimation of enemy conventional capabilities can breed such defeatism that nuclear alternatives are adopted.

The policy-policing McNamara method fought these deplorable tendencies, imperfectly but effectively. A responsible New Look in 1969 will require both a consistent set of strategic policies and a no less effective, but perhaps a less abrasive and improved, implementing method. What should they be? And how can they be better related to international affairs?

IV. What Policy for General Purpose Forces?

For a consistent set of policies we need, above all, appropriate complementarity between our Strategic Retaliatory Forces and our General Purpose (or overseas-theater-oriented) Forces. It is better to begin with the issues posed for our General Purpose Forces, in order to see what residual burdens they can and do leave for Strategic Forces.

President Nixon immediately escaped his campaign rhetoric on Strategic Forces with the smooth semantic glide from "superiority" to "sufficiency." When he commissioned a study of an all-volunteer Armed Services, however, he left open the possibility that this reasonable prospect might be rationalized by one of his least reasonable campaign statements: "Korea was probably our last conventional war. Those we must prepare against in the future are either nuclear exchanges, in which the draft would be irrelevant, or guerrilla wars."[10] This quota-

[10] *The Air Force Times*, September 25, 1968, 8.

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tion is from a considered statement on national security policy solicited from each Presidential candidate, and may accordingly be more difficult to disavow than a casual declaration.

Should we really prepare General Purpose Forces to fight only the most immediately experienced, and possibly atypical, war? In any case, a neat boundary line between conventional and guerrilla warfare is misleading. Granted, if our forces were to be involved in Vietnam at all, we should probably have concentrated more upon the security of dense local populations, and concentrated less upon seeking mass battles in remote and sparsely populated areas. Even if we had done so, however, the Viet Cong would have done all they could to overpower local security forces. The resultant escalation by degree would soon have met any definition of conventional war. Vietnam doubtless yields a great many lessons on how to use conventional power more skillfully and less destructively. It yields no lesson at all on dispensing with it altogether.

There was no campaign call in 1968 for revival of "massive retaliation" as an all-purpose doctrine. Nonetheless, specifically for possible Asian contingencies, we may get to this doctrine indirectly by way of less ambitious global policy-guidance for General Purpose Forces structures and logistic capabilities. The most vulnerable target for would-be economizers is the inherited guidance: "to provide forces that can meet one major contingency in NATO, one major contingency elsewhere, plus [presumably one or more minor contingencies]."[11] An economizer's alternative objective for General Purpose Forces might be the ability to meet only one major contingency at a time, not "two-plus" contingencies.

Such an alternative objective might be formulated more sharply by specifying which theater of possible major operations, Europe or Asia, was to take priority. If it were so formulated, in all probability Europe would be stressed. We then get some variant of "massive retaliation" doctrine for Asia by default. Proponents of the 1953 New Look used 1953 weaknesses in Soviet tactical nuclear weaponry as a bad, but effective, argument for emphasizing United States and NATO nuclear capabilities for years when these Soviet weaknesses would have disappeared. So contemporary planners might use China's present weakness to justify neglecting non-nuclear defense preparedness against China tomorrow. Or our planning might simply gamble on possible ene-

[11] Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (90th Cong., 2nd sess.) on *U.S. Tactical Air Power Program* (Washington 1968), 192.

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mies' not having any aggressive intentions now or in the future, and so fail to provide specific countercapabilities.

V. The NATO Problem

THE PLANNER'S NIGHTMARE

A new administration's options are constrained by a much longer half-life for United States doctrine abroad than at home. The paramount example is NATO. Between the early 1961 New Look and the formal adoption of "flexible response" by the North Atlantic Council ministerial session on December 14, 1967, "following the first comprehensive review of NATO's strategy since 1956,"[12] NATO international planners were still formally bound by 1956-57 doctrine!

For General Purpose Forces, planners always begin with NATO as the biggest problem. NATO outspends and outmans the Warsaw Pact, but it has never converted this potential for conventional superiority into actuality. Specifically, even when United States forces temporarily added for Vietnam are excluded, "NATO has 30 percent more men under arms (5,470,000 vs. 4,200,000) than the Warsaw Pact"; . . . has more total manpower in its "Division Forces in the Center Region (677,000 vs. 619,000); . . . [and] a detailed examination of equipment indicates no area where the Pact's different structure provides a major relative advantage."[13] NATO's members do not fail to spend money and to draft men for defense, contrary to prevailing beliefs. NATO's main problem is its inefficiency in translating these resources into fighting capabilities. Worse, given such inefficiency, its military posture is dangerous as well as wasteful. Its tactical air forces have been glaringly vulnerable even to conventional attack,[14] and in all probability will remain vulnerable to nuclear attack. To be conventionally inadequate, while well-stocked with vulnerable tactical nuclear weapons that look ominous to the possible enemy, is a planner's nightmare. That is what we have in Europe.

When inefficiency is also dangerous, its sources are worth probing. A coalition is inefficient because each member, in seeking forces that

[12] "NATO Ministers Meeting Communique," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, VI (Spring 1968), 112-14.

[13] Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain C. Enthoven, Exhibit A in Report of the Special Subcommittee on National Defense Posture of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives (90th Congress, 2nd sess.), *Review of a Systems Analysis Evaluation of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces* (Washington 1968), 8-15. For detailed amplification, see Annex IV, *Report of the United States Delegation to the Fourteenth Meeting of Members of Parliament from the North Atlantic Assembly Countries*, U.S. Senate (91st Congress, 1st sess., Washington 1969), pp. 50-59.

[14] *Ibid.*, 15.

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are nationally "balanced," procures forces and weapon-systems that could more efficiently be supplied by others. We must expect such diseconomies, and try to mobilize international suasion to hold them to moderate proportions—save for France. The high costs to NATO of French geographic denial and reduced forces bring only the consolation of French abstention when the North Atlantic Council, reassembled as The Defense Committee of Fourteen, gets down to serious business. Nobody else in NATO so flagrantly upsets a semi-reasonable division of military labor.

GEOGRAPHY VS. OBJECTIVES

The sources of NATO inefficiency go beyond deplorable, if understandable, national lapses from the goal of balanced collective forces. They are to be found in geography, compounded by over-ambitious force- and weapon-system unit designs and, more generally, in over-ambitious objectives for military performance relative to available resources. Geographic considerations obviously pose special problems for the extreme flanks. A rugged terrain in northern Norway and eastern Turkey is coupled, in the former case, with a much sparser population and fewer troops than in the latter, while each differs from the Central Front. But positive Norwegian views toward NATO conventional defense stem from their interest in defusing dangers in Central Europe, and not from misconceptions about the feasibility of purely local defense of their extreme north. The Turks' mixed views toward such NATO defense relate in a different, but equally important, way to NATO's Central Front. Their doubts about local defense are magnified by NATO concepts that have been imported from the Central Front for use in defending Thrace. Hence the traditional focus upon the Central Front is justified, both because the main allies are directly involved there and because NATO-wide doctrine is determined by this one Front, if more than it should be.

To understand the governing geographic constraint, we need only a map of Europe and a piece of string. The shorter the front to be defended, other things being equal, the more feasible a local defense will be. Early plans for NATO defense, given small forces to begin with, realistically started with the natural barrier of the Rhine River to reinforce holding capabilities, and extended this defense line along a south-north axis to the North Sea. Such a defense front is little more than 400 miles long, and could be kept to this dimension as one moved east to lesser river barriers in the middle of The Federal Republic, but not as one moved beyond them:

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> "It has always been an aim of the Alliance to defend physically the territory of NATO Europe as *far forward* as possible, but realization of this aim has been conditioned by the forces actually available to achieve it. For example, in the early days of NATO the best we could do in Central Europe was to man a defence based upon river obstacles deep in our own territory. With the strengthening of our forces in recent years, the defences have steadily moved forward, as, indeed, they should. . . . The need, however, is not only for increased numbers. To fight an effective *mobile defence* requires greater tactical mobility, more armour, more conventional fire power and better logistical support than is found at present . . . [and] some restationing is needed."[15]

The combination of forward defense in geography and mobile defense in concept yields the most expensive possible defense of the Central Front. Let our piece of string follow every bend and curve in the Eastern boundary of The Federal Republic, and we trace a front of about 650 miles. A forward defense thus involves a front about 50 percent longer than a straight north-south defense line to the rear. This ambitious task was left for General Lemnitzer by his predecessor as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe: "If you have lost the forward area, why, in that instance, try to hold even the line of the Rhine? . . . I established the forward concept when we didn't have the military means and I was criticized by many military people for having done this."[16]

Prevalent defeatism about conventional defense in NATO is now easy to understand. All those men normally stationed in Division Forces in NATO's Center Region make up, at most, 28 2/3 divisions, when 5 French divisions are hesitatingly included.[17] Suppose this total were an even 30 divisions. Even then, with a large front to cover, a mobile defense whose rationale rests upon its flexibility and speed would keep a minimum of 10 to 15 divisions in immediate strategic reserve, leaving at most 20 divisions forward. Divide a 600-mile-long front among 20 divisions, and we get average frontages per forward division of 30 miles each. Is a NATO division, although bigger and more expensive than its Warsaw Pact counterpart, so much better that it can cover such a wide front?

[15] General Lemnitzer, excerpts from address to Western European Assembly, *NATO Letter* (July-August 1963), 20. Italics added.

[16] General Lauris Norstad, interview, "Defending Europe Without France," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, IV (Summer 1966), 180.

[17] Enthoven, 10.

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PERCEIVED CONVENTIONAL INADEQUACY

The prevailing answer, among generals in NATO, is flatly negative. Their professional counsel is the one heeded by European member governments, not least because it inadvertently supplies the best excuse for failing to make the effort to improve their own forces. Why correct qualitative deficiencies in conventional forces if they are going to be deemed quantitatively inadequate in any case? A perception that the number of divisions will still be inadequate, because too thinly spread, is utterly devastating. It destroys the argument that the expected numerical advantage for a local defender against an attacker—which varies with terrain and many other considerations, but is typically expressed as three to one—can be generalized to the entire front. To generalize this advantage is a fallacy of composition unless one's forces combine sufficient thickness and mobility. With NATO divisions spread over such thin divisional frontages, an enemy can exploit gaps between them.

Such is the standard professional military judgment that dominates European political views. Worse yet, military comparisons are typically expressed merely in numbers of opposed divisions. Then the greater number of Warsaw Pact divisions normally in the Center Region (46) is contrasted to NATO's (at best 28 2/3), rather than the lesser total number of men in Warsaw Pact Division Forces (619,000 vs. 677,000) as contrasted to NATO's total. An average NATO "Division Force," which is 80 percent larger than the Pact's in manpower and other inputs[18] is not credited with anything like an 80 percent greater capability. These statistics are misused by some to spread undue pessimism about NATO defense: " 'NATO is outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact on the central front by more than two to one in infantry formations and nearly three to one in armored formations. The Warsaw Pact superiority in aircraft is nearly two to one,' the British Defense Minister said."[19] *Life*'s main editorial immediately compounded the error: "The Warsaw Pact powers now *outman* NATO three to one in armored brigades, two to one in both infantry and aircraft."[20] The same statistics are equally misused by others to generate undue optimism about existing NATO defense, as they ignore the "thinness" and maldeployment of NATO divisions relative to forward defense geography, and count only the total manpower and related inputs rather than the outputs: "Currently, NATO forces on the central front are roughly in

[18] *Ibid.*, 10-13.
[19] Defense Minister Dennis Healey, *The New York Times*, February 2, 1969, 18.
[20] *Life*, Vol. 66 (March 14, 1969), 34. Italics added.

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balance with the opposing Warsaw Pact forces west of the Soviet frontier, measured in terms of *capacity to fight* a conventional ground war; indeed the NATO forces immediately available probably have some qualitative superiority on the central front, especially in terms of aircraft."[21]

The greater NATO resource-investment in conventional forces does not provide an equilibrium in Europe measured in ability to fight conventionally because (1) unit designs for its forces are typically very complicated and expensive. As the paramount example, a division for "mobile defense" is supposed to provide some form of mechanized transport for each infantryman for speedy, off-road, flexible deployment. Thus one compounds cost per unit, because heavy initial equipment investments translate, by maintenance standards, into large manpower noncombat requirements. For any given total budget level, higher costs per division translate into fewer divisions. Meanwhile, (2) NATO commanders have moved the intended battle-line forward, thus calling for a greater number of divisions to cover a longer front, not a smaller number.

This prospect would not be so distressing if, with respect to conventional capabilities, NATO had planned well to emphasize mobilization rather than immediate readiness; or, with respect to nuclear capabilities, had planned well for a good substitute for conventional preparedness. An emphasis upon mobilization capabilities would fit the prevailing relaxed political appraisal of today's Soviet intent, if not its capabilities. NATO governments are fully prepared to gamble that the probability of Soviet surprise attack upon them, without ample political warning, is small. Yet for nearly twenty years NATO has emphasized nominally ready forces and de-emphasized reserve forces. Our most optimistic authoritative source about potential NATO superiority in ready forces concedes Warsaw Pact "advantages in reinforcement capabilities" that might be overcome "if we organized ourselves efficiently to do it"; specifically, if the many Europeans who have finished their training tours of duty, "were organized into fully equipped ready reserve units."[22] Here is a call for quantity as well as quality in reserve units, as few reserve divisions exist in Western Europe. Yet, after Czechoslovakia, the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session proclaimed that "the quality of reserve forces will also be improved"; while the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, stresses "an improvement in the quality of our forces, not the quantity."[23]

[21] Kaysen, 569. Italics added. [22] Enthoven, 13.
[23] Communiqué and Speech, respectively, *The North Atlantic Quarterly*, VI (Winter 1968-1969), 607 and 505.

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TACTICAL NUCLEAR DILEMMAS

We can be just as gloomy about good nuclear substitutes for conventional capabilities in NATO. How a theater posture could be designed for two-sided tactical nuclear warfare remains hotly disputed among the theorists. Their paper designs typically stress not only the removal of obvious vulnerabilities, especially within a sophisticated command, control, and communications system for complex battle management, but hyperdispersal of forces to reduce their vulnerability as well. Such dispersal dissipates conventional capabilities in advance, and therefore logically requires predelegated authority to military commanders to use nuclear weapons against enemies who suddenly confront one's missing conventional capabilities.

Hence, naturally, alternative designs for tactical nuclear preparedness remain contested in studies and papers, while none is put into practice. Refashioning NATO's physical military posture in Europe for any such preparedness would require a European willingness to invest large resources. This willingness has been notably absent. There are natural suspicions that the only purpose in making Europe an efficient nuclear battleground is to create conditions favoring a joint sanctuary for United States-Soviet territory. The necessary resources have been and will continue to be missing. Further, while many European governments allege that their fear is that some other government may veto the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis, they adamantly refuse to predelegate nuclear authority to anybody. Defense Minister Healey, much as he depreciates conventional capabilities for NATO, could announce to the House of Commons that he had assented to predelegating nuclear authority to German and Turkish military commanders only if his statement were coupled with his Government's resignation. Among European Defense Ministers, Minister Healey on this point is not untypical. The military requirements for an efficient tactical nuclear defense in Europe are flatly incompatible with political imperatives, with the predictable result.

The deterrent virtue that can be drawn from this planner's vice is that if NATO's posture frightens us this much, it will surely frighten the Soviets enough. Perhaps it will. We have created a large escalatory machine, with the prospect that any conflict in Europe might necessitate or even tempt early recourse to nuclear weapons, but with no assurance that two-sided nuclear warfare would be either advantageous to or controllable by NATO. The ultimate deterrent, United States strategic retaliatory power external to the European theater, might have to be invoked in some form. Therefore, it had better be available in an

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appropriate form. Yet, however tailored, this ultimate deterrent could surely be used only as a dangerous low-confidence measure. Lesser dependence upon it, by way of improved theater design, is militarily desirable. It may also be politically desirable, or governments may simply prefer to save money instead. We trust that they will at least consider improved designs.

THE CRUDE SOLUTION

To be as blunt about solutions, for the moment, as we have been about problems, the answer is for NATO to replace its ground-force posture designs with Soviet designs. This answer has a great deal to commend it, not least its simplicity. First, if senior generals and defense ministers persist in counting divisions as divisions, ignoring great differences among divisions as if adding apples and oranges because fruit is fruit, then by all means let us create more small divisions from the same resources. Specifically, by copying the Warsaw Pact divisional design, weaknesses as well as strengths, let NATO consider creating 50 Pact-style divisions on its Central Front from the identical manpower and other inputs that now yield but 28 2/3 Western-style divisions.[24] Then the prospect that results when a standard training-manual number is applied for the frontage that a "division" can cover would, for the front as a whole, become much less gloomy as the same factor was multiplied by the larger number of divisions.

Second, however, let us not convert all our Western-style ready divisions into 50 Pact-style divisions, but only into, say, 40 divisions. The remaining resources can be used to create significantly more than 10 less expensive reserve divisions, again Pact-style. Opposite Czechoslovakia, militia-style reserve units could stand ready to defend prepared positions, as the most cost-effective of all divisions. Understandable political resistance to prepared positions opposite East Germany, because they might signify acceptance of a permanently divided Germany, would probably necessitate lesser efficiency elsewhere, but reserve divisions would still be less expensive.[25] Such Soviet-style greater emphasis upon a mobilization base fits two crucial Western circumstances: (1) It conforms to prevailing political beliefs that there will be ample political warning about any adverse change in Soviet attitudes, permitting mobilization of such reserve units as exist. (2) It conforms to the vast increase in American lift capabilities and prepositioned

[24] Enthoven, 10.

[25] See Malcolm W. Hoag, "Rationalizing NATO Strategy," *World Politics*, XVII (October 1964), 131-42.

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equipment for its forces, and the enhanced readiness that is being achieved for priority U.S. reserve divisions. Here is the simple remedy. Let us put false pride aside, and for armies use the Soviet model for cost-effectiveness. It is the matching mobilization base that European NATO most needs.[26]

In all probability, to copy the Soviet model is not the optimal solution, save as its simplicity outweighs other drawbacks. We must later consider how to get more sophisticated remedies. Our initial view of NATO problems, and the crude remedy, serves to remind us that it takes a good policy-policing system to implement a good policy. It reminds us specifically that defense goals in territorial terms must fit feasibly forthcoming resources to achieve them. Note the remarkable personal flavor of, "I established the forward concept when we didn't have the military means."[16] The Federal Republic of Germany was no doubt pleased.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FORWARD DEFENSE ELSEWHERE

Turkey was likewise pleased if others (the United States) were going to supply the military equipment to permit a forward, mobile defense of Thrace. Turkey had a sound traditional defense of the straits (the Dardanelles and the Bosporus) that could concentrate upon two exceedingly narrow land approaches from the European side, and accordingly be a very simple, inexpensive, and yet effective defense. Still, as a member of NATO, could Turkey be denied a forward concept that was awarded to The Federal Republic? As a recipient of grant military assistance, however, her position differs from that of The Federal Republic. Is the United States Congress bound to supply the means for what an international commander orders, with a different front primarily in mind? Will it? If not, is not the United States in greater trouble by far than if goals had been tailored to realistic prospects for military aid throughout?

The clearest non-NATO application of the moral is to post-Vietnam Southeast Asia, specifically to Thailand. There we have a SEATO commitment, reinforced by a 1962 bilateral understanding, to come to Thailand's aid in the event of overt Communist invasion. Insurgency in Thailand, we expect and hope, can be met by Thai forces alone. But it is ridiculous to suppose that a Thai army of but 95,000 men[27] could meet a Chinese-North Vietnamese overt invasion. Yet if we want to

[26] McNamara, *The Essence of Security*, 40.

[27] The Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1968-1969* (London 1968), 35.

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honor our commitment as efficiently and unobtrusively as possible, the first step is to ensure that no SEATO commander imposes as a binding precedent so costly an obligation, specifically in terms of forward defense, that the United States Congress will rebel against supplying the means for it.

Another principal United States commitment on the Asian mainland is to South Korea, where geography and strong local forces make forward defense not merely feasible, but especially cost-effective. To defend a front of only 153 miles, South Korea has an Army of 550,000 men, with 19 front-line infantry divisions.[28] Further, unlike NATO's, the troops are already deployed forward to fit the concept, within prepared positions that enhance their defensive effectiveness. We can therefore rightly generalize to the entire front local numerical advantages over an attacker. Given such Korean strength, and moderate geographic commitments elsewhere in Asia where comparable self-strength is lacking, total Asian increments to our General Purpose Forces requirements can be moderate.

VI. Implications for Strategic Forces

Our discussion reaffirms that United States Strategic Retaliatory Forces must still provide greater backing for theater forces abroad than is desirable, at a time when Soviet counter-capabilities are becoming so formidable as to make declaratory policies about strategic "superiority" bipolar, and when the number of nuclear powers must be expected to increase. The obligations to support theater forces, to counter Soviet capabilities, and to deter nuclear proliferation can best be related to each other by considering the need for "light" strategic attack preparedness. Such preparedness best explains the role, incidentally, for the much-publicized "thin" anti-ballistic-missile defense (ABM).

The 1961 New Look included the concept of "controlled nuclear response." Such a response can be large or small because its enduring element is omissions from a formerly all-inclusive target list, not inclusions. In the special circumstances of 1961-1962, however, the concept tended to be too narrowly identified with a large counterforce attack upon the Soviet Union. Such an attack would, by various target and weapon constraints, nonetheless preserve Soviet cities as hostages for continuing deterrent power. This excessive declaratory emphasis upon control in large attacks reflected a since-vanished Soviet acute vulnerability, in a gradual trend that did not eliminate the options introduced in the 1961 policy revolution, but that made our officials less sanguine

[28] *Ibid.*, 38.

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about any of them: "The strategy options for general nuclear war have not changed since 1962."[29]

That these options have not changed in all this time is deplorable but understandable. It was hard enough to introduce any flexibility into plans for "general nuclear war." Strategic military commanders, if ever their forces have to pay the price of penetrating stiff Soviet defenses, want to hit every crucial target. General Wheeler, when questioned in 1968 about Secretary McNamara's famous 1962 Ann Arbor declaration that "the principal military objective in the event of nuclear war should be the destruction of the enemy's forces," succinctly replied, "That is Mr. McNamara speaking. Speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we *still* have adhered to *our concept*. Yes, you attack the urban industrial base, that is the population base and industry, but we have always held to the view that we must attack those forces of the Soviet Union which are able to inflict destruction on ourselves and our allies."[30]

Despite the great increase in protected Soviet strategic forces that makes recourse to such general nuclear war all but unthinkable, we must nonetheless provide ultimate support for deficient theater forces. In these circumstances we need plans for controlled nuclear strikes that fall observably short of general war. Such plans do not present good military options, but rather the least bad among options for contingencies that, by assumption, are desperate. Assume losing a conventional war or, worse, losing a tactical nuclear war. Then the hope is that a controlled nuclear strike, coupled with a suitable "hot-line" message, will not add fuel to the flames but rather will be, in Bernard Brodie's apt phrase, "a de-escalating device."[31]

The import of Soviet capabilities for comparable strikes, if not their intent, is clear. The Soviets hold Western Europe hostage with some 700 medium- and intermediate-range missiles, among other means, and could conduct limited nuclear strikes with any portion of these forces. Further, they can assess the probability of penetrating nonexistent European ballistic missile defenses as being 100 percent, regardless of the size of their missile strike, for the forseeable future. So can the West for missile strikes against East European targets. In short, either side could stage nuclear demonstrations in Central Europe, with

[29] Department of Defense Statement of January 16, 1968, refuting allegation in *The Washington Post*, in *The New York Times*, January 17, 1968, 10. For another DoD reaffirmation, see U.S. Senate Hearings, *Status of U.S. Strategic Power*, Part 1, 138.

[30] General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in U.S. Senate Hearings on *Status of U.S. Strategic Power*, Part 1, 6-7. Italics added.

[31] Bernard Brodie, *Escalation and the Nuclear Option* (Princeton 1966), 23.

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a small number of missiles, without incurring an operational penalty from defenses effective against small attacks.

If we reach an early strategic arms agreement with the Soviet Union that bans ABM deployments on both sides, including Soviet dismantling of their current Galosh system, a similar option would be available for small missile strikes against the homeland of each superpower. At this late date, such an agreement is highly unlikely, and probably no longer desirable. The time to seek such agreement upon zero ABM was during the New Look of 1961 rather than 1969, as many of us then argued.[32] Now technology has made area missile defense of entire land masses feasible against light attacks. Such defense promises several utilities.

Who would argue for asymmetrical strategic postures that featured zero ABM for the United States and significant area ABM coverage for the Soviet Union? Then, in response to any nuclear demonstration that we were forced to employ against Eastern Europe because of NATO conventional weakness, the Soviets could counterdemonstrate against either Western Europe or the United States with a comparably light and yet effective attack. The first function of a thin ABM system for the United States, in my view, is to remove this asymmetry in strategic postures. We want the Soviet Union to be confident that any nuclear demonstration against the territory of the United States would be effective only because they employ an unmistakably heavy attack, with large numbers of high-confidence aids for penetrating defenses. In other words, we want to drive the Soviets to so conspicuously higher a level of counterdemonstration that they will be deterred by the greater risks of escalating to general nuclear war.

The rationale for a thin ABM system for the United States differs little, after all, from the rationale for air defense. We know that our airspace is not impervious, because high confidence can never be put in airtight defense. At the same time, to abandon air defense entirely is to replace our low-to-medium confidence in it with publicly acknowledged zero confidence, which would be absurd. Such a posture would permit any nuclear power that could afford long-range airliners a free ride to American targets with bombs kicked from the hatch. Our modest air defense plans permit no enemy any assurance of a free ride. So it should be with anti-ballistic missile defense. There is much utility in low-to-medium confidence aerospace defense, precisely because it shifts the burden of desired high confidence in penetration capabilities,

[32] Malcolm W. Hoag, "On Stability in Deterrent Races," *World Politics*, XIII (July 1961), 523.

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in a complicated and uncertain world, to the shoulders of the enemy. Upon even Soviet shoulders it is a considerable burden.

Our rationale for a thin ABM system should cover both a deliberate light attack from the Soviets, and any accidental attack. It should also provide an option for "hard-point" ABM defense for hardened retaliatory missile sites, as proposed for the "Safeguard" system. Increased hardness alone no longer promises sufficient protection: "This new basing concept of hardened and defended complexes currently appears to be the best long-term way to achieve the necessary survivability of the land-based force."[33]

Finally, the system should provide area defense of the entire United States against light attacks from small nuclear powers. Our declaratory policy should have depreciated, rather than exaggerated, the need for this defense, because we should have the mainland Chinese out-deterred at all times from any use of their nuclear weapons. At the same time we might have quietly acknowledged that a small insurance premium was nonetheless worth paying for this added protection. A Chinese strategic weapon designer would then have to provide both survivability for his systems against qualitatively different United States and Soviet threats, and penetration capability against qualitatively different United States and Soviet defenses as well. If Chinese leaders need any sober lessons, they will best come from Chinese strategic-system designers.

Our dilemma is to exploit these three ABM rationales reasonably and yet make them an acknowledged part of a responsible arms control policy. We can resolve this dilemma. It will not be easy, fundamentally because the original ABM physical design, from which the Sentinel-Safeguard was subsequently derived, was oriented toward a thick system. The original design emphasized expensive radars and computers that, it was hoped, could handle heavy attacks. To the extent that such ambitious radar-computer capabilities remain in the redesign for Sentinel-Safeguard, proponents of thick systems will be able to argue that more interceptor missiles (Spartans and Sprints) can be added at small incremental costs. Once their foot is in the door, they can exploit arguments that doubling expected physical effectiveness will increase costs by significantly less than two.

Such military proponents will find some support from a respectable minority within the community of academic strategists, who would reverse current heavy emphasis upon offense relative to defense. They

[33] Statement of Dr. John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, U.S. Senate Hearings on *Status of U.S. Strategic Power*, Part 1, 53.

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argue that deterrence would still be strong at much lower mutual levels of United States and Soviet capabilities for "Assured Destruction," while mutual devastation would be much less if deterrence were to fail.[34] Their conclusion rests upon analyses which find that offense is now comparably expensive with the new defense technologies. In these analyses, however, the offense is required to assume the burden of many uncertainties, at every stage of the calculations, by employing only high-confidence, and therefore expensive, aids for penetrating defenses. Such calculations are fair enough, provided we note their converse. For heavy retaliatory attacks, both the United States and the Soviet Union would employ high-confidence penetration aids. At the same time, each would toss in a collection of light, low-confidence penetration aids that might work. Even a small nuclear power can use such inexpensive aids. In short, we know how to provide high-confidence retaliatory capabilities. Nobody knows how to provide *high-confidence* ABM systems against sophisticated heavy attacks in designs that, at every stage of the calculations for hypothetical missile exchanges, force the defense rather than the offense to assume the worst about each uncertain element. There might lurk a fatal flaw in our thick ABM, which enemies can cheaply exploit, and no confidence that a similar flaw is to be found in the posture of the other superpower. This possibility is enough to keep governments from embracing the unorthodox view that strategic postures should emphasize defense rather than offense.

Mutual investments in heavy ABM systems may be avoided by explicit agreements that arise from United States-Soviet arms control negotiations. As an arbitrary but reasonable example, there might be an agreement that each side would deploy no more than 1,000 interceptor missiles within a thin area coverage of its territory. Such an explicit agreement would limit ABM expenditures, and on that score be mutually beneficial. At such a numerical limit, moreover, each of the multiple utilities from thin ABM deployments could be preserved. Specifically, there would be modest scope for additional United States interceptor deployments; all of which, perhaps as a stipulated part of the agreement, could be deployed only in defense of hardened missile silos rather than for additional protection of hostage cities.

The main hope for holding the line at thin ABM deployments comes from current offensive technological developments that supply the best possible deterrent to large investments in ABM systems. Why should the Soviets invest billions of rubles in a thick ABM system that promises

[34] See, notably, D. G. Brennan, "Post-Deployment Policy Issues in Ballistic Missile Defense," *Adelphi Paper 43*, The Institute for Strategic Studies (London 1967).

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to be ineffective against future large numbers of United States retaliatory vehicles? The large numbers include not merely Multiple Re-entry Vehicles (MRV) from a single missile launcher, but Multiple-Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV), each one of which the defenses would have to treat as a threat against a separate target. Such vehicles are high-confidence penetration aids, because the cleverest conceivable defense discrimination could not dismiss them as mere decoys. Add, to repeat, a Soviet fear that some among the accompanying array of lower-confidence penetration aids might also work, and we have a dismaying prospect of cost-ineffectiveness about thick ABM, for a Kosygin if not a Grechko to ponder.

Yet rather than capitalize upon this promising deterrent to thick ABMs, some of our most prominent academic strategists propose its antithesis. Thus Carl Kaysen would seek "a ban on new systems (*specifically MIRVs* and new launching platforms or vehicles)." Concretely, his preferred "197X" defense budget has a 40 percent reduction in the cost of strategic forces "to reflect the institution of a freeze," and a smaller reduction in Research and Development to reflect "the sharp slowing down of efforts to create new weapon systems."[35] Projected budgetary savings of this magnitude assume either an utterly unrealistic prediction about reaching quick agreement on a strategic freeze or, dangerously, a willingness to gamble upon a unilateral United States freeze. At this level of expenditure no new United States strategic programs could be funded at all.

Let us hope that United States-Soviet talks on strategic arms limits proceed promptly and fruitfully. Yet we know that they will be complex, time-consuming, and bedeviled by the Soviet's traditional objections to any inspection on its territory. So let us further hope that this Soviet intransigence lessens. But it will surely not lessen to the point where foreign experts are permitted to peer inside missile warheads to verify the nonexistence of a MIRV capability. Those who seek stability in mutual deterrence, in part because each side fears the unknown penetration aids contained within the other's warheads, will not accept such close inspection. Nor can external monitoring of Soviet tests provide high confidence about nonexistent MIRV capabilities. We already know that the Soviets possess guidance and related necessary missile capabilities. They could test the critical mechanism for a MIRV capability—the ejector mechanism for a re-entry vehicle—with only one ejection per launch. Our test monitors would learn nothing.

[35] Kaysen, 568 and 581 respectively. Italics added.

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Realistic hopes should be pinned to gross arms limits that can be inspected, supplemented to the maximum extent possible with on-site inspection, perhaps on a statistically randomized basis. The simplest gross limits might be expressed in terms of numbers of bombers and missile launchers, coupled with agreements that any excess numbers were to be destroyed rather than transferred to any other nation. More sophisticated limits—for example, upon the aggregate payload weight for total missile forces on each side—would be still better in principle, but inspection requirements would become more onerous. Many permutations and combinations are possible in an arms agreement, with great opportunities for mutual gain, and yet with considerable risk that vulnerabilities could be enhanced rather than decreased. Consequently, enormous demands will be put upon the negotiators. Nonetheless, the negotiators can and should proceed.

They need not be rushed, however, by currently prevalent alarmism. Even sophisticated observers mislead us. Thus former Director of the Bureau of the Budget Charles Schultz frets about what the Soviets "could" fear (1) "if the U.S. deploys MIRVs and if it has the capability to expand its thin ABM system; . . In turn as they introduced MIRVs and a thick ABM, (2) our own forces would have to be expanded; . . For these reasons, a decision (3) to continue with the already-approved MIRV and ABM programs could lead to an unstable situation."[36] On the contrary, a decision *not* to continue with the already approved programs could lead to an unstable situation. We need the MIRV programs to deter Soviet thick ABM deployments. In seeking to divert funds from military to civilian uses, Schultz forgets that our strategic planners have already insured against the emergence of "a Greater-Than-Expected Threat," while imploring the Soviets not to move to such a threat,[37] so that his feared step 2 has already been fully reflected in the calculations before he recounts it. When experts become over-alarmist, it is no wonder that the journalists create hysteria.

Beyond MIRV programs, we need to continue, most of all, with new means of reducing the vulnerability of our retaliatory forces. Technology never stands still. Four years of evidence about large Soviet military outlays under a permissive Brezhnev-Kosygin regime have now made it clear that, in capability terms, we face a more formidable potential enemy than before. Yesterday's survivability measures for our strategic retaliatory forces will no longer be good enough. Moderniza-

[36] Charles Schultz, "Post Vietnam Arms Budget Could Soar," *The Washington Post*, January 12, 1969, E1-2.
[37] Clifford (in Ref. 4), 49-52.

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tion programs are imperative to meet the changing threat, although these need not involve forces expanded in numbers of bombers or missile launchers. Very possibly their aggregate number will decline.

A decline in the aggregate number of bombers and missile launchers, plus mutual restriction to thin rather than thick ABM deployments by the two superpowers, will not satisfy the non-superpowers who protest shrilly against discrimination in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But then, nothing will satisfy the shrillest among them. We need to make it clear that we seek to lessen the pace of actual nuclear proliferation in the world, for which purpose the NPT is but one means among many. To deter proliferation in ways that supplement the NPT, a United States-Soviet agreement at a new plateau of bipolar strategic equilibrium, with mutual MIRVs and thin ABMs, promises also to be effective.

A modest would-be nuclear power, one that aspires to retaliatory capabilities only against minor neighbors, must then weigh the thought that superpower nuclear guarantees to NPT signers level unquestionably credible retaliatory threats at him, because he totally lacks any counter-threat. For the more ambitious "all-azimuth" nuclear powers, retaliatory capabilities against a superpower will now carry a distinctly higher and perhaps prohibitive price tag, as they seek survivability and penetrability against MIRVs and ABMs. As sovereign powers, each will make his own choice. For world stability, incentives will have been tilted in the right direction. In any event, to back our nuclear guarantees, we need appropriate plans and capabilities for "light" retaliation, made more credible by a posture that discourages possible enemies from comparably light attacks against us.

VII. Proposals for General Purpose Forces

Many will find our survey gloomy. Some may also find it chauvinistic, because the rationale for light strategic retaliatory preparedness is put in terms that protect us at all times better than we protect allies. To any who take this view, the American reply should be as emphatic as politeness permits.

Nobody, of course, can with confidence forecast our possible enemies' intentions for a decade or more. Meanwhile, tinder for unintended fires (for example, lack of peace settlements in Central Europe, the Mid-East, Korea, and Southeast Asia) is abundant. Under such circumstances, the moral ideal is collectively supplied defense capabilities whose adequacy permits us to fulfill our commitments, and yet to have a "no-first-use" doctrine for nuclear weapons. No American ad-

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ministration has pressed for such an extreme doctrine. But since the New Look of 1961, we have sought to lessen excessive dependence upon nuclear "first use," and have conspicuously led the way in hard efforts to create conventional alternatives. If those with abundant resources, especially in NATO Central Europe, find their security inadequate, they need look no further for an explanation than to their own obstructionism, inefficiency, and utter failure as governments to generate alternative constructive designs. An American president needs to school himself in patience to meet concurrent complaints from abroad about United States "hegemony" and "lack of leadership." But he need lose no sleep brooding about United States failures to adopt constructive proposals from allied governments.

Our allies, of course, have valid complaints, and one recurring theme in this paper is directly related to them. We need detailed military designs for efficiency, and an effective policy-policing bureaucratic organization to get them. By default, NATO has mostly turned to the United States for its designs, and has good reason to be displeased with some of the results. The grand solution, of course, is a profound reorganization of NATO, so that it could generate good designs with no invidiously nationalistic name-tags pinned to any of them. For the long term, that is surely the preferred solution. But it is too long-term and nebulous for our present purposes, worthy as it remains in its own right.[38]

In simplest terms, in NATO there is little concurrent planning in depth that marries force and financial planning, and that provides compelling incentives and staffing in the search for cost-effective means of performing military tasks. NATO lacks a Ministry of Defense, in short. When NATO Ministers want to discuss ABM issues, for example, they must draw upon national (mainly American) inputs to the Nuclear Planning Group, the most constructively useful of NATO organizational consultative innovations. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, specifically, has a huge operational job in meshing the forces of many nations for possible contingencies. It is understandable that he is inadequately staffed for long-term design of weapon systems and forces.

So, perforce, NATO, and still more our less developed alliances, look to America for design. Our design for armies changes continually of course, but what is striking is the conceptual continuity that spans our New Looks of 1953 and of 1961. The reasons are twofold. First,

[38] See, in particular, Alastair Buchan, "The Reform of NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, 40 (January 1962), 165-182.

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soldiers do and should design armies. The United States Army, like its sister services, is a continuing body whose members preserve an outlook that spans the expected duty-time of several Secretaries of Defense. Further, their profession puts great dependence upon continually renewed conventional combat experience. This experience also yields an understandable stress upon the "effectiveness" that, whatever its other effects, reduces casualties among their troops in performing assigned missions. Though a rude "defense intellectual" might preface his argument for an advanced missile-system design with, "General, I have fought as many nuclear wars as you have," he cannot so defend his army design. Additionally, his perennial difficulty in getting equal emphasis upon the "cost" in cost-effectiveness comparisons of future military designs is here compounded.

Second, the American services under both New Looks have perceived constraints upon their size, expressed in force structure units: numbers of divisions, air wings, attack carriers, and the like. Though urged under the McNamara system to examine all trade-offs between quality and quantity, many officers doubtless feared that proposing a less expensive aircraft as more efficient, for example, might penalize rather than reward them. Their proposal might well be, at a constant budget level, to take the resultant efficiency gains in terms of more aircraft within more air wings. Their fear might be that numerical constraints upon force-size would not, however, be affected at all, in which case both their total budget and aggregate effectiveness would drop. A bureaucratic inclination, in consequence, may be to crowd more expensive equipment within a given number of units ("gold-plating") than is, in a broader perspective, efficient.

How, then, do we move our bureaucracies to consider fully and fairly all the trade-offs that might efficiently yield more combat units, in a manner that will be persuasive to our allies? One answer is for an American Secretary of Defense to send a memorandum, for example, to the Department of the Army somewhat as follows: "Effective X months from today, I order that the Soviet model for army design be adopted as the standard for United States army design, from top to bottom, at least for European contingencies, with a phasing period of no more than Y years in which to accomplish the complete transition. However, this order will be rescinded or modified at any time within X months, if, to my satisfaction, you present more cost-effective designs than the Soviet model. I, expect, of course, that you can and will provide such improved designs. For this planning purpose, you are to assume that current long-term (post-Vietnam) policy guidance for

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combat contingencies remains as now stated, and that budgetary outlays for General Purpose Land Forces will average Z billions of dollars per year for the next decade. My staff and I look forward to continuous consultation about this extremely important matter. In particular, we expect your analysis to provide the professional foundation for United States proposals for NATO ground force redesign, as we invite counter-proposals from our allies."

The Pentagon might be stunned by such a shock treatment. Have not less radical means, however, been exhausted? With the pride of the Army thus stung by a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, its competence would be mobilized and motivated, in all probability, to initiate improved force designs. Much of it they have already done. After eight years of only partly rewarding haggling within NATO about appropriate relative measures for NATO/Warsaw Pact military inputs, we need solid arguments about improved outputs that will persuade European generals. The gravity of the goal—a less dangerous because more efficient theater posture—justifies the bureaucratic friction.

Concurrently, of course, our top policy-makers would be continuously asking whether the capabilities are needed. It is our allies, monitored by an impatient United States Congress, who will ultimately answer this question. We must hope that they will answer after American good faith has been demonstrated anew in the most constructive way. To supply better blueprints for overseas defense is much better than to exhort. To repeat, the blueprints would stress peacetime economies through greater dependence on mobilization and lift capabilities. Hence, they would be compatible with generally prevailing beliefs about the current state of tension, and with such further redeployment of American forces from Europe as could be demonstrated to mesh with the timetable for matching West European mobilization.

The military goal would be to create a posture that, when mobilized, would not be dangerously dependent upon nuclear initiatives. From the bargaining position of such a posture, let us negotiate as much reciprocal arms reduction and inspection in Europe with the Warsaw Pact as we can. The cynics on both sides of the Iron Curtain, of course, will expect to see unilateral reductions in NATO capabilities, unaccompanied by a constructive redesign, and they may well be right. If so, however, let us conduct ourselves so that the onus rests squarely upon European NATO shoulders. Then we shall all save money, with a clearer conscience.

From the New Look of 1969 we can certainly expect great attention to NATO, and much consultation prior to any abrupt action. The

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imminent pressure to cut our long-term General Purpose Forces will relate to Asia. Disillusion with Vietnam has revived the post-Korea "never again a land war on the mainland of Asia" slogan more powerfully than ever: For example, "we should determine our force needs on the basis of more modest plans. These plans would include the capability of meeting simultaneously on short notice a large troop requirement in Europe and a *small* one elsewhere in the world."[39] Such an explicit disavowal of a capability to meet a concurrent major commitment in Asia would clarify matters for our military planners, while virtually repudiating our current commitments, specifically, to South Korea and Thailand on the mainland.

The aspiration for regional self-defense in Asia, as a counterweight to mainland China, is as natural as its counterpart dream for Europe. Regrettably, it is far less feasible. Granted, after Vietnam, any American president should and will be most reluctant to involve American troops in counterinsurgency operations. Yet for long-term United States force planning, capabilities to meet overt invasion in Asia must be explicitly posed as a goal or else rejected. Two questions arise. If we reject this current goal, who will replace the capability? If nobody replaces it, will not the nonexistent capability possibly tempt the Chinese toward less cautious behavior than we have observed? As to replacement capabilities, the skeptics note Asian internal governmental instability, lack of relevant resources, and distrust of one another, rather than any compelling Monnet-like thrust toward effective unity.[40] Surely they are correct in doubting the feasibility of Asian self-replacement of the United States capability, which leaves the second question open.

An explicit repudiation of a capability to fulfill Asian commitments would do more than depreciate the general currency of our pledges elsewhere. Specific Asian domino effects are involved. After a year of doubt about whether the new Australian Government would supply its appropriate link in a chain of related forward defenses in Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand have agreed to maintain military forces in Malaysia and Singapore after the withdrawal of British defenses there in 1971: "A possible American involvement in Canberra's thinking on Southeast Asian defense was strongly hinted by Mr. Gorton. The Prime Minister declared that Australia would seek the support of "outside powers" if a situation arose in which Malaysia and Singa-

[39] Kaysen, 578. Italics added.

[40] See, in particular, Coral Bell, "The Asian Balance of Power: A Comparison with European Precedents," *Adelphi Paper 44*, The Institute for Strategic Studies (London 1968); and Owen Harries, "Should the U.S. Withdraw from Asia?," *Foreign Affairs*, 47 (October 1968), 15-25.

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pore needed help beyond Australia's resources.[41] Here staunch ANZUS allies stand willing to maintain a forward presence that is politically more acceptable than an American presence, and better fitted by relevant experience and specialized skill. Nor need we maintain any sizable peacetime presence in Thailand, for it is not desired by the Thai government, but we do need to maintain only an ability to bring our General Purpose Forces to bear quickly if ever overt invasion occurs or appears clearly imminent. Fortunately, China's capability to invade across formidable geographic obstacles, unlike her capability to defend her own territory, is not large. Furthermore, we can plan flexibly to meet a threat where and if it develops, rather than be rigidly committed to forward defense of extended boundaries at all times. Consequently, the resource demands upon our General Purpose Forces for Asian contingencies can be modest, while our peacetime presence can be unobtrusive.

For post-Vietnam policy, therefore, we argue for a better implemented New Look than that of 1961, but similar to it in emphasizing flexible response and in providing policy guidance for contingencies that our forces, with those of our allies, should be designed to meet. Nothing less seems prudent. For all the pressures upon our resources, such a policy would demand roughly no more than 7 percent of our growing GNP, consistent with continuing modernization of our forces.[42] Perhaps explicit arms control agreements will cut this burden further, as we all desire. Nonetheless, the neo-isolationists may well prevail, but not, we trust, without a struggle with our new administration: "It will be no small thing if America's enemies come to the conclusion that the Americans abandoned a major policy because they could not stand seeing what war looks like on television."[43]

[41] *The New York Times*, February 26, 1969, 4.

[42] Malcolm W. Hoag, "A New Administration Faces National Security Issues: Constraints and Budgetary Options," The RAND Corporation, P-3959 (Santa Monica 1968), 6-22. Published in part in Japan in *The National Defense*, XVIII (April 1969), 51-64.

[43] *The Economist*, December 21, 1968, 12.

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SOVIET INTEREST GROUPS AND THE POLICY PROCESS

The Repeal of Production Education*

By PHILIP D. STEWART

THE role of interest groups in the policy process has long engaged the attention of students of democratic politics.[1] Only recently, however, have Soviet interest groups been studied systematically.[2] This lag can be explained by two facts: the employment of the totalitarian model, emphasizing hierarchical controls and ignoring or denying significant political conflict;[3] and the considerable difficulties of applying group theory to nondemocratic societies.[4]

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[1] The first major work was Arthur Bentley's *The Process of Government* (Bloomington 1949). The original edition was published in 1908. The decades from then to the early 1950's saw the publication of many specialized monographs on interest-group activity. In 1951 David Truman attempted to summarize this empirical work in his theoretical book, *The Governmental Process* (New York 1951). Other significant contributions on American interest-groups include Earl Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics* (Ithaca 1952); Alfred deGrazia, "Interest Group Theory in Political Research," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, cccxix (September 1958), 1104-20. For a review of interest-group literature see H. Zeigler, *Interest Groups in American Society* (Englewood Cliffs 1964). For a stimulating new approach to interest group activity see Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965).

[2] The most important work to date is the forthcoming book by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton 1969). See also Joel Schwartz and William R. Keech, "Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," *The American Political Science Review*, LXII (September 1968) 840-51. Several studies relevant to group politics but utilizing essentially an elite analysis include Jeremy R. Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* (Cambridge, Mass. 1966); Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton, eds., *Soviet Policy-Making* (New York 1967); and Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton 1967). Also note the suggestive contributions by H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 435-51; and Sidney I. Ploss, "Interest Groups," Allen Kassof, ed., *Prospects for Soviet Society* (New York 1968), 76-103.

[3] The standard works employing the totalitarian model include Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Cleveland 1958); Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York 1962); Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass. 1963); Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 2nd ed. (New York 1965); and Carl Friedrich, ed., *Totalitarianism* (New York 1954).

[4] Some of the difficulties in applying group theory to both Western and non-Western

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One consequence of the utilization of a totalitarian model in an era when it no longer adequately accounts for many aspects of the Soviet political process[5] is the marked controversy in the standard texts on the functioning of Soviet interest groups. Differences of interpretation center on 1) the kinds of groupings that exist; 2) the rules of the game governing the articulation of their interests; and 3) the degree of influence groups may have on policy outcomes. Brzezinski and Azrael see policy-relevant groups as forming principally along occupational lines, such as the military, the state bureaucrats, the Party apparatchiki, etc.[6] Meyer, cautioning against any attempt at an *a priori* listing, suggests that interest groups may form around issues, or individual political leaders or bureaucrats, in addition to occupations.[7] Barghoorn, following Leonhard,[8] argues that the major policy groups do *not* form along occupational lines but cut across these to coalesce around issue orientations. They are most usefully identified as "modernizers and conservatives, revisionists and dogmatists."[9] Skilling and Griffiths similarly conclude that groupings most frequently form around issues, but unlike Barghoorn they see a great multiplicity of viewpoints.[10]

These writers appear to divide roughly into two camps when assessing the informal rules governing group activity. All agree that some kind of expression of perceived group interests can and does occur in the Soviet Union. Differences arise over the limits imposed on such activity. One line of interpretation stresses the illegitimacy of group action and the high risks of crossing the line from "advocacy to pressure."[11] The other tends to emphasize the "much greater freedom of discussion" occurring in the past decade, even on "vital" issues. While there is no freedom of speech in the Western sense, open debate leading

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situations as well as general critiques of the theory are presented in the following: Harry Eckstein, "Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups," Harry Eckstein and David Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (New York 1963), 389-97; Joseph LaPalombara, "The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations," *ibid.*, 421-30; Roy C. Macridis, "Groups and Group Theory," *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*, 3rd ed. (Homewood 1968), 234-38. See also the comments by Skilling, "Interest Groups," 435-51.

[5] See the cogent critique by Darrell Hammer, "Towards a Theoretical Model of Non-Competitive Political Systems: Conflict and Decision-Making in the USSR," unpublished paper delivered at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

[6] Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York 1964) chap. 4 but esp. 195-97; Azrael, 9-10.

[7] Alfred G. Meyer, *The Soviet Political System* (New York 1965), 233-37.

[8] Wolfgang Leonhard, *The Kremlin Since Stalin* (New York 1962).

[9] Frederick Barghoorn, *Politics in the USSR* (Boston 1966), 216.

[10] Skilling and Griffiths, chaps. 1 and 2.

[11] Brzezinski and Huntington, 196; Barghoorn, 214-15; and Azrael, 9-10.

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to persistent policy-related pressures on the Communist Party is seen as a normal and accepted feature of Soviet political life.[12]

Assessments of the extent of group influence on policy outcomes are as diverse as those on the rules of the game. Brzezinski, Azrael, and Barghoorn stress the Party's formal monopoly over decision-making and the weakness of interest groups. At the same time they suggest that certain groups, especially those with relatively high institutional cohesion, such as the military, may occasionally act as veto groups, successfully resisting Kremlin pressures.[13] Meyer, while pointing out our serious lack of knowledge of Soviet policy processes, suggests that the interests of a wide variety of groups are considered by Soviet decision-makers. At the same time, he concludes, usually such interests "do not count very heavily."[14] Griffiths, Skilling, and Meissner, by contrast, argue that certain kinds of strategic groupings may indeed count heavily in Soviet decision-making.[15] Accepting fully Brzezinski's view, Schwartz and Keech have suggestively elaborated the conditions under which groups might be influential in Soviet policy-making.[16]

This diversity of interpretation in the literature of Soviet politics suggests the need for further research. Through a close study of group activity related to the repeal of Khrushchev's policy of production education in August, 1964, we make an effort here at empirically clarifying some of our notions of Soviet interest group politics. We will examine three hypotheses.

1) In the arena of educational policy,[17] interest groupings[18] form pri-

[12] Meyer, 114, 187-93; Vernon Aspaturian, "The Soviet Union," Roy Macridis and Robert Ward, eds., *Modern Political Systems: Europe* (Englewood Cliffs 1968), 550-51; Skilling and Griffiths, chaps. 1 and 2.

[13] Huntington and Brzezinski, 196-97; Azrael, 9, 150; Barghoorn, 213-15, 254.

[14] Meyer, 110-11.

[15] Skilling and Griffiths, chaps. 1 and 2; Boris Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change," *Problems of Communism* (November-December 1966), 58.

[16] Schwartz and Keech, 847-51.

[17] For a discussion of the concept of policy arena, or system, as applied to the making of American national education policy see Eugene Eidenberg and Roy D. Morey, *An Act of Congress: The Legislative Process and the Making of Education Policy* (New York 1969), 4-9.

[18] Of special value for this study was the persuasive critical evaluation of traditional notions of "interest groups" by Franklyn Griffiths. Especially relevant for this study are the following elements of Griffiths' analysis: (1) the inappropriateness of focusing on "groups" as reified entities; (2) the essential significance of *action* in the Bentleyian sense as the fundamental datum of the political process; (3) the conceptualization of the group as simply groupings of similar articulations or expectations with respect to a given issue area; and (4) the conceptualization of "group" influence as the communication of expectations (in the form of values, analyses and/or policy recommendations) by individual members of a collective grouping. For detailed argument and analysis, and for a full discussion of the literature from which these notions are derived see Griffiths' chapter in Skilling and Griffiths.

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marily (a) among individuals, and (b) on the basis of similarity of viewpoint on one or more issues. These groupings may be found either within a single bureaucratic structure or cutting across organizational lines.

2) Operating within a broad consensus about the preservation of the system as a whole, interest groupings openly formulate, build public support for, and urge the adoption of their specific proposals by the Party leadership. We hypothesize that these activities—at least within the arena of educational policy—are considered legitimate by both official and nonofficial participants in the policy process.

3) Interest groupings may exercise influence and share power in Soviet policy-making. This hypothesis explicitly rejects the assumption of manipulation of all policy controversy either by a monolithic Kremlin or by various factions of the leadership.[19] Instead it suggests that policy positions may be articulated, groupings of opinion formed, wide support built up, and the adoption of policy proposals urged prior to that point at which the leadership or some faction of it takes any specific action about these activities. We define the operational measure of this "point of entry" as that moment when there is convincing empirical evidence of Presidium (Politburo) activity with respect to the particular actions of the interest grouping under study. If the Presidium initiates and organizes a policy discussion, as in the case described briefly by Schwartz and Keech,[20] the proposals of the mobilized interest groupings doubtless simply reflect various leadership-factions' positions. The interest groupings probably have little influence in these cases except in the sense that their support may increase the political resources of this or that faction of the leadership. At the other end of the hypothetical range of influence, if the leadership enters an ongoing policy discussion only after considerable individual and organizational support has coalesced around the specific proposals of a fairly unified interest grouping(s), then the central policy-makers may find their realistic options very limited. The interest groupings in such cases may share political power in the determination of the final policy outcome.[21] We examine these hypotheses further in the light of the following case study.

[19] This assumption appears to underlie the conclusions regarding interest group influence of the following: Brzezinski and Huntington, chap. 4 but esp. 196-97; Azrael, 9-10; and Barghoorn, chap. 7, but esp. 213-15 and 254. This assumption is also accepted by Schwartz and Keech, 845.

[20] Schwartz and Keech, 840-45.

[21] This formulation expresses in somewhat different form the idea of veto groups noted by Brzezinski and Huntington, 196-97.

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On August 13, 1964, a joint resolution of the Party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers reduced the period of secondary education from three to two years and in effect liquidated Khrushchev's program of production education.[22] Unlike the situation preceding the adoption of this program in 1958[23] there was no officially organized public discussion of this issue. Yet in the two years prior to the repeal of production education a variety of groupings, or "tendencies of articulation" coalesced around a series of issues related to production education. Initially, groupings formed within bureaucratic institutions, including the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, and the RSFSR Council of the National Economy (Sovnarkhoz). Some groupings vigorously advocated raising production training to the status of the highest principle of education. Others took more the cautious position of supporting production education in theory but only as one of many important facets of education, while some advocated the adoption of differentiated education as an alternative policy.

After a period of debate within the Pedagogical Academy, during which issues were clarified and initial policy proposals formulated, each major grouping moved to build support across institutional lines. Advocates of production education found allies within the RSFSR Ministry of Education, among the editors of the Ministry's paper, *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta*, and within some regional pedagogical institutes. Proponents of differentiated education received support among some prominent scientists and educators in the Siberian branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, and somewhat later in *Izvestiya*.

Each side then attempted, apparently, to create a political issue out of their differences of opinion. Each grouping sought to win the support of some leadership faction for its position. The supporters of production education, whose most vocal spokesmen included A. Shibanov and A. Vasil'ev, the vice-director and the director of the Academy's Institute of Production Education, chose the strategy of an extensive attack upon the entire structure of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, and especially upon its alleged lack of sufficient devotion to prob-

[22] *Pravda*, August 13, 1964.

[23] The original law was adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet on December 24, 1958. *Pravda*, December 25, 1958. For a review of the discussion preceding the adoption of this law see Schwartz and Keech, 840-45, and also Richard V. Rapacz, "Polytechnical Education and the New Soviet School Reforms," George Z. F. Bereday and Jaan Pennar, eds., *The Politics of Soviet Education* (New York 1960) 28-44.

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lems of production education.[24] Such attacks had been used previously by others with some success.[25] But this time the criticism failed to arouse much interest, although the editors of *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta* supported it. In fact, the most evident achievement was the creation of an apparent unanimity within the Academy's Presidium *against* the policy of production education.[26]

The opponents of production education did not content themselves with passive rejection of demands for a "trade-school" reorientation of the Academy's research and structure.[27] Within the Academy they actively moved toward the adoption of a resolution supporting the program of differentiated education as the best alternative to production education. On the basis of four years of research on differentiated education in the Institute of General and Polytechnical Education, under the direction of M. A. Mel'nikov, a committee headed by F. D. Skazkin, respected botanist and full member of the Academy, prepared a resolution.[28] The resolution proposed continued research on differentiated education and the adoption by all USSR secondary schools of this system by 1970-72. These recommendations were submitted to the Institute's "scholarly council" (*uchenyi sovet*) on November 2, 1962, and "confirmed" by it late in the year.[29] After further discussion, including several scathing attacks on these proposals by a spokesman for the Ministry of Education,[30] the Presidium of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences in March, 1963, unanimously adopted this resolution as its own policy.

It is noteworthy that the final arguments of the defenders and opponents of production education prior to the adoption of this resolution were published by the government newspaper, *Izvestiya*, but without editorial comment or endorsement of any kind. This suggests that although the central leadership must have been aware of the debate

[24] The review of the events leading to the repeal of production education presented here necessarily only summarizes many important events. A complete study of all of the evidence has been prepared and is available from the author upon request.

[25] The attack by Shibanov and Vasil'ev was carried in the following issues of *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta*: November 24, 1962; December 11, 1962; December 20, 1962; January 10, 22, 24, and 31, 1963; and February 5, 9, 12, and 14, 1963. The editor's summary appeared in *ibid.*, February 26, 1963.

[26] *Ibid.*, December 11, 1962.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] The most complete report on this research is M. A. Mel'nikov, ed., *Svyaz' obucheniia s trudom v srednei shkole i differentsirovannym obucheniem* [The ties of education with labor in the secondary school and differentiated education] (Moscow 1962).

[29] *Izvestiya*, March 2, 1963.

[30] P. Rudnev, *Narodnoe Obrazovanie*, No. 1 (January 1963), 12-22; and *Izvestiya*, February 7, 1963. See also the replies by N. Goncharov, *Sovetskaya Pedagogika*, No. 2 (February 1963), 39-50; and *Izvestiya*, March 2, 1963.

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over production education they did not seek or desire to raise these differences of opinion among educators to the level of a political issue; that is, they did not enter the debate at this point.

Early in the autumn of 1963 another grouping, identifiable only by its institutional organization,[31] the RSFSR Council of the National Economy, apparently on its own initiative and without any observable reference to the groupings and activities described above, became convinced of the inappropriateness of production education because of its high costs.[32] In September 1963, this *Sovnarkhoz* submitted a letter to the Commission on Education of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet outlining proposals for reducing the length of secondary schooling from three to to two years and for concurrently eliminating all but the most basic elements of production training. The Commission agreed with the proposals and recommended their adoption as law.

There is evidence to suggest that by now the central leadership was concerned about this issue, but divided in its attitude toward it.[33] First, contrary to usual practice, a press report on the Commission's meeting was issued.[34] This indicates some kind of central initiative. Second, this report distorted the proceedings in the Commission to give the impression that nothing had happened aside from a general discussion of production education. This, combined with the neutral tone of the report, neither endorsing nor criticizing production education, suggests the lack of a unified position on the issue among the leadership at this time. However, although the publication of *any* report on the Commission's meeting suggests that some faction wished to make the question of production education a public political issue, some other leadership faction, probably led by Khrushchev,[35] sought to limit the scope

[31] At no time when references were made to its positions on this issue was an individual or sub-grouping named in the Soviet press. At all times the reference was to "the RSFSR Council of the National Economy," as a whole. This suggests, as in the case of the actions of the Academy's Presidium, that groupings may, occasionally, form wholly within and act in the name of an official organization. See the text, 17.

[32] This and much of the following data on the RSFSR *Sovnarkhoz's* actions is drawn from an unusually informative source, S. L. Seniavskii, "O perestroike sistemy shkol'nogo obrazovaniia v SSSR (1954-1965 gg.)" [On the reconstruction of the system of school education in the USSR (1954-1965)], Akademiya Nauk SSSR, *Kul'turnaya revoliutsiya v SSSR 1917-1965 gg.* [The cultural revolution in the USSR 1917-1965] (Moscow 1967), 192-93. Seniavskii's data and information are drawn almost entirely from *Tekushchii Arkhiv SNKh RSFSR, 1963* [Current Archives of the RSFSR Council of the National Economy, 1963].

[33] As Schwartz and Keech suggest, this may be an important precondition of group influence on policy-making. Schwartz and Keech, 845-51. See also William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe 1959) 51-55.

[34] *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta*, September 28, 1963.

[35] Between the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 and April 9, 1964, Khrushchev made no public statement on the policy of production education. But the latter statement made

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of public discussion of production education—and for a brief moment succeeded.

Following this initiative by the RSFSR *Sovnarkhoz*, both the supporters and opponents of production education within the Academy took steps to acquire more broadly based support for their proposals. Acting probably with at least implicit support from some leadership faction,[36] *Izvestiya* organized a conference of supporters of differentiated education,[37] ostensibly to assist in defining its position on "the proper content of a secondary education." Evidently feeling that a direct challenge to production education would be ineffective at this time, as the *Sovnarkhoz's* initiative appeared to be, the editors sought other grounds to justify a reduction in the length of secondary education. Since the eleventh year had been added to the curriculum precisely to make time for production education, elimination of that year would necessarily require large-scale alterations in the production-education program.

Although divergent views were expressed in the *Izvestiya* discussion, the main argument used by the editors consisted of the results of re-

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it clear that for him this issue had been settled in 1958. All that remained now was the more complete fulfillment of the law on the schools. *Pravda*, April 9, 1964. Indeed, although many meetings involving the Party apparatus did discuss problems of the implementation of this policy, there was never any hint that it might once again become a political issue. In this light, it appears reasonable to conclude that Khrushchev would attempt to take steps to prevent the question of production education from becoming a political issue again if he perceived the activities of various interest groupings as leading to this result.

[36] The assumption here is that when either of the two most important Soviet papers, *Pravda*, the organ of the Party Central Committee, or *Izvestiya*, the organ of the USSR Council of Ministers, takes an editorial position on questions under discussion it does so ordinarily only in accord with the wishes of some leadership faction. On the other hand, when a less important paper or journal takes such a position this assumption may not hold. *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta*, for example, may take positions reflecting only the opinion of the Minister of Education, or some grouping within the Ministry. But it may also respond to Central pressures. The point here is that this response does not *necessarily* always occur.

[37] *Izvestiya*, October 13, 1963. It is significant that the representative of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences was A. Arsenev, long-time supporter of differentiated education. Among the scientists present was Professor A. G. Marsevich, full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Marsevich, it should be noted, served at this time as Vice-President of the Institute of Soviet-American Relations on whose board sat Nina Khrushchev. Other participants in the conference included A. Kolmogorov, mathematician and Dean of Moscow University's Mechanics and Mathematics Faculty; I. K. Kikoin, prominent physicist; V. A. Kargin, Head of Moscow University's Chair of Physical Chemistry; I. M. Gel'fand, Moscow University mathematics professor; and B. Porshnev, Professor of History and Head of the Modern Western European History section of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History. All of the above, except Arsenev, are either full or corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences. One other participant, A. Leontev, is a psychologist and full member as well as (at that time) Vice-President of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences.

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search by two psychologists, Professors El'konin and Davidov. They concluded that as a result of new teaching methods it was now possible to master four years of primary school in three.[38] Arsenev, writing in *Izvestiya* a week later took the argument further. Revealing that "the idea of a ten-year period of education has been put forth," he stated, speaking for the Academy as a group, "the Academy supports it."[39] However, though completely accepting the validity of El'konin's and Davidov's conclusions on the possibility of beginning systematic education in the fourth grade, Arsenev made it clear that the Academy rejected the idea of moving production education back to the eighth grade. This, he argued, would "lead to the earlier selection of a profession, which would hardly be appropriate."[40] As the supporters of production education had been at pains to point out, and as its opponents intended, this reduction of the period of education clearly implied the elimination from the school curriculum of the teaching of most specific job skills—the very heart of production education. Arsenev's formula for the "proper content" of the new program is "differentiated education."

Boldly seeking direct access to the centers of authoritative decision-making—i.e., the Party Presidium—Arsenev now called for the solution of the issues raised with the "maximum scientific effect." Making clear that for him this meant accepting the Academy's proposals as the basis for national educational policy Arsenev called for more systematic, "not episodic as in the past," inclusion of the pedagogic public in educational policy-making.[41]

Although the evidence here as to motivation is less than fully persuasive, it appears that rather than passively awaiting the emergence of a favorable majority coalition within the Party Presidium, the opponents of production education decided upon a dramatic public action that would both demonstrate the widespread support among academic, pedagogic, and some managerial groupings for their proposals and also persuade the central leadership actively to consider their adoption.[42] At any rate, the publication of the proceedings of a conference called by the Estonian Academy of Sciences together with the Estonian *Sovnarkhoz* appears to have had this result. Organized ostensibly to discuss the proposals of the supporters of production education, the con-

[38] *Izvestiya*, October 13, 1963.
[39] *Ibid.*, October 20, 1963.
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] Meyer suggests the possibility of such a strategy when he argues that only a "mighty groundswell of opinion" could force a debate upon the leadership. The actions of the Academy described here appear to be directed toward creating such a groundswell. Meyer, 192.

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ference instead became a major forum for criticism of the production education program, making public the most direct and comprehensive proposals for change to date.[43]

Although formally indicating that "today no one doubts that the reorganization of the schools on the initiative of N. S. Khrushchev, based upon the Leninist principle of unifying education with production labor, has had a positive effect on the Communist upbringing of youth," the key introductory article reporting the proceedings of this conference concluded, "However, production education must be improved." The "improvements" suggested united all the proposals made by the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and the RSFSR *Sovnarkhoz* groupings and included the following:

1. a two-year period of advanced secondary education;
2. the separation of teaching of specific job skills from the school program (i.e., abandonment of production education); and,
3. differentiation of education.

For the first time all of these ideas were now combined into a single proposal and offered to a public audience as a suitable solution to a problem the central leadership had not officially recognized as existing. Moreover, these proposals were *not* made as the opinions of only a few individuals. Rather, interest groupings placed themselves squarely behind the proposals. Introducing the key article, the editor of *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta* stated directly and without qualification that the author expressed "the collective opinion of industrial officials on these questions."[44] While the Estonian Academy of Sciences did not publish any resolution putting its organizational support behind these proposals, nearly every report to the meeting by its members provided at least general and often direct support to them.[45] When the support expressed here is added to the known positions of the anti-production-education groupings within the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, the RSFSR *Sovnarkhoz*, and the Commission on Education of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, this coalescing of opinion around a specific set of policy proposals must have been looked upon by at least some of the Presidium members as a force that could no longer be ignored or easily repressed.

It was at about this stage that the Party Presidium, in fact, appears

[43] *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta*, November 28, 1963.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] *Ibid.* See particularly the reports by A. Khumal, Vice-President of the Estonian Academy of Sciences; A. Potberg, Assistant Chief of the Estonian Ministry of Education, Administration for Schools; Kh. Khaberman, Academician and Director of the Institute of Zoology and Botany; F. Klement, Rector of Tartu University; and V. Maamiadi, Director of the Academy's Institute of History.

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actively to have entered this policy debate. Differences of opinion among various public interest groupings now became political issues as various factions within the Presidium sought either to bring about an authoritative change in the policy of production education or to prevent this from occurring. Both the fact and the intensity of these conflicts is confirmed by a careful analysis of the press. A brief review here of this evidence will indicate that although the supporters of production education had been strong enough to prevent the RSFSR *Sovnarkhoz*'s proposals from being publicly expressed in the autumn of 1963, by late November they were already on the defensive. This defensiveness continued to increase until April 1964, when Khrushchev announced that the proposals of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and others would now be considered.

The first important act of the opponents of production education within the Presidium was securing the publication of the proposals of the Estonian conference.[46] Prior to the publication of these materials, *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta* had consistently supported and given coverage to those who defended production education. This was consistent with the frequently expressed position of Afanasenko, Minister of Education, whose ministry published the paper.[47] Suddenly, with the publication of the Estonian materials, the paper reversed its position on these issues. Barring an unexplained rapid change of mind by Afanasenko, this action is understandable only in terms of successful intervention in the paper's editorial policy by a Presidium faction favoring repeal of production education. This action under these circumstances suggests that the pro-repeal Presidium faction must at this time have possessed considerable political strength relative to that of the supporters of production education. This line of reasoning tends to be substantiated by other evidence.

[46] *Ibid.* In fact, a more important act may have been organizing the Estonian meeting itself, but there is no good evidence to suggest that this involved any Presidium faction.

[47] Interesting evidence on the relationship between Khrushchev and Afanasenko on this issue is provided by the following sequence of events. On March 19, 1964, Afanasenko inserted a strong plea for the retention of Khrushchev's program of production education into a speech on a quite different subject—speeding up the development of the chemical industry. On April 9, the same day that a major speech by Khrushchev urging retention of production education was published, it was announced that Afanasenko had been awarded the Red Banner of Labor. Although it was ostensibly awarded in connection with his 50th birthday, the actual decision to make such an award is nearly always based upon political service. One week later, Afanasenko personally signed a lead editorial in *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta* supporting production education in the strongest terms, citing Khrushchev by name twelve times and insisting upon the maintenance of production education as the basis of all education. See *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta*, March 19, 1964; April 9 and 16, 1964.

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In late December and early January, the editors of *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta* returned to the issue of production education.[48] Both editorials indicated complete support for production education, but both were aggressively defensive in tone; the second even more than the first. The first, for example, praised the 1958 education reform—and especially production education—as one of the "decisive" achievements of the decade, while completely ignoring even the usually accepted criticisms of the program. The second editorial went even further. In marked contrast to the report on the Estonian conference, the editor now argued that the policy of production education:

1) consisted *primarily* in training youths in *concrete* professions in secondary school;

2) was now an "immutable law," initiated by the Central Committee and Khrushchev personally, and adopted by the Supreme Soviet; and

3) had become the "leading basis" of the "educational and moral training process in the secondary schools."[49]

Although the supporters of production education again made the public pronouncements, the defensive tone of these statements indicates that considerable maneuvering must have been occurring within the Presidium. This group must have felt under increasing pressure to acquiesce to the demands of those opposing production education. In fact, within another month the latter faction was again powerful enough to have the most thoroughly critical attack yet on production education published on the front page of *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta*. This time the form of the opposing coalition was clear. Evidently in order to separate his views from those of the editor-in-chief, the paper's vice-editor signed the article—an unusual move.[50] The opponents of production education had won over the vice-editor; its supporters spoke through the editor.

By February 6, 1964, the Presidium faction opposing production education had evidently convinced their opponents that they would at least have to consider the possibility of a change in the law on the schools. Between this date and April 16, 1964, both Khrushchev[51] and Afanasenko[52] made several public pleas for the retention of production education, even linking their opponents to the Stalin cult, but it is sig-

[48] *Ibid.*, December 24, 1963, and January 7, 1964.
[49] *Ibid.*, January 7, 1964.
[50] *Ibid.*, February 6, 1964.
[51] *Ibid.*, April 9, 1964. It is indicative of the seriousness with which Khrushchev viewed this situation that he devoted an entire speech to the subject while on a tour of Hungary.
[52] *Ibid.*, March 19, 1964, and April 16, 1964.

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nificant that not even those within the Academy who had earlier supported Khrushchev came forward now. Indeed, as stated by Kairov, President of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, the question now was not so much *when* production education would be repealed, but what curriculum changes would accompany the repeal.[53]

Between April and August, the issue of production education was the subject of some apparently hard bargaining among the central leadership and the relevant interest groupings. According to Afanasenko, RSFSR Minister of Education, the preparation of a basic proposal on this issue for submission to the Presidium was delegated to a special commission made up of representatives of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and the Ministry of Education, working under the direction of the Party Central Committee.[54] Afanasenko further indicated that after three months of bargaining the supporters of production education had conceded two major points: a) the policy had a detrimental effect on training students in the hard sciences, and b) the extra year added for production education "had not fully justified itself."[55]

Another month was required before final agreement could be reached on the details of the repeal of production education. On August 13, 1964, the press announced a joint resolution of the Party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers reducing the period of secondary education from three to two years.[56] By this decision the hours devoted to production training were cut in half, with most of those remaining spent learning the principles of production rather than specific trades. Henceforth the primary function of the secondary school would be to provide a broad general education; training in specific job skills resumed its secondary, pre-1958 role.

II

This case study has indicated that diverse opinions existed on the issue of production education. What is not yet clear is whether, or to what extent, these constituted interest groups. According to Truman the essential features of groups are (1) the existence of certain "shared attitudes" plus (2) a certain degree of interaction among the members of a group.[57] This second requirement appears crucial for his concept since he argues that the observable uniformities of claim-making behavior emerge from such interaction. Analytically at least, for Truman it is interactions among its members that constitute the group in poli-

[53] *Ibid.*, March 31, 1964.
[54] *Ibid.*, July 16, 1964.
[55] *Ibid.*
[56] *Ibid.*, August 13, 1964.
[57] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York 1955), 23-26.

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tics.[58] The difficulty with this concept for the study of Soviet interest-group activity is the excessive demands it makes upon evidence.[59] In the Soviet case we cannot demonstrate the interaction within groups that Truman's concept depends upon.[60]

What we can show, however, is expressions of diverse opinions about policy by individuals, organizations, and other formal and informal groupings. Now, if we accept the Bentleyan notion of *actions* as the essential data of politics, and see policy as the result of series of transactions among multiple layers of participants—i.e., a transactional model of political behavior[61]—as proposed in a recent work by Franklyn Griffiths,[62] it becomes possible to keep the analysis within the limits of the data and still draw some meaningful conclusions.

We regard the significant activities described in this study as the expressions of opinion about public policy, including both evaluations and recommendations. When similar opinions on the same issue are expressed by more than one individual, this is called, for analytic purposes, a "grouping." Since mutual dependence of the participants is often difficult to demonstrate, "grouping" is preferable to "group."[63] These groupings may be of two types, depending upon the direction of their activity. "Opinion-groupings" are those whose activities are directed toward persons who are not authoritative decision-makers in the issue-area concerned. These actions are intended primarily to clarify positions, counter the activities of other groupings, or gain more supporters. "Political interest-groupings" exist when the information communicated by an opinion-grouping is received by the relevant official decision-makers.[64] It is in this sense that we understand political interest-groups to exist in the Soviet Union.

[58] *Ibid.*, 160.

[59] Macridis makes this point with reference to any non-American situation. Roy C. Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Politics*, XXIII (March 1961), 31.

[60] We do not intend here to present a critique of this theory, however. See Skilling and Griffiths, chap. 2, and the literature cited therein for the most comprehensive critique of traditional interest group concepts in terms of their suitability for Soviet studies.

[61] Bauer, Pool, and Dexter comment that at least for the making of foreign-trade policy, "The appropriate general model is not one of linear causality, but a transactional one which views all the actors in a situation as exerting continuous influence on each other—with all the actors in to some extent a situation of mutual influence and interdependence." Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York 1963), 456-60.

[62] Skilling and Griffiths, chap. 2.

[63] See Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York 1965), 283-85 and Odd Ramsöy, *Social Groups as System and Sub-System* (New York 1963), 16-17.

[64] See Heinz Eulau, "Rationality in Unanimous Decision-Making," Carl Friedrich, ed., *Rational Decision* (New York 1963), 38.

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This case study appears to provide some confirmation about the kinds of interest-groupings found in the Soviet Union for both the first hypothesis suggested in the introduction and for the views of many scholars cited, at least at a fairly high level of generality.

The activities of the Presidium of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, the RSFSR Council of the National Economy, the Estonian *Sovnarkhoz*, the Estonian Academy of Sciences in opposition to production education and of the RSFSR Ministry of Education, and the Institute of Production Education in support of this program suggest three conclusions about the relation between formal institutions and Soviet interest groupings. First, interest groupings may form within formal institutions. But, the case of Shibanov and Vasil'ev indicates that opposing tendencies may, and are indeed likely to, be found within any given institution.[65] Second, interest groupings may make use of formal institutions to further their policy objectives. The Academy Presidium's resolution, the letter of the RSFSR *Sovnarkhoz*, the recommendation of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Education are all examples of this. Third, the resolutions and actions of institutions are more important in determining policy-outcomes than the actions of individuals alone. The actions drawing strongest criticism from the supporters of production education were precisely those indicated in point 2 above. The most critical event in creating a political issue out of this discussion was the organizational support expressed at the Estonian Academy of Sciences meeting.

Individuals assume importance in Soviet interest-groupings in two ways: as leaders and as supporters. Unlike the situation in Western countries,[66] those who emerge as "leaders" of an opinion-grouping appear frequently not to hold official positions of leadership in their own institutions. The leading spokesmen for those opposed to production education—those who formulated most of the proposals and took the public initiative—included Goncharov, a vice-president of the Academy and editor of its principal journal, *Sovetskaya Pedagogika*; Mel'nikov, a distinguished researcher within the Academy; and Arsenev, Director of the Institute of General and Polytechnical Education. While certainly "prominent" people, they occupied middle-level positions of leadership within their institution. The same can be said of the supporters of production education. Their spokesmen included Shibanov, the Vice-Director of the Institute of Production Education, within

[65] This tends to be confirmed by other studies. See, for example, Juviler and Morton. The same appears to hold true for any occupational group.

[66] Truman, 139-55.

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the Academy, and a certain Rudnev, identifiable only as a Ministry official.[67] Both Kairov, the President of the Academy and Afanasenko, Minister of Education, took active parts only after the issue had become a political one. Even then their roles were more supportive than leading.

The necessity for analyzing individual activity is emphasized by the finding here that opinion- and interest-grouping supporters came from within not only the leading institutions involved in the issue but from a wide variety of institutional settings. Support for one or another position often was expressed by individuals as their own opinion and not that of any institution. Several members of both the Moscow and the Siberian branches of the USSR Academy of Sciences expressed individual support for differentiated education. Frequently, it is worth noting, this support was not accompanied by any explicit stand on the question of production education.[68] Individual teachers and directors at regional pedagogical institutes were the most active supporters of production education.

Both institutions and individuals are important to Soviet interest groupings, but the question still remains as to just when do they cease being institutions and individuals and become something usefully called opinion or interest groupings? The concepts of "issue" and "activity" are of critical significance here.[69] Opinion or interest groupings exist in the Soviet context as analytic constructs, not as concrete organizations. Opinion groupings exist when two or more persons within one or more institutions publicly express similar opinions about any given value or values that the regime allocates for the society as a whole.[70] Expression of similar opinions may occur simultaneously or sequentially, without knowledge of the opinions of others or as the result of influence. That is, interaction need not occur, but frequently may occur, as in the present case. The requirement for "public" expression is related to the transactional model of politics utilized here. Communication of an opinion on a public issue through public media is the essential *activity* of opinion groupings.[71] It is precisely this activity

[67] Although Rudnev wrote the important attacks on differentiated education in the Ministry's journal and in the press, his position is nowhere identified, suggesting this may be a pseudonym for some Ministry official. His major articles on the subject are the following: P. Rudnev, *Narodnoe Obrazovanie*, No. 1 (January 1963), 12-22; *ibid.*, No. 7 (July 1963), 22-33; and *Izvestiya*, February 7, 1963.

[68] See, for instance, the articles by M. Lavren'tev, Chairman of the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and by Academician S. L. Sobolev, a leading Soviet mathematician. *Pravda*, October 18, 1960; *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, June 26, 1962.

[69] Skilling and Griffiths, chap. 2 and the literature cited therein.

[70] *Ibid.*

[71] Karl Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York 1963), 146 and 208.

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that constitutes the grouping and distinguishes it from an institution or collection of individuals.[72] The Presidium of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences became an opinion grouping over the issue of production education when it communicated its position through adoption of a resolution that it then published. It became an interest grouping once the central leadership actively intervened in this issue area—that is, when the authoritative decision-makers had received its communication. The significance and "being" of an opinion or interest grouping consists of the sum total of its activities *relevant* to an issue.[73]

This analysis, then, suggests that the first hypothesis validly emphasizes the significance of individuals, and appropriately stresses that groupings may form within one or across many institutions. What requires more emphasis is the importance of *activity* with respect to issues as the essential feature of Soviet opinion and interest groupings.

The second hypothesis suggests that a wide range of activities related to issues is considered legitimate in the Soviet context. The most relevant informal norms of behavior governing such activities are those concerning the context, the scope, the arena, and the techniques of opinion- and interest-grouping activity. These norms, discernible primarily by observing the kinds of activities not followed by negative sanctions, identify the range of legitimate political activity.[74]

The most important contextual norm governs the locus of authoritative decision-making. All interest groupings appear to accept—at least none openly challenges—the legitimacy of the monopoly of national policy-making by the higher organs of the Party. The most common manifestation of acceptance is the frequent professions of loyalty to the regime by all participants in policy debates.[75] Complementary to this norm, and appearing completely to rule out interest-group activity as it is usually understood in the West, is the *official* illegitimacy of any grouping or faction within the Party.[76] While this rule certainly does limit the formation of organized interest groups, few would suggest that it has prevented loose interest groupings from engaging in political activity. Rather than making all unauthorized political ac-

[72] Skilling and Griffiths, chap. 2.

[73] Azrael appears to come close to accepting this image of Soviet interest groups. Azrael, 9.

[74] Truman, chap. 16.

[75] Skilling and Griffiths, chap. 1, and Aspaturian, 551, both make this point.

[76] *KPSS v rezoliutsiykh i resheniyakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK chast' I 1894-1924* [The CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences, and Central Committee plenums, part I 1894-1924] (Moscow 1954), 527-29. See also Barghoorn, 56-57.

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tivity illegitimate[77] this rule appears, in practice, to require only that all political activity by informal groupings be framed within the context of general acceptance of the goals of the Party. Within this context there exists a varying range of legitimate political activity.

This scope of acceptable activity doubtless varies with issue-area, but at least in respect to education it appears rather broad. Schwartz, following Brzezinski, argues that the Party is still generally unwilling to allow criticism of policy but that it encourages discussion of performance.[78] Meyer, in contrast, sees open debate on many "vital" issues of public policy.[79] Criticisms of Khrushchev's policy of production education were clearly implied by many and directly stated by some of the participants in this case. To the extent that the issue of production education was "vital"—and many of the participants seem to have perceived it as vital—this case tends to support Meyer more than Schwartz or Brzezinski. Moreover, since no serious threats or sanctions against any of the participants were observed, it appears that the activities of these groupings, irrespective of the serious differences over policy expressed, were considered legitimate. The important criticisms of policy observed in other issue-areas indicates that this finding is probably of fairly general significance.[80]

Although recognizing this considerable latitude for discussion, Meyer argues that the arena of policy-making is still limited to the Party. "All stages of policy formation," he states, "take place within the framework of the Party."[81] The Party, he suggests, is the agency that formulates "programs and platforms, ideological positions and policies." This study suggests that this position has some validity, but it is incomplete. Though the Party did formulate and seek to carry out its own policies, interest groupings *also* formulated programs and platforms; and suggested policies quite at variance to those of the Party. Prior to the entry of the Party leadership into the discussion, various interest groupings criticized established Party policy, formulated specific alternatives, built public support behind them, and then attempted to pressure the regime into accepting them. The Party was of course necessary to this process; it had established the general context of the discussion by its previous policies and it still was the only agency capable of authoritatively changing official policy. Only in the vague sense that most participants in

[77] See Azrael, 9.
[78] Schwartz and Keech, 846-47.
[79] Meyer, 188-193.
[80] See the exhaustive listing of relevant literature cited by Griffiths in Skilling and Griffiths, chap. 2, n. 22.
[81] Meyer, 110.

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policy discussions are probably Party members is the policy arena limited to the Party. More realistically, the policy arena is seen here as broader than the Party; it includes the relevant interest groupings as well. The norms of Soviet policy-making do not exclude interest groupings from all stages of the policy process.

Although in the case study, we have described the techniques of interest-grouping activity, it may be useful to summarize here those that appear to lie within the range of legitimate political behavior.

(a) Within the limitations set by the context, scope, and arena of policy-making, formal organizations may adopt resolutions having as their goal changes in national policy.

(b) Individuals and groupings may publicly *solicit* support for alternative policy proposals from other individuals, institutions, or groupings.

(c) Either as private citizens or in their official capacities, individuals, institutions, and groupings may demonstrate publicly their support for proposals initiated or formulated by others.

(d) The printed media (newspapers, scholarly journals, etc.) may provide forums for this range of activity.

(e) Individuals and groupings may seek to participate at the stage of authoritative decision-making in the issue-area of interest to themselves.

This analysis of the norms governing political activity tends to support the second hypothesis of this study—that there exists a wide range of legitimate political activity in which Soviet interest groupings can and do engage. It remains now to assess the extent to which this activity can lead to influence on authoritative outcomes and the sharing of political power.

Assessing influence and power in any political setting is a complex and difficult undertaking.[82] The relatively high degree of secrecy in Soviet policy-making further complicates this problem and doubtless accounts for much of the controversy over this issue. Analysis of the data presented in this study in terms of an explicitly defined set of concepts may add some small bit of clarity to this question.

Following Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson, we define political influence as the recognition given the actions—positions, proposals, etc.—of one political participant by another or by others.[83] The act of political

[82] See the comments by Dahl in Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs 1963) 40-53.

[83] Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, *The Rulers and the Ruled: Political Power and Impotence in American Communities* (New York 1964), 51. The argument in this section is based upon this source.

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influence consists of the communication of a policy position, proposal, or attitude, by one individual, institution, or grouping and its receipt by another. Influence may range from strongly negative, where the recipient becomes openly hostile to the initial communicator, through neutral, where the effect of the message is neutralized by other messages, to positive, where the recipient is motivated by the communication to respond favorably to the message. Political influence in this sense was exercised by most of the participants in this case. But political influence is not the same as political power. Influence occurs at all stages of the policy process, whenever one individual grants political recognition to the views of another, irrespective of policy-outcomes. Political power is a measure of the sum of contributions at the stage where policy-outcomes are decided.[84] As such, political power is shared by a collectivity. The analytic question here, then, is to what extent did any of the interest groupings share power with the Party Presidium in the repeal of production education?

Sharing political power depends first of all on access to the locus of authoritative decision-making. The central meaning of access is responsiveness of official policy-makers to outsiders.[85] Competition among elites and relatively open channels of communication are essential for responsiveness.[86] Where these features are lacking, the predominant direction of influence is most probably from the policy-makers to other participants. That is, manipulation of nonofficial participants by official leaders is most likely to predominate.

Now, as the "conflict school" has convincingly argued, competition among elites has been a major feature of post-Stalin politics.[87] Earlier in this paper we have suggested that this competition has been accompanied by a significant broadening of legitimate political expression.[88] This reasoning tends, then, to strengthen the presumption against manipulation of all Soviet interest-grouping behavior. The appropriate conditions now exist for the sharing of political power by Soviet interest groupings. But to what extent did this occur here?

The case study suggested the existence within the Party leadership

[84] *Ibid.*, 51, 56.

[85] Kornhauser, 59. Kornhauser talks of responsiveness of elite to nonelite. See also Truman, 264-70.

[86] *Ibid.*, 55.

[87] Two recent examples are Carl Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership* (Baltimore 1966), and Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin* (New York 1969).

[88] Schwartz and Keech make this same point in their elaboration of the conditions under which the leadership might be responsive to interest-group activity. Schwartz and Keech, 847-51.

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of at least two groupings on this issue. Until the autumn of 1963, both appear to have ignored the activities of the opinion groupings. In this way, access to the Presidium was denied; production education was not yet a political issue. Then, in October, one group, apparently led by Khrushchev, appears to have "entered" this debate in order to prevent an accurate report from being published on the resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Education. At this stage the opponents of production education influenced the political decision-makers, but only negatively. By November, another Presidium grouping appears to have actively entered this debate through facilitating the organization and publication of the Estonian meeting. While the question of who was using whom cannot be satisfactorily answered, the important point is that interest groupings had formulated their proposals, built support for them, and advocated their adoption long before the entry of the Presidium. By our definition the Presidium groupings for whatever reasons, accorded recognition to the views of the political interest groupings. That is, the latter exercised political influence over the former. But this does not yet mean that the interest groups shared power in the final decision.

Now, political power is here conceived to be shared by all those who have communicated policy preferences to policy-makers and who are to some small degree satisfied with the policy-outcome.[89] Taken literally, the statement by one of the strongest supporters of production education, Afanasenko, that "there is no doubt that this decision [repealing production education] will be accepted by everyone with satisfaction,"[90] suggests that all those who communicated their views, pro or con, to the Presidium shared political power in this decision. Somewhat more realistically, those groupings within the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and the RSFSR *Sovnarkhoz* and their supporters who opposed production education can be said to have shared political power with the Presidium in this policy-outcome. Even if we insist upon the narrower conception that only the actual participants in the formulation of the final authoritative decision can exercise political power, then according to Afanasenko, both the Academy and the Ministry of Education shared power with the Presidium and the Secretariat.

An important objection to this reasoning is the argument that even when interest-group representatives participate in authoritative decision-making they do so only as expert consultants, not as spokesmen for a grouping or as advocates of a special point of view. Under these con-

[89] Agger and others, 51, 62.
[90] *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta*, August 13, 1964.

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ditions, it is contended, interest groupings cannot really be said to share political power.[91] In view of the rather extended period over which the opponents of production education openly and heatedly advocated policy changes, and of their moves to pressure the regime into listening to them, they cannot be seen as participating in the stage of authoritative policy-making other than as spokesmen for specific interest groupings.

This case study, then, tends to confirm the third hypothesis—that Soviet interest groupings can and do exercise influence and share political power in the Soviet policy process.

[91] Brzezinski and Huntington, 196; Schwartz and Keech, 840-45. Others argue the contrary. Skilling and Griffiths, chap. 1; Barghoorn, 213-14.

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ETHNOLOGY AND THE PEACE OF SOUTH ASIA

By WALKER CONNOR

I

THE distribution of ethnic groups throughout South Asia constitutes the region's single most significant strategic factor. Other factors, varying in importance according to specific location and time, do, of course, interact with the ethnic factor. Thus, the topographic, political, economic, and transportation maps all contribute essential elements to our knowledge of the region. Nevertheless, the settlement pattern of distinct culture-groups, as defined by the language and dialect maps, is clearly the most critical of all tangible phenomena. Whether investigating the internal stability of any or all of the region's states, the possible realignment of alliances and counter-alliances, susceptibility to Communist blandishments, the potentiality for guerrilla warfare and/or "national wars of liberation," or the direction that long-range United States policy toward the region should take, in each instance the distribution of ethnic groups will prove to be a fundamental element.

The great pertinence of ethnology to an understanding of political developments is not confined to South Asia. The growing tendency of peoples to think primarily in terms of the ethnic group and to demand separate political status for that group is global in scope, and is currently challenging the existing political division of Africa, Europe, and the Americas, as well as Asia.[1] Nevertheless, there are a number of elements that combine in the case of South Asia to magnify the effect of ethnic distribution.

II

The first of these elements is the particularly complex and asymmetrical character of the South Asian ethnic map.[2] Four subfactors are particularly noteworthy. First, as indicated in the following table, each of the states to the south and southwest of China, from the Vietnams in the east to Afghanistan in the west, contains a number of ethnic groups. Second, and this underlines the need to employ such statistics only in conjunction with an ethnic map, the minorities are usually

[1] See Walker Connor, "Self-Determination: The New Phase," *World Politics*, XX (October 1967), 30-53.

[2] See map, pp. 52-53.

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

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ETHNOLINGUISTIC COMPOSITION OF SOUTH ASIAN STATES

State (Estimated Population in Parentheses)	Ethnolinguistic Groups by Percentage of Population		*State* (Estimated Population in Parentheses)	Ethnolinguistic Groups by Percentage of Population	
Afghanistan (16 million)	Pushtun	60	Nepal (10 million)	Pahari—Nepali	49
	Tajik	30		Tarai	24
	Uzbek	5		Tamang	6
	Hazara	3		Newar	5
	Turkoman	1		Tharu	4
				Magar	3
Burma (25 million)	Burman	75		Rai	3
	Karen	12		Gurung	2
	Shan	6		Limbu	2
	Indian-Pakistani*	3		Bhote	1
	Chinese	1			
	Kachin	1	Pakistan (105 million)	Bengali	55
	Chin	1		Punjabi	28
				Urdu	7
Cambodia (6 million)	Khmer	85		Pushtun	7
	Chinese	6		Sindhi	6
	Vietnamese	5			
	Cham	1	Singapore (2 million)	Chinese	75
	Mon-Khmer Tribes	1		Malay	14
				Indian-Pakistani*	8
India (483 million)	Hindi—including Hindustani	33	Thailand (32 million)	Thai	60
	Telugu	9		Lao	25
	Bengali	8		Chinese	10
	Marathi	8		Malay	3
	Tamil	7		Khmer	1
	Gujarati	5			
	Kannada	4	Vietnam, North (19 million)	Vietnamese	85
	Malayalam	4		Tho	3
	Oriya	4		Muong	2
	Rajasthani	3		Tai	2
	Punjabi	2		Nung	2
	Assamese	1		Chinese	1
	Kashmiri	1		Meo	1
				Yao	1
Laos (3 million)	Lao	67			
	Mon-Khmer Tribes	19	Vietnam, South (17 million)	Vietnamese	87
	Tai—other than Lao	5		Chinese	5
	Meo	4		Khmer	3
	Chinese	3		Mountain Cham Tribes	3
				Mon-Khmer Tribes	1
West (Mainland) Malaysia (8 million)	Malay	49			
	Chinese	36			
	Tamil	11			

* Otherwise undifferentiated.

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much more strategically significant than their numbers would indicate. For example, although there is a dominant group comprising a majority within Burma and Laos, in each instance more than half of the state's territory is populated by minorities. In both North and South Vietnam, the ethnic Vietnamese constitute more than 85 percent of the population, but are concentrated in less than 30 percent of the territory. The third subfactor, adding still further to the significance of the minorities in South Asia is that, with very few exceptions, it is the minorities and not the dominant group who populate the border regions. This is equally true of the entire southern border region within China. Moreover, even in those few cases where the majority group does populate a sector of the border region, there is little likelihood that the border will signify the outer territorial limit of that people. Indeed, along the thousands of miles of land-border that divide sovereignty among the twelve states (including China, excluding Singapore), it is a rarity to encounter a stretch of even a few miles in which the border does not bisect an ethnic group. Consequently, in those few instances where a border area is populated by the state's dominant ethnic group, as on the Cambodian side of the Thai-Cambodian border, the geographic continuation of that same people across the border gives rise to an irredenta minority within the adjoining state. A fourth and final characteristic that makes the ethnic distribution of South Asia particularly pernicious is its crazy-quilt quality. Rather than inhabiting a single, contiguous region, many ethnic groups are separated into a number of widely spread, tiny enclaves. This phenomenon greatly increases inter-ethnic contacts, thereby increasing political complexity.

The second factor that causes ethnology to have an unusually marked effect upon the politics of the area is the comparatively high level of cultural consciousness of many of the diverse peoples. This is significant because cultural consciousness is a prerequisite of political consciousness. That is to say, awareness that one's own culture is distinctive leads to the "us-them" syndrome that, in turn, is conducive to a rise in inter-ethnic tensions and a corresponding aversion to being ruled by those deemed aliens. The advanced stages of this development among many of the area's ethnic groups is attested to by a large number of movements demanding greater cultural autonomy as a minimum and complete political separation as a maximum. India, Pakistan, and Burma have been particularly susceptible.

The Indian government has been challenged by a succession of demands on the part of its many linguistic groups and, in general, has

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

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succumbed to the pressures of the major groups for cultural autonomy.[3] Although these concessions have thus far preserved Indian unity, Kashmiri agitation in the northwest and armed independence movements by the Mizos and Nagas in the northeast, offer ominous evidence of the intensity of ethnic convictions and the warning that cultural autonomy may prove only a temporary palliative.

Pakistan's multi-ethnic structure is even more shaky. There is an in-

[3] For an article describing the most recent concession, the creation of a new "autonomous state" within Assam, see the *New York Times*, September 12, 1968.

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creasingly articulate desire for separation from the union within East Pakistan, whose people share no cultural attribute, other than Islam, with the people of West Pakistan. West Pakistan has itself been challenged in the recent past by separatist movements on the part of the Pushtu-speaking people along the Afghan border.

Of all South Asian states, Burma is probably the most threatened by secessionist ethnic movements. The two major minority groups, the Karens and Shans, as well as the Kachins, Chins, and Mons, are offering armed resistance to Burmese rule. Effective control by the government is essentially limited to the area populated by Burmese.

Other peoples have also furnished evidence of a significant measure of ethnic-political awareness. Thus, within Thailand, the Malay people of the southernmost sector, the Khmers of the southeast, the Lao-speaking people of the northeast, and the hill tribesmen of the north have all displayed resistance to Thai rule. So, too, the diverse mountain peoples of the cordillera, which protrudes through much of Laos, the Vietnams, and Cambodia, have long manifested dissatisfaction with political domination by the Laotians, Vietnamese, and Khmers. One manifestation of this attitude on the part of tribesmen within South Vietnam is the creation of a rudimentary framework for an intertribal resistance organization known as FULRO, a French acronym for United Forces for the Struggle for the Oppressed Races.

As in other segments of the globe, these ethnic movements in South Asia are self-generating, and would therefore exist, and could be expected to grow, even in the absence of outside support. But this conclusion need not rule out an important catalytic role for outside interests. In such a polygenetic and polyglot region, an agent who is fully aware of the emotional attraction and disruptive potential of ethnic aspirations, and who is militantly anti-*status quo*, could, through propaganda and various forms of assistance, kindle the more dormant ethnic nationalisms, fan smoldering nationalisms into full flame, and feed those nationalistic fires already burning. The third element that causes ethnic considerations to be particularly significant in South Asia is the presence of two such catalytic agents, the governments of China and North Vietnam.

There is, of course, much that is philosophically paradoxical in the active support of nationalistic movements by adherents of an internationalist ideology whose old testament was addressed to "workers of the world." Nonetheless, from Marx's time to the present, the principal spokesmen of Marxist-Leninist doctrine (whether purist, revisionist, dogmatist, or deviationist) have exemplified a keen appreciation for the

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divisive potentialities of ethnic attitudes.[4] Particularly in the cases of China and Vietnam, the leadership has manifested a marked proficiency at manipulating ethnic forces for their own ends.

III

Considering the enormous number of Han (Chinese) living within mainland China (well over 700 million), as well as the fact that minorities constitute less than 6 percent of China's people, it may appear odd that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) should place so much stress on ethnic considerations. However, as in other states to which reference has been made, the minorities possess an importance out of all proportion to their numbers because they (1) inhabit more than half the territory and (2) populate most of China's land frontiers. In addition, it should be noted that 6 percent of China's population approximates the total population of states such as Britain, France, or Italy. Moreover, though it is seldom noted in historical accounts of the rise of the CCP, minorities and minority policies played extremely important roles.

The policies the CCP developed toward the minorities represented a quite natural extension of the party's post-1927 strategy for successful revolutionary activity, both with regard to the need for creating base areas and for the actual conduct of revolutionary warfare. It is not surprising that the CCP, or any other revolutionary group operating within a multi-ethnic situation, should ascribe great importance to minorities, since the key element in revolutionary warfare is not tactics, nor terrain, but the attitude of the local people. Although studies of Chinese Communist strategy have tended to emphasize military tactics, there is little that is militarily original in Mao's writing on warfare or

[4] The interwoven history of Marxist-Leninism and ethnic nationalism is too multifaceted to be treated adequately here. However, a partial listing of milestones in this interrelation, not otherwise discussed in this article, would include: (1) Lenin's amazement that Europe's proletariat would fight along national rather than class lines during World War I; (2) his explanatory work of this development, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, in which nation-states (imperialist and colonial) had largely replaced classes as the principal vehicles of history; (3) subsequent to the publication of this work, the key tactical role assigned in propaganda to the negative aspect of African and Asian ethnic consciousness (i.e., "Don't be ruled by the British, French, Belgian, and Dutch [*alien*] imperialists."); (4) Lenin's promises to Russia's minorities, prior to the revolution, that they would be granted the right to determine their future political allegiance; (5) the eventful history of "the nationality problem" within the Soviet Union and within the other multi-ethnic, Communist states such as Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia; and (6) the history of difficulties arising between Moscow and other Communist states, at least in part a reflection of clashing national interests and/or historic national sentiments (such as Romanian dislike of Slavs or traditional Chinese suspicion of Europeans).

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National Autonomous Regions

Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region: Mongols

Kwangsi Autonomous Region: Chuang

Ninghsia Autonomous Region: Mohammedans (Hui)

Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region: I-li (Kazakh), K'e-tzu-le-su (Khalka), Ch'ang-chi (Hui)

Tibetan Autonomous Region: Tibetans

Larger Provincial Minority Autonomous Districts (Chou)

Hainan
South: Li and Miao

Hunan
West: Tuchia and Miao

Kirin
East: (Yen-pien border): Korean

Kweichow
Southeast: Miao, Tung
South: Puyi, Miao

Szechuan
West (Kan-tzu, A-pa areas): Tibetan
South (Liang-shan): Yi

Tsinghai
West (Kuo-lo, Yu-shu): Tibetan
Northwest (Hai-hsi): Mongol, Kazakh, Tibetan
East (Hai-pei, Hai-nan, Huang-nan): Tibetan

Yunnan (Shan)
South: Thai, Chingpo, Hani, Yi
Northwest: Lisu, Tibetan
West: Pai, Thai, Chingpo, Chuang, Miao
Central: Yi

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in the campaigns conducted by the CCP.[5] Tactics, in any event, are flexible and, conceivably, may not determine the outcome of a battle, much less a war. Vastly more significant is the relationship of the revolutionary forces and the local people. The awareness of this order of significance was articulated in 1936 by a leading military figure of the CCP, P'eng Teh-huai. While in command of the First Front Red Army, then locked in combat with Nationalist (KMT) forces, General P'eng forcefully remarked during an interview granted to Edgar Snow:

> Finally, it is absolutely necessary for the partisans to win the support and participation of the peasant masses. If there is no movement of the armed peasantry, in fact, there is no partisan base, and the army cannot exist. Only by implanting itself deeply in the hearts of the people, only by fulfilling the demands of the masses, only by consolidating a base in the peasant Soviets, and only by sheltering in the shadow of the masses, can partisan warfare bring revolutionary victory.
>
> But nothing, absolutely nothing, is more important than this—that the Red Army is a people's army, and has grown because the people helped us . . .
>
> Tactics are important, but we could not exist if the majority of the people did not support us . . .[6]

The "support" to which General P'eng alluded need not manifest itself in positive actions. But whether contemplating the creation of a base area or the actual conduct of revolutionary warfare, the passivity of the local people is the irreducible minimum. If the people do not love you more, they must at least despise you less than they do your enemy. This minimum attitude guarantees (1) that the local people

[5] See, for example, Stuart Schram, *Mao Tse-tung* (Baltimore), 156-57, in which the author notes that "virtually all of Mao's tactical principles are to be found in the classical Chinese writings on the subject, and above all in the maxims of Sun Tzu, the famous military writer who flourished about 500 B.C." Schram, in turn, cites as authority General Samuel Griffith, who translated Sun Tzu.

For an example of emphasizing the importance of topography, see J. L. S. Girling, "Northeast Thailand: Tomorrow's Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVI (January 1968), 393-94. The author feels that the lack of mountainous terrain probably precludes effective revolutionary warfare in Thailand's northeast. However, there are a number of cases in which insurgency has been efficaciously conducted in non-mountainous areas, the Mekong delta being a case in point. Mao himself noted in 1938: "Plains are of course inferior to mountains, but one must not rule out the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare or establishing some sort of base areas on the plains. That guerrilla war can be developed on the plains is proved by the extensive guerrilla war developing on the plains of Hopeh and northern and western Shantung." In "Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War," *Mao Tse-tung, An Anthology of his Writings* (New York 1962), 128.

[6] Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York 1961), 304-05.

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will not violently resist your presence, (2) that they will not furnish information on your movements or otherwise cooperate with your enemy, and (3) that food and other essential needs can be acquired locally without excessive coercion.

Apathy on the part of the indigenous people, then, is the minimum attitude compatible with successful revolutionary warfare. But between this minimum and the maximum of ideological conversion and total commitment, lie great opportunities for various levels of positive cooperation with the revolutionary forces. Common manifestations of such positive cooperation are (1) the furnishing of food and shelter, (2) the provision of intelligence on the enemy,[7] and (3) the offer of porters to carry ammunition and other necessary supplies (porters being almost essential for conducting successful revolutionary warfare in the almost roadless tracts of Asia). In order to achieve this progression from apathy to positive cooperation (and, perhaps, to ideological conversion), programs, such as land reform, which possess great appeal to the mass of the local people were inaugurated by the CCP in occupied areas; and the revolutionary forces were instructed to treat the local people with the utmost circumspection.[8]

Beyond the critical importance of the surrounding people, whether of the majority or minority, there were a number of reasons why the minorities should appear particularly important to the CCP. Two of these reasons were the result of the peripheral location of the non-Chinese peoples. The Communists had withdrawn into the rural hinterlands after 1927. From that vantage point, the minority areas took on a new strategic importance, for to deny them to the KMT was to lessen materially the chance of encirclement. Secondly, once in the hinterland and cut off from the coast, the Communists could hope to receive assistance from the Soviet Union, or any other power, only through minority territory. Moreover, in addition to considerations of location, the well-known lack of enthusiasm with which the minorities viewed Chinese authority offered promising possibilities.

The CCP had good reason to anticipate that the minorities would not cooperate with any movement identified as Chinese, particularly with that of the Nationalists (KMT). The minorities harbored a tradi-

[7] As General P'eng noted in the same interview with Snow: "the partisans, being inseparable from the local mass, have the advantage of superior intelligence, and the greatest use must be made of this. Ideally, every peasant should be on the partisans' intelligence staff, so that it is impossible for the enemy to take a step without the partisans knowing it." Snow, 303. For similar comments by Mao, see Schram, 157-59.

[8] The famous eight rules to be observed by all members of the revolutionary forces in their dealings with the masses are listed in Snow, 176.

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tional dislike of the Chinese, in large part a reflection of the Chinese penchant for treating non-Chinese as cultural inferiors. The KMT's program of political consolidation of all the territory and all of the peoples of imperial China was, therefore, hardly one to elicit minority cooperation. The CCP leaders could expect that the minorities would remain at least coldly neutral, and they indicated their awareness of this strategic asset on a number of occasions when their forces, badly harassed by the KMT, purposefully fell back on non-Chinese areas.[9] Moreover, the minority policies of the CCP were well calculated to turn this strongly established apathy into at least "sympathetic neutrality."

The bait the CCP dangled before the minorities was the right to determine their own political allegiance, including the right to select total independence. In a resolution adopted at the First All-China Congress held in southern China in November, 1931, the CCP noted the existence of the many minorities within China, and then pledged "that the Chinese Soviet Republic categorically and unconditionally recognizes the right of national minorities to self-determination. This means that in districts like Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang, Yunan, Kweichow, and others, where the majority of the population belongs to non-Chinese nationalities, the toiling masses of these nationalities shall have the right to determine for themselves whether they wish to leave the Chinese Soviet Republic and create their own independent state, or whether they wish to join the Union of Soviet Republics, or form an autonomous area inside the Chinese Soviet Republic."[10] The essence of this promise of self-determination was to be repeated to specific nationalities on a number of occasions. Within two years of the original pronouncement on the matter, Mao's forces began their Long March, during which they were to travel thousands of miles through southern, southwestern, western, and, finally, northwestern China. During the overwhelming portion of this two-year journey, the Communists were traversing the territory of various minorities, and they successively communicated the Party's position on self-determination to the major groups encountered.

By the treatment subsequently accorded the Tibetans and others, the CCP has made it evident that such promises to ethnic groups were viewed in much the same manner as was their often repeated promise concerning the private ownership of land by the tillers of the soil, i.e.,

[9] See, for example, Jerome Ch'en, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution* (New York 1967), 176, 190, and 195.

[10] For full text, see Chang Chih-i, *The Party and the National Question*. Translated by George Mosley (Cambridge, Mass. 1966), Appendix B. It was at this Congress that the Chinese Soviet Republic was proclaimed.

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as essentially an expedient that would not survive the building of socialism. Even at the time of making these promises, there is evidence that the leadership never planned to permit political separation. It is instructive, for example, to contrast Mao's public statement and the official pledge of the CCP to the people of Inner Mongolia, both of which were made in December, 1935, with Mao's more private statements concerning the people of Inner and Outer Mongolia that were made just seven months later. The officially declared policy of the CCP was that "we recognize the right of the people of Inner Mongolia to decide all questions pertaining to themselves, for no one has the right to forcefully interfere with the way of life, religious observances, etc., of the Inner Mongolian people. At the same time the people of Inner Mongolia are free to build a system of their own choosing; they are at liberty to develop their own government, unite in a federation with other peoples, or to make themselves entirely separate."[11] A personal greeting by Mao at the same time noted that "we are persuaded that it is only by fighting together with us that the people of Inner Mongolia can preserve the glory of the epoch of Genghis Khan, prevent the extermination of their nation, embark on the path of national revival, and obtain the freedom and independence enjoyed by peoples such as those of Turkey, Poland, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus."[12] Yet in an interview during July 1936, Mao made no mention of a possible separate state for the people of Inner Mongolia, but spoke only of an "autonomous state." Later he added, "When the people's revolution has been victorious in China the Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at their own will. The Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples, likewise will form autonomous republics attached to the China federation."[13] By the expressions, "autonomous states" and "autonomous republics" Mao did not mean independence. Even then employed within the Soviet Union to describe that state's subsidiary political organs, these terms had a precise connotation—cultural autonomy but political subservience. Both Lenin and Stalin had, on numerous occasions, differentiated between self-determination, which to them and therefore to all true Marxist-Leninists included the right of secession, and autonomy, which did not.[14] Mao was unques-

[11] *Ibid.*, 50-51.
[12] Quoted in Schram, 196.
[13] Snow, 96.
[14] Lenin had addressed himself directly to the issue in "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Theses)," written in 1916. He criticized "the reactionary nature of the ideas of Renner and O. Bauer," who contended that self-determination meant "cultural national autonomy," and he insisted that there

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tionably clearly aware of this distinction. Remember that the CCP's 1931 resolution on minorities, which is quoted above, made clear this same distinction between an "independent state" and "an autonomous area inside the Chinese Soviet Republic."[15] As in the case of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, once in power the CCP instituted a minorities' policy of enforced union with "cultural autonomy," and secessionism was branded as "counterrevolutionary." It would appear that the implementation of any other policy had never been seriously contemplated.

Regardless of its sincerity, its minority policy served the CCP well during some of its most trying times, as evidenced by the success of the Long March, most of which, as noted, traversed minority territory. In view of the poorly equipped, ill-fed, tiny fraction who did complete the March, it appears reasonable to conclude that determined indigenous resistance to the CCP's passage, or limited cooperation with the KMT by local peoples, would have proven disastrous.[16] Nor did the importance of the minorities terminate with the establishment of the historic base in Yenan. Continued good relations with the nearby Mongols and Hui (Moslems) were necessary in order to secure the rear and right flanks respectively. Thus, the realization of the minimum goal (the passivity of minority peoples), obtained in part by sporadically declared promises of ethnic self-determination, was an essential element in Mao's survival from 1927 until the evacuation of the Yenan base twenty years later.

What the CCP leaders tried to achieve from the manipulation of ethnic aspirations was not restricted to apathy, however. Having

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could be only one meaning to "self-determination, i.e., the right to free political secession." See V. I. Lenin, *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination. Selected Writings* (New York 1951), 73, 76.

In 1921, Stalin, in an article entitled "New Features of the National Question," sarcastically commented on the mistaken interpretation of self-determination by Kautsky, Springer, and Bauer: "When they spoke of the right of self-determination, the moving spirits of the Second International as a rule never even hinted at the right of political secession—the right of self-determination was at best interpreted to mean the right to autonomy in general." See Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question. Selected Writings and Speeches* (New York 1942), 112.

[15] Considering all this, Mao's coupling of the independent states of Turkey and Poland with the pseudo-independent Ukraine and Caucasus, in his 1935 address to the Mongols, would appear to be a deliberate attempt to confuse independence with autonomy, and seemingly to hold out the right of secession while simultaneously laying the groundwork for the political integration he intended.

[16] The only significant resistance by minorities to the passage of Mao's forces was offered by the Man-tzu in northern Szechwan Province, and this was disorganized. It is also interesting that this people never afforded the CCP an opportunity to explain its policy on minorities. See Snow, 213-14, and Schram, 187-88.

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achieved, by their promise of political independence for minorities, a modicum of good will (or at least a better image than that enjoyed by the KMT), the CCP employed this entering wedge to gain further advantage. Here the leadership had a number of choices with regard to both intermediate goals and techniques. For example, the CCP could deal with a minority as a strategic unit and urge it to declare a war of national liberation against the common KMT enemy. Or it could try to entice members of the minority to join its forces, either as individuals or as tactical units. Second, the CCP could cooperate with the backward ("feudal") leadership, or work with the more progressive ("bourgeois") elite, or limit itself to operating through Communists. Third, it could defer the ideological conversion of the minorities until the revolution was successful, or it could begin indoctrination immediately. In actuality, the CCP's decisions were marked by great flexibility reflecting pragmatic opportunism, for it employed all of these approaches at one time or another. Exact numbers are unattainable, but members of minorities did volunteer to act as porters during the Long March, and others joined the Red Army either as individuals or as units.[17] There were also numerous attempts to have entire minorities declare their independence, thereby declaring civil war with the KMT. In some cases, the attempt to create a secessionist state was taken under the leadership of members of the CCP.[18] But the CCP was not averse to working through the most conservative elements, if such an avenue promised success. In the case of the Moslem Hui, for example, the CCP took advantage of a schismatic struggle by allying itself with the most conservative religious leaders against a modernizing movement which had the support of the KMT-allied, ruling house.[19] The question of the communization of the minority masses was also approached pragmatically. As noted, the basic appeal made by the CCP to the minorities was the potential discarding of an alien political yoke. But the minorities were concurrently urged to overthrow native landlords and other national reactionaries.[20] Thus, ethnic nationalism and communism were linked, but there was a clear recognition on the part

[17] See Snow, 282 and 350, for references to various minority peoples, from both south and north China, who were serving in the Red Army in 1936.

[18] Prior to the Long March, the southern element of the CCP, of which Mao was a part, created a number of soviets (base areas) within minority territory. Another leader, Chang Kuo-T'ao, later created a minority soviet in Szechwan Province, and still later (1935-1937) was to lead the attempt to create independent minority states throughout Tibet, Sinkiang, and Kansu. See Ch'en, 195-97, and Schram, 186-87.

[19] Snow, 343-44.

[20] See, for example, the 1931 resolution on minorities. The key section of the document, promising self-determination, has been quoted above. Elsewhere (Point 3), it calls for the toiling masses of the nationalities to overthrow their national exploiters.

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of the CCP that the greater attraction, the wedge, was nationalism. Political independence was depicted as near at hand; the timetable for broad acceptance of Marxism was left less definite. Wherever possible, the psychological groundwork for conversion was laid, but the pragmatic goal of the revolution's success was to take paramountcy over ideology. Since the Long March occurred primarily in minority territory, both (1) the long-range necessity and inevitability of the ideological conversion of the minorities and (2) the lack of immediate urgency for such a conversion are clearly conveyed by Mao's statement of late 1935: "The Long March is also an agitation corps. It declares to the approximately two hundred million people of eleven provinces that only the road of the Red Army leads to their liberation. Without the Long March, how could the broad masses have known so quickly that there are such great ideas in the world as are upheld by the Red Army?

"The Long March is also a seeding machine. It has sown many seeds in eleven provinces, which will sprout, grow leaves, blossom into flowers, bear fruit and yield a crop in the future."[21]

There still remains the question of how much importance was actually ascribed by the leaders to the manipulation of ethnic attitudes during the revolution. One of the nadiral periods in the CCP's history coincided with the 1935 meeting in western Szechwan Province of Mao's forces from the south with those of another Communist leader, Chang Kuo-T'ao, who had been active in central China. The forces of both men were badly depleted, and the possibility of ultimate failure was evident. Strategy was debated, and it was decided that Chang would work totally among the minorities of western China (Tibet, Sinkiang, and Szechwan), while Mao would move northeastward to Yenan and work primarily among the Han Chinese, whose support he would gain by espousing an anti-Japanese resistance movement. Chang was to fail and be purged, and his entire plan was later to be described as "warlordism," purportedly carried out only over Mao's strongest objections.[22] There are a number of reasons, however, to suspect that Chang's and Mao's respective courses of action constituted a two-pronged strategy, and that Mao's objections were *ex post facto* and were a result of the plan's failure rather than of its concept. But,

[21] Mao Tse-tung, *On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism*. Selected Works, Vol. I (New York 1954), 161-62.

[22] The derogatory reference to Chang's plans to create independent nation-states in western China as "warlordism" would appear to be another illustration of the lack of sincerity underlying Mao's ostensible support at this time for secession by national groups.

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in any event, Mao's own course was also predicated upon a profound appreciation of the political power of ethnic distinctions. The Japanese were to prove an asset, for Mao correctly gauged that a crusade against the alien would prove more seductive to the Han Chinese than would Chiang Kai-shek's call against communism. Moreover, he also counted upon ethnic nationalism to bring ultimate victory over the powerful Japanese. Responding to a sceptical inquiry concerning the possibility of backward China defeating highly industrialized Japan, Mao commented in 1936: "It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China. This means that the Japanese will be entirely surrounded by a hostile Chinese people. The Japanese will be forced to move in all their provisions and guard them, maintaining troops along all lines of communications, and heavily garrisoning their bases. The great reservoirs of human material in the revolutionary Chinese people will still be pouring men ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines long after the tidal flood of Japanese imperialism has wrecked itself on the hidden reefs of Chinese resistance."[23] To Mao there was an obvious parallel between a Japanese army operating in eastern (Han) China, and a KMT army operating in a minority region of China. The intervention of the Japanese in China made it feasible to apply those concepts of successful revolutionary warfare, which were predicated upon ethnic diversity, through the medium of the majority, Han-Chinese people.

Had it not been for the Japanese intervention, it appears that the CCP would have depended primarily upon the minorities. It was formally prophesied at the culmination of the 1935 Szechwan meetings between Mao and Chang Kuo-T'ao that the bringing of the minorities under the leadership of the CCP "will be of decisive significance on the road ahead to the victory of the Chinese people's revolution."[24] It is therefore evident that the Chinese Communist leadership fully appreciated the close interrelation between peoples' wars and ethnic psychology, and that once having adopted the strategy of gaining power by conducting

[23] Snow, 100.

[24] The formal declaration was entitled "Decisions of the Central Committee on the Political Situation and our Tasks following the Linking-up of the First and Fourth Armies." The section cited can be found in Chang Chih-i, 49. The issuance of this announcement is one reason for believing that there was general support for Chang Kuo-T'ao's plan to work among the minorities of western China. Another is that Chu Teh, Mao's close associate (both before and after this adventure), accompanied Chang rather than Mao. Another reason is that, prior to the Long March, Mao's southern organization had done similar work among minorities, creating a number of soviets (base areas), at least one of which was headed by a non-Chinese. On this latter point, see Ch'en, 153-54. It is assumed that if such activity constituted "warlordism" in western China, it did so also in the southern areas.

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such a war, they continuously ascribed the greatest importance to the exploitation of ethnic attitudes.

IV

The pre-1949 stratagems and experiences of the CCP in their dealings with non-Chinese peoples have been dealt with in some detail because of their evident ramifications, which go well beyond China in scope and well beyond 1949 in time. There are, for example, remarkable parallels between the minority policies that have been described and those followed by the Communist movement of Indochina. It is more difficult to trace the ethnic policies of Ho Chi Minh and his associates because in some periods their programs were limited to what is now North and South Vietnam and at other times encompassed Laos and Cambodia as well.[25] But whatever the geographic extent of their claim, the various organizations with which Ho was associated prior to the end of World War II promised self-determination to all minorities within their sphere of power.[26] Moreover, again as in the case of the

[25] The first important organization was founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1925, and, as implied by its name, Association of the Revolutionary Vietnamese Youth, did not apply to all of the peoples of Indochina. A number of localized Communist movements sprang up in the ensuing years, causing Ho to call a meeting of the leaders of the factions in January 1930, at which a united organization, called the Vietnamese Communist Party, was created. However, the Third International felt that an organization with a larger base would be necessary to challenge the French effectively, and the Vietnamese were ordered to incorporate Laos and Cambodia in the organization. Ho then insisted on this step, and in October 1930 the Party took the title, Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). In May 1941, Ho created the Viet Minh, a united front, under the effective control of the leadership of the ICP. In order to ensure the continued unity of the Viet Minh, the formal organization of the ICP was dissolved in November 1945, although it continued to function through "study groups." By the time it was formally resurrected in March 1951 as the Workers Party (Lao Dong), the Communist Party had ostensibly become once more a party geographically limited to Vietnam. It is necessary to emphasize the word *ostensibly*, because the Vietnamese Communist leadership continued to dominate the Communist parties of Laos and Cambodia. For substantiation of the latter point, see Bernard Fall, "The Pathet Lao," in Robert Scalapino, ed., *The Communist Revolution in Asia* (Englewood Cliffs 1965), 178, passim.

[26] On May 9, 1929, the Association of Revolutionary Vietnamese Youth stipulated as "a fundamental and urgent demand" . . . "Reconnaitre à tous les peuples: cambodgien, man, laotien, etc. . . . le droit de se gouverner eux-mêmes." See Gouvernement Générale des Affaires Politiques et de la Sûreté Générale. *Contributions à L'Histoire des Mouvements Politiques de L'Indochine Française. Documents.* Vol. IV (1933), 56.

At its founding in 1930, the Indochinese Communist Party set itself ten "concrete tasks." Number seven was "Indépendance politique du l'Indochine; reconnaissance du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes." See Nguyen Kien Giang, *Les Grandes Dates du Parti de la Classe Ouvrière du Vietnam* (Hanoi 1960), 22.

In 1943, a Viet Minh conference included as Point Four of its political program "the right of minorities to self-determination." See United States Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, *Political Alignments of Vietnamese Nationalists*, OIR Report No. 3708, October 1, 1949.

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CCP, there is evidence that the Vietnamese Communist leadership never intended to honor the promise of self-determination.[27]

More recent history does indicate one unique feature of Ho's minority policies, however. Sometime around the close of World War II, the Communist movement dropped the slogan of self-determination for the "other nationalities." It is, of course, impossible to know whether party cadres, when in actual contact with minorities between 1945 and 1954, continued to hold out such a possibility. But, at least in their official declarations following the Japanese defeat, the Viet Minh replaced the grail of separation with that of cultural autonomy.[28] Two possibilities for this alteration come to mind: (1) in the multi-ethnic states of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and China, earlier promises of the right of self-determination made by the local Communist parties were in each

[27] An interesting Party article of 1934 dealt with the question at some length. It noted that certain comrades had found fault with the party slogan, "Droit pour les Cambodgiens, Laotiens et autres nationalités de disposer d'eux-mêmes," on the ground that it should specify the right of separation. The comrades were accused of not appreciating the total meaning and great flexibility of the slogan. Certainly, the concept of self-determination included the right of separation: "Le droit des peuples de disposer d'eux-mêmes c'est l'indépendance politique, c'est le droit de ces nations de s'arranger comme bon semblera, de décider eux-mêmes s'ils s'unissent ou non avec le pays qui les a opprimés jusqu'à la révolution." However, it was not wise to emphasize the right of separation at this time (1934), because the unity of the Anamites, Cambodians, Laotians, and the other nationalities was necessary to assure the defeat of French imperialism. Moreover, the French would themselves employ appeals to separatism in order to divide and thereby perpetuate their rule. It was, therefore, necessary at this time to emphasize unity, not separatism. The article next denied that the other nationalities (i.e., other than Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian) had achieved national consciousness. Therefore, they did not qualify as nations under Stalin's definition. The evident but unstated implication was that, not being nations, they did not qualify for the right of nations to self-determination. See "Vers le Renforcement du Parti Communiste Chinois," *Cahiers du Bolchevisme* (July 1, 1934), particularly pp. 798-99.

[28] In an important party tract, called "The August Revolution," written in 1946 by Truang Chinh, a party leader who was later to become General Secretary, it was stated in consecutive paragraphs (1) that "the principle of 'the right of nations to self-determination'" gave Vietnam the right to total freedom from France, and (2) that attempts to form a "'Nam Ky state,' 'Moi state,' 'Thai state,' 'Nung state,' etc." had to be rejected. "Viet Nam must be worthy of the name *nation*; that is to say, it is one and indivisible. . . ." "The August Revolution" was published in Hanoi in 1962, and can be found in Truang Chinh, *Primer for Revolt* (New York 1963). The quotations are from 62-63.

The enumeration of various states (Nam Ky, Moi, etc.) was a reference to proposals by France to subdivide the territory into a complex system of federated states and autonomous regions—a system in which ethnicity would play a major role in determining political boundaries. The motives behind these French proposals would have been less suspect had they been advanced prior to France's attempt to reassert its authority over Indochina. However, the chronology of events makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that the proposals were merely an attempt to play one ethnic group against another. Nevertheless, these French proposals should have been acceptable to Ho as fully consonant with earlier promises of his party. (On France's proposals and related French activity, see Ellen Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina* [Stanford 1954], particularly 162, 172.)

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case transformed, upon the assumption of power by the party, into the lesser right of cultural autonomy within the existing state, and the Viet Minh definitely believed that they were on the threshold of power in 1945;[29] and (2) the promise of independent statehood to the minorities of Vietnam, who had ethnic counterparts within China, Laos, or Cambodia, might well have had adverse effects upon the Viet Minh's relations with the major ethnic groups of these states. In any event, the bulk of the minority peoples of Indochina had not achieved that level of cultural-political sophistication at which a group's demands tend to be formulated positively as a demand for political independence; rather, they were more apt to be expressed negatively as a demand not to be dominated by some neighboring ethnic group. In such cases, the distinctions between ethnic independence and political independence become murky, and promises of cultural autonomy will appear tantamount to promises of self-determination. But whatever the reason for prematurely discarding self-determination for minorities, events were to prove the promise of cultural autonomy to be more than sufficient.

The minorities and minority territories played even more important roles in the rise of Ho than they did in that of Mao. The first and all-important World War II base area of the Viet Minh, which was developed by Giap, was not in ethnically Vietnamese territory, but in the territory of the Tho and other Tai peoples on either side of the China-northeast Vietnam border. It was here that the Viet Minh first created the nucleus of an effective organization, and it was to this same area that the Viet leadership repaired to begin the Indochina War following the breakdown of French-Viet Minh negotiations.[30] It was also in this original base area in Tai territory, and in the minority territories to the west, that the major battles of the French-Indochina War, including that of Dien Bien Phu, were waged.[31] Moreover, the leadership of the Viet Minh was at least as aware as were the leaders of the CCP that the relation of the local inhabitants to the armed forces was of vital importance. In 1947, at the beginning of the war, Truang Chinh wrote:

[29] Ho proclaimed the existence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on September 2, 1945.

[30] Several earlier attempts to create base areas in ethnically Vietnamese territory had failed.

[31] For the most complete account of the essential roles played by the minorities in the French-Indochina War, see John T. McAlister, "Mountain Minorities and the Viet Minh: A Key to the Indochina War" in Peter Kunstadter (ed.), *Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations* (Princeton 1967), 771-844. See also McAlister, "The Possibilities for Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," *World Politics*, XIX (January 1967), particularly 273-80.

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> Guerrilla warfare must be the tactic of the people as a whole, not of the army alone.
>
> To achieve good results in guerrilla and mobile warfare, we must mobilize the people to support our armed forces enthusiastically and to fight the enemy together with them. The people are the eyes and ears of the army, they feed or keep our soldiers. It is they who help the army in sabotage and in battle. *The people are the water and our army the fish.* The people constitute an inexhaustible source of strength to the army. To increase their numbers, the troops must recruit new fighters from among the people. That is why the entire people must be armed, guerrilla movements must be initiated, the actions of the regular army and guerrilla forces must be coordinated. We must act in such a way that wherever the enemy goes, he meets the resistance forces of the entire Vietnamese people, who arms in hand, fight against him, ready to die rather than return to slavery.[32]

Here, just as in the statements of Mao and P'eng, the local people are assigned the key roles of providing food, shelter, recruits, and intelligence, while performing the equally important tasks of denying each of these to the enemy. As has been indicated, it was members of a minority who in most instances constituted "the local people" in the French-Indochina War. And, in fact, throughout the war the minorities did play all of the strategic roles assigned to them in Communist guerrilla strategy. They harbored Viet Minh forces and supplied them with food and shelter; they worked as porters (consider the importance of this contribution in massing artillery around the French position at Dien Bien Phu); they furnished information on French movements; they fought in Viet Minh ranks, both as individuals and as units. The role of the minorities was unquestionably vital to the Viet Minh victory.

V

The strategic manipulation of ethnic diversity by Hanoi and Peking has not been limited to their own states. Hanoi, for example, has been extremely active among the many minorities who populate the mountain chain that forms all of Laos except for the Mekong Valley in the west, most of South Vietnam north of Saigon except for a thin coastal

[32] From "The Resistance Will Win," republished by Hanoi in 1960; it can be found in Truang Chinh, 116-17.

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strip, and the northeastern corner of Cambodia. The program includes such diversified approaches as the employment of North Vietnam-trained cadres of indigenous stock, broadcasts from Hanoi in the native languages, the training of the Viet Cong and PAVN forces in the native languages and their instruction to honor local mores and institutions, the effective utilization of ethnic prejudices and resentments, and the conjuring of the ubiquitous vision of ethnic independence.[33]

How important has the program been to Hanoi? It would be difficult to exaggerate the strategic importance of the area (1) for its supply lines (both the Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk trails are totally in minority areas), (2) for the minority territory within South Vietnam that contains or commands most of the strategic targets north of Saigon, or (3) for the Laotian and Cambodian areas that have proffered the sanctuaries that have magnified the problems associated with counter-insurgency efforts within South Vietnam.

How effective has the program been? First, it is noteworthy that in Laos the Communist forces (the Pathet Lao), with the exception of a handful of top leaders such as Souphonophong, are almost totally non-Lao.[34] United States Special Forces have made some important allies among certain tribesmen, but, in general, the vast minority areas of Laos are definitely more available to Hanoi than they are to the Laotian government. In Cambodia, broad-scale resistance to Sihanouk's government is lacking, but the Red Khmer's bases appear to be located essentially in the northeastern region and in other minority areas in the southwest.[35] Certainly Sihanouk's vacillating and conflicting positions concerning his northeastern border would appear to indicate

[33] The promise of cultural autonomy has been echoed in the programs of the National Liberation Front. There is a curious hedging in the most recent program, however. Although the program of 1961 promised "to set up . . . autonomous regions or areas inhabited by minority peoples" and "to abolish . . . forced assimilation," the program of 1967 limits the establishment of autonomous zones to "the areas where the minorities live concentrated and gather the required conditions." The nature of these "required conditions" and the time and manner of "gathering" them are not specified. For the text of the 1961 program, see United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam* (3d. rev. ed.) (Washington 1967), 269-74. For the 1967 Program, see the *New York Times*, December 15, 1967.

For descriptions of Hanoi's operations relative to minorities outside its borders, see Bernard Fall, *The Viet-Minh Regime* (New York 1956), 80; Dennis Warner, *The Last Confucian* (New York 1963), 167; and Charles Joiner, "Administration and Political Warfare in the Highlands," *Vietnam Perspectives*, 1 (November 1965), 19-37.

[34] See Joel Halpern and Peter Kunstadter, "Laos: Introduction" in Kunstadter, 244; and Bernard Fall, "The Pathet Lao" in Scalapino, 173.

[35] For an account of anti-governmental violence by minority tribesmen in the northeastern area, see the *Christian Science Monitor*, November 22, 1968.

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that his government's authority simply is not effective in this region.[36] Finally, it is evident that the Viet Cong and PAVN forces operating within the South Vietnam hill country have had the benefit of at least that minimum essential of apathy on the part of the populace.[37] There have been many indications during the past two or three years that positive cooperation with the Communist forces by the local people has been decreasing, and that coercion has been increasingly necessary in order for the Communist forces to acquire foodstuffs, collect taxes, etc. Nonetheless, it is also evident that most of the minority peoples of South Vietnam, as well as those of eastern Laos and northeastern Cambodia, are not actively impeding the Communist forces, nor reporting on their movements to governmental authorities.

Meanwhile, Peking has been active on a much wider geographic basis. In late 1965 and early 1966 China signaled a new emphasis upon its activities in South Asia by announcing the formation of the Thailand Patriotic Front and the Malayan National Liberation Front. Chinese trained cadres subsequently increased activities in the minority areas of north, northeast, and southernmost Thailand and among the insurgents in northern Malaya, most of whom are of Chinese extraction. In all of these situations, the Chinese were attempting to agitate and manipulate ethnic dissonance through Communist cadres or fronts. But the Chinese have also been very willing to give direct support to non-Communist nationalistic movements in other states.[38] Moreover,

[36] Despite much contrary evidence, Sihanouk, on a number of occasions has denied that VC forces were using Cambodia's northeast as a sanctuary. At other times, he has berated North Vietnam and the VC, not only for infiltrating the area, but for arming the minority hill-tribesmen. (See, for example, the *New York Times*, March 4, 1968.) In mid-1968, Sihanouk announced that his government could no longer guarantee the safety of diplomats traveling in this area and in other minority areas along Cambodia's western border. See the *New York Times*, June 5, 1968.

[37] As in the case of the minorities within China, the "montagnards" have long-standing reasons to dislike all Vietnamese, whose traditional name for the mountain people ("Moi," translatable as "barbarian") is an accurate reflection of the attitude of the Vietnamese toward the tribesmen and their culture. However, the promises of cultural independence by Hanoi and the NLF have fallen on particularly fertile ground because of a policy of enforced assimilation which was inaugurated by South Vietnam's former President Diem. The policy, which was strongly resented and resisted by the tribesmen, has not been pursued by subsequent governments, which have moved increasingly toward equaling Hanoi's promises. See n. 43 below.

[38] Official sanctioning of cooperation with non-Communists in national liberation movements outside China is found in an important tract by the Deputy Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities, which has been translated and distributed abroad by the Chinese Government: "When their class interests are encroached upon by the imperialists through national oppression, the national bourgeoisie and even certain patriotic kings, princes, and aristocrats of an oppressed nationality may sometimes fight against national oppression together with the broad masses of working people of their own nationality. In this struggle the proletariat should unite with them, while at the same time they must understand that the attitude of these people towards imperialist

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there is strong evidence that the Chinese are escalating both the type and the amount of assistance furnished such secessionist movements. Though the governments of India, Burma, and Cambodia have long been loath to acknowledge the validity of the rife rumors of Chinese involvement in their domestic affairs, all three felt compelled to publicize Chinese intervention during 1968. The Indian Parliament confirmed that hundreds of Nagas had been trained and armed in China and then returned to northeastern India.[39] Ne Win informed the Burmese that China was providing sanctuary for Kachin insurgents, and this admission, together with his trip to New Delhi in order to discuss Chinese activities in the Burma-India-China border region, lent great credence to reports of Chinese assistance to the other secessionist movements (Karen, Shan, etc.) within Burma.[40] Sihanouk spoke of the intervention of Communist states, and more specifically he accused Peking of agitating the Chinese minority, Hanoi and the Viet Cong of arming the minority tribesmen in the northeast, and the Thailand Patriotic Front of equipping rebels in the west.[41]

Despite the many words written about the threat posed by the "overseas" Chinese, they have not played a significant role. The explanation, as the ethnic map makes evident, is that the Chinese are heavily concentrated in small territorial pockets, usually urban. As the early CCP and Indochinese Communist movement made evident, such small territories do not make ideal revolutionary base areas. Moreover, as the history of Communist insurrection in Malaya attests, to establish an essentially Chinese movement in a territory inhabited by the politically dominant ethnic group (or one that considers itself closely related to the dominant ethnic group) is probably to deny to the movement even that minimally necessary environment characterized by apathy on the part of the inhabitants. By contrast, both Hanoi and Peking have evinced a very pragmatic and flexible approach, characterized by a willingness to work with whoever offers the best local possibility. It has been noted, for example, that the Pathet Lao has been essentially an anti-Lao movement with few Lao members; nonetheless, one theme of Chinese propaganda beamed to the Lao of northeast Thailand is

national oppression is, in the final analysis, based on their own class interests." Liu Chun, *The National Question and Class Struggle* (Peking 1966), 5-6. Later in the same article, Liu, although referring to the national question within China, makes clear that such an alliance is temporary and that the successful national revolution must be followed by the elimination of the exploiting classes. See below, n. 45.

[39] *New York Times*, November 17, 1968.

[40] *New York Times*, March 17, 1968, and March 20, 1968.

[41] See n. 36 above, and the *New York Times*, December 8, 1968.

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of a greater Laos that would incorporate the Lao-speaking people on either side of the Mekong. This same flexibility has been displayed in cases in which the principal target of resentment on the part of one minority was a second neighboring minority, rather than a more distant majority. At various stages in the French-Indochina War, the Viet Minh proved adroit at allying itself with both minorities involved in such a local competition.[42]

Why have Peking and Hanoi been so successful in manipulating ethnic attitudes, and the opposition so ineffectual in taking countermeasures? It would be dangerous and unfair to seek scapegoats. Any judgment is unfair during a period when the immediate goal of Hanoi and Peking is merely to cause dissension. As noted earlier, all of the elements of ethnic discord are already present, in some cases already operative, and, in any case, easily agitated. The separatist movement within South Vietnam called FULRO, for example, has avoided Hanoi or NFL direction and appears, on balance, to be anti-Communist.[43] Its actions, nonetheless, dovetail effectively with Hanoi's short-range goals. However, it is evident that such an organization must at some point conflict with any government, Marxist-Leninist or otherwise, that tries to extend its authority over the entire territory of Vietnam. In pandering to minority nationalisms, Hanoi and Peking may well be nurturing their enemies of tomorrow. Since coming to power, both CPs have encountered minority dissonance within their own states.[44] Both know how to feed the beast, but not how to tame it.

[42] See, for example, McAlister in Kunstadter, 813. Remember also the great flexibility practiced in such matters throughout its early history by the CCP (e.g., the willingness to work with the most conservative Moslems).

[43] In a highly publicized ceremony held in early 1969, a number of FULRO members formally defected, pledging allegiance to Saigon in return for promises of cultural and military autonomy. However, the absence of the movement's most important leader cast doubt upon the scale of the defection. See the *New York Times* of February 2, 1969.

In any event, it is very dubious that a pledge of allegiance to a Vietnamese Government signifies the overcoming of the deep animosities traditionally manifested by the "montagnard" toward all Vietnamese. (The history of failures of intermittent similar arrangements between the Kurds and the Iraqi Government is pertinent.) Such a pledge, if in fact given by large numbers, would probably indicate a "montagnard" willingness to become more neutral in the Hanoi-Saigon conflict, and to refrain from waging war against the South Vietnamese in return for ostensible freedom and subsidies. Such an arrangement, if in fact widescale, would have great significance for the Hanoi-Saigon conflict, but decidedly less significance for the longer-range relationship of "montagnard" and Vietnamese.

[44] China has been the more seriously troubled to date. The government's problems with the Tibetans and with the Turkic peoples of Sinkiang have been given the most publicity, but what the Government calls "reactionary local nationalism" appears to have afflicted practically all groups. For a remarkably frank acknowledgement of broad-scale ethnic dissonance, by the Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Cabinet's Commission of Nationalities, see Liu Chun, particularly 18-22. See, also, Richard Diao,

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The unfairness of the contest between the feeders and tamers of nationalism is illustrated by the experiences of United States Special Forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Even their limited successes are remarkable, for the Americans had no authority to equal Hanoi's promise of cultural or political independence. Indeed, American successes have been watched warily by the respective governments who feel uneasy over the arming of potential dissidents, who certainly do not approve of aliens interceding between themselves and their subjects, and who are, therefore, always ready to complain of American intervention in their internal affairs. The former freedom of action enjoyed by the Special Forces in their relations with the "montagnards" has, in fact, been increasingly restricted by Saigon.

Finally, it should be acknowledged that there is little that the government of a multi-nation state can do to counter the manipulation of ethnic groups, short of granting the right of secession. Even if one accepts the very dubious contention that extensive efforts to advance the minorities economically and educationally will quell ethnic demands,[45] such programs would take years to accomplish and would do little to meet the current challenge.

Hanoi and Peking have not, then, developed some miraculous strategy guaranteeing the communization of South Asia. But by their actions and successes to date, the leadership of both states have underlined their keen awareness of the extremely complex ethnic mosaic of the region, their ability to employ this knowledge to their short-run and often to their long-run advantage, and their intention to continue and apparently to escalate their efforts through the ethnic media. In view of all this, their capacity to sow discord in South Asia is almost limitless. As but one illustration: China, which is already supporting nationalist insurrections in the far northeast of India, is in an even more favorable position, because of its presence in the Ladakh area to the northwest of India, to train, equip, and then repatriate Kashmiri who are intent on breaking their ties with New Delhi. In such event, the pressures on the government of India, further complicated by the role of Pakistan

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"Minorities and the Chinese Communist Regime" in Kunstadter, particularly pp. 198, 199.

For an official acknowledgment of ethnic discord within North Vietnam, see Nhan Dan of June 21, 1957 (JPRS/DC 198). See also Fall, 67. For additional references see the footnote in Kunstadter, 685.

[45] Opposing such a contention are the recent activities of such economically and educationally advanced groups as the Basques and Catalans of Spain, the French-speaking element of the Jura in Switzerland, the Flemish of Belgium, the Croatians and Slovenes of Yugoslavia, etc.

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and China, would be monumental, and the radical redrawing of the political map of South Asia could not be ruled out.

VI

Investigating the political implications of the ethnology of South Asia does not produce solutions to the problems which are posed. But it does give rise to a number of reflections—often unrelated, often overlapping, sometimes conflicting:

(1) *On dominoes*:

The concept that a Communist victory in one state leads to a victory in the next in a continuously expanding pattern does have a limited rationale. Hanoi and Peking have consistently taken advantage of the traditional view of the sanctity of state borders in order to create sanctuaries and supply routes, and, as a consequence, the vulnerability of a government is unquestionably magnified by the proximity of a Communist state. Nevertheless, it is evident that the vulnerability of the states of South Asia to "wars of national liberation" varies greatly because of other considerations. Most of Laos, for example, is already denied to its government. But on the other hand, it is extremely doubtful that either a legitimately indigenous or an externally promoted anti-government movement could make much headway in the great sector of Cambodia populated by Khmers, most of whom almost worship Sihanouk. An intent neighboring power could unquestionably further intensify disorder among the minorities in Cambodia, particularly those in the northeast. Such activities would, of course, be vexatious to Sihanouk, but it is most doubtful that they would pose a serious threat to his political survival. To achieve a Communist victory over the Khmers would almost certainly require an invasion by foreign troops. The case of Thailand is somewhat similar, although its vulnerability is greater. The great Lao-speaking northeast, the northern hill tracts of the non-Thai tribesmen, and the Malay-populated south vary in their degree of susceptibility to a war of liberation, but all three are vastly more vulnerable than the culturally compatible, heavily populated, Siamese-speaking central area, throughout which there is a popular identity with the monarchy. Large tracts of state territory might be denied to the Thai government by dissidents, but, as in the case of Cambodia, it is very doubtful that the monarchy's survival could be seriously challenged in the absence of an actual invasion by foreign troops. Burma falls somewhere between Thailand and Laos on the vulnerability scale, and the position of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan,

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Nepal, Singapore, and Malaysia could also be roughly plotted. The question of the probability of the governments of South Asia succumbing to internally based, dissident movements, then, resists mechanistic explanations such as the domino theory. A starting-point for evaluating a particular situation is the ethnic map.

(2) *On over- and under-simplifications concerning the interrelation of nationalism and Communist movements*:

There is a current tendency to view Communist movements, particularly the Chinese and North Vietnamese, as more nationalistic than internationalistic in their goals. American foreign policy is often criticized for allegedly being predicated upon a simplistic notion of communism as a monolithic entity, all of whose parts are directed to the common goal of global Communist victory. It is said that this view blinds American statesmen to the obvious fact that while the governments at Peking and Hanoi are indeed Communist, they are nationalists first and Communists second. Although they may express themselves in Marxist-Leninist terminology and pay lip service to the international goals of traditional Marxist-Leninism, their aims, it is contended, are best understood and analyzed in terms of their respective national interests. Whereas Stalin once described the general milieu within a multi-ethnic Marxist state as "nationalist in form and socialist in content," this contemporary view of the policies of Hanoi and Peking could be summarized as "socialist in form and nationalist in content."

But is the content nationalist? It must, of course, be granted that the socialist states do not form a monolithic structure, although it might be noted that this knowledge was shared by many serious scholars and formulators of American foreign policy even at the apogee of that short-lived hyphenate, the Sino-Soviet Bloc.[46] It is, however, a leap of impressive dimensions from such an acknowledgment to the conclusion that the leaders of Marxist-Leninist movements are nationalists whose thoughts and plans start and end with the nation. Surely Trotsky and the Trotskyites were no less internationalist in their objectives because of their objection to Stalin's (and, therefore, Moscow's) direction of the movement. Is Mao less of an internationalist because he insists that the leadership of the Soviet Union has betrayed the world revolution? If people who disagree over the content of the national interest can

[46] Even the hyphenate indicated that equal status was ascribed to two states. Moreover, the granting of substantial United States assistance to Yugoslavia (over $2.25 billion) and to Poland (over $500 million) *prior* to the Sino-Soviet rift does not support the contention of a belief in a Communist monolith.

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nonetheless be nationalists, then certainly Marxist-Leninists can disagree over the international interest and remain internationalists.

It is essential to distinguish between (1) being aware of the great power of nationalism and the wisdom of adapting it to an immediate advantage, and (2) being its devotee. It has been established that Mao and Ho have long been manipulators of nationalism. But their appreciation of the potentiality for manipulating the land-hungriness of the peasants did not mean that Mao and Ho had become believers in the wisdom of indefinitely perpetuating private property. So, too, the case of nationalism.[47]

There are a number of factors that cause Mao, Ho, and other Communist leaders to be seen as nationalists. One is that the principal organ through which Marxist-Leninists have operated is the state, so that in promoting the interests of their movement, they have often become identified with the interests of a particular state.[48] And to those, such as the bulk of the Han-Chinese in China and the ethnic Vietnamese in Vietnam, who view the state as the state of their particular nation, the leadership is therefore nationalistic. Moreover, it has been clearly established above that both Mao and Ho have long appreciated the advantages to be derived from manipulating national attitudes, and both have striven, when it suited their ends, to cloak themselves in nationalistic garb. Indeed, Mao goes to great lengths to prove that the CCP is the heir to Sun Yat-sen's national movement, to exaggerate the role of the CCP in defeating the Japanese invader, and to propagandize its current role of frustrating the insidious plans of foreign imperialists. Ho, too, as the leader of the resistance to French colonialism, cloaked his movement in a united front of all patriots, just as Hanoi and the NLF do today in their resistance to "American imperialism." But can

[47] See Liu Chun, 21: "Nationalism is a bourgeois ideology." And 12-13: "The national question can never be solved apart from revolution and class struggle. . . . The more thoroughly the revolution is carried out the more completely will the question be solved."

[48] Mao made explicit in 1936 that victory within the state was a necessary step, but only a step, toward world revolution: "*The victory of the Chinese national liberation movement will be part of the victory of world Socialism*, because to defeat imperialism in China means the destruction of one of its most powerful bases. *If China wins its independence, the world revolution will progress very rapidly.* If our country is subjugated by the enemy, we shall lose everything. For a people being deprived of its national freedom, the revolutionary task is not immediate Socialism, but the struggle for independence. We cannot even discuss Communism if we are robbed of a country in which to practice it." Snow, 455. Italics added.

The following year Mao added: "The Chinese Communists are internationalists; they are in favor of the world Communist movement. But at the same time they are patriots who defend their native land. . . . This patriotism and internationalism are by no means in conflict, for only China's independence and liberation will make it possible to participate in the world Communist movement." See Schram, 201.

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it be safely concluded from (1) the fortuitous coincidence of short-range CP goals and long-range national goals, (2) the periodic self-description of CP leaders as national patriots, and (3) popular conceptions of the leadership on the part of the masses of the same ethnic group (even though the people who hold these conceptions may not be Communist and may not be currently under the political power of the CP), that the leaders of the CPs are, in fact, essentially nationalists whose actions are determined by what they perceive to be best for the nation?

Analysis of the interaction of nationalism and communism requires a differentiation between ties to the ethnic group (ethnic nationalism) and ties to the state, which might be called state-nationalism. Are Mao and Ho ethnic nationalists whose plans are limited to the Han-Chinese and ethnic Vietnamese respectively? Clearly not, since both insist on keeping within their borders huge areas populated by other peoples who have been denied national independence despite earlier promises. Are they then state-nationalists who merely wish to reconstruct the empires dominated by the Chinese and Vietnamese prior to the penetration of Asia by Europeans? This larger but still limited framework could not explain, for example, China's activities relative to the Thailand Patriotic Front and the Malayan National Liberation Front. Nor could it explain Ho's fluctuating position on the ethnic groups encompassed by his party from just the purely Vietnamese (prior to 1930), to all the peoples of French Indochina (1930-45), to the peoples of what are now known as North and South Vietnam (1945 to the present). Hanoi's continued assistance to movements within Laos and Cambodia, and several references to these states in North Vietnamese documents, make clear that Hanoi's plans extend at least to the borders of former French Indochina;[49] and there are indications of its planned extension into northeast Thailand as well.[50] Since Vietnam's imperial territory never encompassed all of that known as French Indochina, much less Thailand, state-nationalism is not a sufficient explanation for Hanoi's activities.[51]

[49] In the platform of the Vietnamese Communist Party (the Workers' Party), for example, the party pledges to cooperate to bring about "an independent, free, strong and prosperous federation of the states of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia if the three people so desire." The full text of the platform is presented in Allen Cole, *Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions* (Ithaca 1956), 96-106.

[50] See, for example, the *New York Times*, May 12, 1968, in which Thailand's Premier estimates the presence of 3,000 North Vietnamese agents within his country.

[51] It is also difficult to harmonize an image of Ho as a nationalist, of either the ethnic or the state variety, with his willingness to collaborate with the French colonial administration in 1937 and 1938. He did so under the direction of the French CP, which, in turn, was following a course of action dictated by the Soviet Union. Ho's action was described by the Vietnamese Trotskyites as "the Popular Front of Treason."

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Are the goals of Hanoi and Peking then unlimited? There is nothing incompatible between dedication to the global victory of a movement and what might be termed regional spheres of influence. A convinced Marxist-Leninist, such as Ho (or Castro), might well feel that his own experience or knowledge is the most appropriate for achieving Communist victories in the immediately surrounding region, and that his paramountcy there should be recognized by other Marxist-Leninist leaders. A similar conviction on the part of Mao appears to include all non-European areas, so the possibility of disputes arising from conflicting Communist spheres of influence is real. Is personal and, yes, even national ego (ethnocentrism) involved in such claims to regional paramountcy? Quite probably. But the admission of the possibility of a role for individual and national motivation does not vitiate the basic international orientation of Hanoi and Peking.

The interrelation of communism and nationalism is a complex and subtle one that defies generalizations. That nationalism has proven to be a much stronger force than communism is indisputable. When communism and nationalism have been wedded in the popular mind, communism has found broad acceptance; when communism and nationalism have been viewed as at odds, communism has tended to be spurned. But the fact that the masses are motivated primarily by nationalistic considerations cannot be accepted as evidence that their leadership is not motivated primarily by internationalist, Marxist-Leninist tenets. Much of Mao's and Ho's power derives from their common image as national leaders. This should not be construed to indicate that they are nationalistic, rather than internationalistic, in their fundamental orientations. The facts indicate otherwise.

(3) *On the wisdom and practicality of United States involvement in South Asia*:

The ethnic map of South Asia, the many ethnic struggles already underway there, the many others that could erupt at any time, and the ethnic policies of Hanoi and Peking, make it imperative that the logic of undertaking a course of action toward a certain area or state within South Asia be measured against the entire yardstick. As has been noted, throughout South Asia areas and states blend into one another, and problems show a recurring pattern. It is, therefore, illogical to treat a specific question without studying its possible ramifications in other parts of the region. Does a commitment of U.S. troops, upon request of the reigning government, in order to defend South Vietnam against Communist insurgency mean that the United States is prepared to

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respond in similar fashion to similar entreaties from the Malaysian Government, if the Malayan National Liberation Front becomes more of a threat, or upon request of the Thai Government if anti-governmental activities increase in their northeast? How can the United States differentiate between Communist insurgency and nationalist insurgent movements supported, and perhaps infiltrated, by Communists? Will the United States be prepared to help India in Assam if the Indian Government requests help and depicts the Naga and Mizo movements as Communist-supported and -inspired? Or aid Burma if Rangoon so requests, and produces data linking the Karen and Kachin movements to Peking? True, the Governments of Burma and India have thus far been virtuously independent, but the level of determination to uphold such a stance is inversely related to the magnitude of the threat. And it must be restressed (1) that nationalist movements represent a greater threat to the survival of those governments than does internal communism, and (2) that China has been offering assistance to these and other nationalist movements and the offers are increasingly being accepted. Is the United States prepared to be identified as militarily opposing the right of self-determination of distinct national groups? More pragmatically, could the United States, whose people are already badly divided over the wisdom of conducting operations limited to South Vietnam, marshal the human and financial resources to undertake a series of similar actions, perhaps simultaneously, in response to a number of diverse situations extending from Afghanistan to the Gulf of Tonkin?

(4) *On whether a participant in an ostensibly civil war can afford the presence of an ally*:

There is substantial reason to doubt that the physical presence of large numbers of allied foreigners is an asset in an *intra*national, guerrilla war. What is the explanation for the undeniable difference in the morale and fighting capability of North Vietnamese (PAVN) and Viet Cong (VC) troops on the one hand and the forces of South Vietnam on the other? Why have the PAVN and VC forces been able to elicit sufficient sympathy from the ethnically Vietnamese masses to create base areas, receive intelligence from local people, and deny knowledge of their own whereabouts to the enemy? It is dangerous to generalize about the motivations of a large number of people, but an examination of the insurgents' propaganda strongly suggests (1) that the most fundamental factor in the Communists' success has been an appeal to ethnic nationalism, and (2) that their major asset in iden-

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tifying their side as the nationalist one has been the presence of Americans. It is true, of course, that appeals are made to practically every Vietnamese special interest—to peasants, factory workers, veterans, women, religious groups, and even the "overseas" Vietnamese.[52] But the underlying theme throughout is nationalism, which in its positive form stresses patriotic ties to "the fatherland," and in its negative form stresses that the government it opposes is merely a puppet of American imperialism. The introductory words of the program of the National Liberation Front are an accurate reflection of the principal motif: "To abolish the disguised colonial regime established by the United States imperialists in South Vietnam, to overthrow the puppet administration, hireling of the United States, not to recognize the puppet "National Assembly" rigged up by the United States imperialists and their lackeys; to abolish the "constitution" and all *antinational* and antidemocratic laws enacted by the United States imperialists and the puppet administration." (Italics added)

To the typical Vietnamese in the street or the rice paddy, the ubiquity of the foreigner (American) constitutes confirmation of the NLF's position. There is little point in trying to counter by pointing out the long-range implications of communism (no mention of Marxist-Leninism is made in NLF programs), or by noting that the Soviet Union, China, and other foreign states are furnishing aid to PAVN and VC forces. Chinese and Russians are not visibly present, and are not physically involved in fighting Vietnamese.[53]

The detrimental effect of the presence of a foreign ally applies to either side of a guerrilla, intranational war. It has been noted, for example, that the failure of the Communist insurrection movement in Malaya was primarily due to its Chinese membership; similarly, Che Guevara's failure in Bolivia was due primarily to the Bolivian Indians' view of his group as aliens. In this context, Lin Piao's emphasis on self-reliance for the conduct of wars of national liberation, which he set forth in his now famous tract, "Long Live the Victory of People's

[52] See, for example, the text of the recent programs of the National Liberation Front, *New York Times*, December 15, 1967. As has been earlier noted, appeals have also been directed to minorities, but here we are concerned with appeals to the ethnic Vietnamese.

[53] The leaders of China, North Vietnam, and the USSR have all shown a keen cognizance of the undesirable consequences that are apt to flow from too ubiquitous a presence of distinguishable aliens. All three governments, both at home and abroad, have emphasized the need to train and to work through cadres who are themselves members of the ethnic group. Similarly, large Soviet missions abroad, such as the group of technicians at work on the Aswan Dam, live an almost isolated existence, keeping contacts with the indigenous people to a minimum.

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War!", takes on a different meaning from that which has been popularly attributed to it.

"Revolution or people's war in any country is the business of the masses in that country and should be carried out primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way."[54] This is not necessarily a statement of Chinese caution or inability to support wars of liberation, but a statement of sound strategy. But if a basic precept of successful national wars of liberation is that they can be fought only by nationalists, then the corollary is that *national wars of liberation are best countered only by nationalists.*

There are two points that must be stressed. The first is that the preceding remarks have been limited to guerrilla war. In the Korean War, Americans and Chinese played key roles, but that struggle was marked by conventional positional warfare. In such warfare, civilian populations play a markedly less important role and the essentiality of their cooperation is correspondingly lessened. However, as a result of its failure, the Korean War may prove to be the last of conventional wars of liberation.

The second point is that the discussion has been limited to intranational situations. Allies can clearly be assets in international situations, including intrastate situations in which different peoples are pitted against each other. Thus, because of the deep hostility felt toward the Vietnamese by the "montagnards," Americans have found it easy to work with them against Vietnamese in general, but not against just some Vietnamese and in favor of others. Similarly, the United States could conceivably form an alliance with *all* Khmers, or Karens, or Burmese, in the same way that the Chinese could conceivably form an effective alliance with all Nagas or Kashmiri.

There is, finally, a question that runs through all of the preceding discussion. Do all aliens produce the same measure of ethnic reaction, or are some aliens more foreign than others? All other things being equal, would there be less popular support for the VC and PAVN, if from the beginning the Americans had been replaced by an equal number of Koreans or Gurkhas? If there is no such distinction among aliens, then slogans such as "Asia for the Asiatics," "pan-Africanism," and "the colored peoples of the world" would not be resurrected so often. And yet this question defies a simple yes-or-no answer. Local ethnic antagonisms, such as those between Malay and Chinese, Vietnamese and "montagnard," and Hausa and Ibo, have been severe enough to out-

[54] Lin Piao, *Long Live the Victory of the People's War!* (Peking 1965), 38.

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weigh all other ethnic considerations. The question deserves and requires much greater investigation.

(5) *On international and interstate relations*:

The impact of ethnic distributions within South Asia is not limited to the internal affairs of states and the foreign policies of Marxist-Leninist governments. Because of the almost total lack of coincidence between ethnic and political borders, the relations between adjoining, non-Communist states are also strongly influenced by ethnic forces. A thorough study of contemporary and prospective alliances, counteralliances, and cooperative ventures of a peaceful nature would have to contemplate the role of ethnic distributions.

Imagine, for example, the changed circumstances in the struggle within South Vietnam should Sihanouk trade his neutral stance for a military alliance with the United States: rather than providing a VC sanctuary, Cambodia would form part of a military hammer-and-anvil, and the situation of the VC would be drastically altered. A principal reason for Cambodia's neutrality is age-old resentment of the Thais and Vietnamese, and this resentment, in turn, is largely a reflection of ethnic considerations involving Khmers and related peoples presently under Thai and Vietnamese control. The emotions surrounding this classical irredenta situation have thus far precluded any common defense efforts on the part of this strategically located state and its neighbors.[55]

In some instances, the existence of a transborder ethnic group has had the opposite effect of leading to intergovernmental cooperation. In recent years, Thailand and Malaysia have cooperated in joint attacks upon insurgents operating near their common border; India and Burma have cooperated in a similar manner. But at least in irredenta situations

[55] Sihanouk has not only protested concerning the Khmers in Thailand and in Vietnam, but has also directly supported FULRO on the grounds (not totally ethnically correct) that the mountain tribesmen of Vietnam are related to the Khmers. He has been particularly incensed by attempts to assimilate Khmers. In 1965, for example, he prophesied that all such attempts would fail because of "the national sentiments of our forefathers which enabled the Khmer race to resist all attempts made to exterminate it, and to survive the genocidal tactics employed to that end by the Siamese and Anamites for a period of 500 years." See Kunstadter, 54. This anti-assimilationist stance coupled with his often repeated disclaimer of any territorial ambitions would seem to indicate that his policy is similar to the "prickly-hedge" policy that was pursued for many years by the amirs of Afghanistan in their dealings with the British to the south. In essence, it was to keep within the adjoining state, a zone inhabited by people over whom that state could not exert effective control.

The ethnic problem has also troubled relations between Cambodia and the Communist leaders. In December 1964, a meeting between representatives of Cambodia, North Vietnam, and the NLF failed to reach agreement because of the latter's refusal to make unspecified guarantees concerning Khmers in Cochin China.

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(i.e., when one state's minority is ethnically the same as the dominant group in the adjoining state), it seems most probable that the situation will adversely affect intergovernmental relations in the long run. Even though the Malaysian Government finds it advantageous to cooperate with Thailand in order to eradicate the Chinese-membered, Communist-oriented insurgent movement, the history of irredenta movements indicates that the Malaysian Government at some future time will actively seek, or be pressured to seek, union with the Malay-populated region of southern Thailand.

Even if the transborder ethnic group constitutes only an insignificant minority in each state, it is still likely that any anti-governmental activity among the group's members will result in incriminatory accusations and a deterioration in relations between the two involved governments. Seldom will a government, faced with a seditious group on its border, feel that its neighbor is doing its utmost to prevent support for the movement on its side of the border. The relations between Burma and Thailand are thus endangered by the anti-Burmese movements among the Karens and Shans.

In view of the growing tendency for South Asia's ethnic groups to think in ethnic-political terms, the ethnology of South Asia can be expected to play a correspondingly larger role in the relations among the region's states. It is evident that its potential impact extends to cooperative ventures, such as the development of the Mekong River Valley, as well as alliances. An illustration of the profound influence ethnic matters can have upon all aspects of the foreign relations of governments was furnished by Afghanistan in the mid-1950's. Unable to find support among the western powers for its position concerning the ethnically akin people on the West Pakistan side of its southern border, the Afghan ruling house completely reoriented its traditional foreign policy and trade-patterns when the Soviets announced their support for the Afghan position on Pushtunistan.

Ethnology thus permeates all aspects of South Asian politics, interregional and intraregional, interstate and intrastate, Communist and non-Communist. Yet despite some noteworthy exceptions, disproportionately little attention has been bestowed upon it. The political dimensions of South Asian ethnology demand its greater attention by both scholar and policy maker.

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Research Note

THE YOUNG SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

By BRUCE M. RUSSETT

WE have entered a new phase in the apparently endless debate over method. Argument once centered on the possibility of quantifying important political variables, and of establishing empirically based generalizations about international behavior. With accumulating evidence that measurement and generalization are possible, the grounds have shifted. Sometimes only specific applications are attacked. Though it is curious how few of the extant applications of scientific method come up to the high standards of some of their critics, the critics' targets cannot complain too much. After all, the methods and applications are new, most studies do suffer from significant flaws of one sort or another, and constructive criticism is essential to their improvement.

But a more sweeping criticism is now being encountered; it is phrased in the language of scientific inquiry, and deserves careful examination. Essentially, the new case is one for the merits of deductive analysis in political science, and a virtual rejection of inductive procedures. One example is Oran R. Young's review of my *International Regions and the International System*,[1] but the deductivist position is not restricted to a single article or author. My own conclusion is that the controversy is essentially unprofitable, and that the *general* argument (as opposed to questions of specific application in particular studies) is a silly one. There is room for both induction and deduction, the particular application being determined by such factors as the researcher's skills and temperament, the kind and quality of scientific work that has preceded the application, and the difficulty of data-gathering.[2] I find it impossible

[1] "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor," *World Politics*, XXI (April 1969), 486-511.

[2] There is an extensive technical debate about induction as a means of inferring universal statements from singular ones, contributed to by Hume, Kant, Mill, Keynes, Reichenbach, Popper, and others, that I do not think is relevant here. I assume that no one takes seriously the idea that one derives deterministic laws merely by generalizing from observed cases to general principles. For a discussion of probability and inductive reasoning, with an attempt to put induction on firmer ground, see economist Sir Roy Harrod, *Foundations of Inductive Logic* (New York 1956). We are concerned here only with whether induction from bodies of data may be a useful means of generating

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to imagine any firm rules that would satisfactorily set out an exclusive province for one or the other, just as I cannot imagine any exclusive province for "quantitative" versus "non-quantitative" research.

This view seems rather widely shared. For instance, two authors who are basically more sympathetic to deductive than to inductive procedure declare: "Philosophers of science and methodologists in sociology and related disciplines argue endlessly about the nature of induction and inference. And the controversy shows no signs of abating." They then confess their fear that a blanket rejection of induction will mean that "much exploratory research, guided by vague questions and hunches, may come to be regarded as improper or non-scientific. Such an approach would stifle, rather than encourage, certain significant social research."[3]

Another, Abraham Kaplan, sets out an argument for inductive pattern identification that I find useful if one-sided: "The proposition that the patterns we have so far experienced will persist in what is yet to come, Hume pointed out, is neither a tautology nor can it be grounded in experience without begging the question. How we can know that the future will resemble the past, and whether, indeed, some principle of uniformity of nature is even presupposed by science—such questions have exercised many philosophers of science. Yet scientists themselves —and surely behavioral scientists—would be quite content to have only as much justification for their predictions as we have for expecting the sun to rise tomorrow."[4] Or, "Insight, imagination, and perhaps genius, are required firstly to pick out the best fundamental concepts and to classify phenomena in a way that makes induction possible, and then to frame a tentative law as a working hypothesis which can be tested by further observation and experiment. . . . Having chosen the right fundamental concepts, it is probable that relations between some of them soon appear, as to Galileo. The relations, or logical deductions from them, can be tested experimentally, and some of them will be confirmed. Thus simple laws are established, and the new subject begins to take shape. Each new relation suggests new experiments, and the growth in experimental knowledge needs and suggests new hypothetical relations. Insight and imagination are needed to formulate

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hypotheses, or at most tentative propositions that one is prepared to accept with some limited confidence until they have been deductively articulated, and tested and not disconfirmed by new data.

[3] Gideon Sjoberg and Roger Nett, *A Methodology for Social Research* (New York 1968), 49, 57.

[4] *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco 1964), 20. On the other side, a good argument for gathering data only to test carefully derived deductive propositions is John Platt's chapter on "Strong Inference" in his *The Excitement of Science* (Boston 1962).

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probable hypotheses; logical and sometimes mathematical power is needed to deduce their consequences; patience, perseverance, and experimental skills are needed to test their validity. In fact, as N. R. Campbell says, induction is an art and science the noblest of arts."[5]

Most scientific inquiry employs a combination of approaches and skills.[6] In classical physics, Newton, Galileo, and most especially Kepler, in his discovery of the laws of planetary motion, used reasoning in which induction played a central role. According to the late Norwood Russell Hanson, "Physicists do not start from hypotheses; they start from data. By the time a law has been fixed into an H-D [hypothetico-deductive] system, really original physical thinking is over. The pedestrian process of deducing observation statements from hypotheses comes only after the physicist sees that the hypothesis will at least explain the initial data requiring explanation."[7]

Hanson, and Peirce before him, describe Kepler's work as a great example of "retroductive" reasoning, by which he searched for an explanation to link what appeared to be discrete facts. "From the observed properties of phenomena the physicist reasons his way towards a keystone idea from which the properties are explicable as a matter of course."[8]

One should not, of course, simplify what is in fact a very complex set of issues. It may well be that the state of political science, and even of international politics, is now sufficiently advanced to offer relatively more opportunities for relatively more deductive (*followed by hypothesis-testing*) efforts than have so far been attempted. But major areas of science, areas that have really achieved great progress, have made and continue to make substantial use of inductive reasoning. Enormous breakthroughs in understanding the causes of various diseases, such as cancer, are now emerging from the examination of massive material on occupation, habitation, and family history, where the researcher has very little explicit theory to guide him. Kenneth Boulding, for one, asserts that war is a problem of public health, and that the social sciences have to be essentially therapeutic or "medical" sciences. Surely it is a mistake to hold up one idealized style of research as the model for politics, ignoring work such as that typified by much of biology, a field perhaps near in method as well as substance to our own.

Induction *per se* has been much maligned. Whatever the approach,

[5] Sir William Cecil Dampier, *A History of Science* (New York 1942), 457-58. His reference to Campbell is *Physics, the Elements* (Cambridge 1920).

[6] A striking example is the work of Watson and Crick on DNA. See James D. Watson, *The Double Helix* (New York 1969).

[7] *Patterns of Discovery* (London 1958), 71.

[8] *Ibid.*, 90.

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the goal is to arrive at non-obvious propositions. Some of our colleagues in natural science may *now* be more heavily deductive than we, but that is in part made possible by *past* inductive successes that have become embedded in their knowledge. Because our discipline of international politics has been sorely lacking in good, deductive, formal, rigorous theory, we have often been forced to be rather heavily inductive, and have achieved substantial payoffs despite the handicap of weak theory. Inductive uses of various techniques, such as multiple regression, factor analysis, multi-dimensional scaling, "causal modelling," and "curve fitting," have proved valuable. Their productivity provides a powerful defense of induction, at what I have called the "macroscopic" level and especially at this stage in the growth of what is still a youthful science.[9]

Oran Young's review, referred to above, raises a number of points relevant to this discussion. Fundamentally, the review is a broadside against the use of inductive methods in science, especially in the study of international politics, and an attack on *International Regions* as a horrible example of "puristic induction."[10] The precise grounds for dissatisfaction are not as clear as they might be, and the author manages in side comments to say just enough positive things about induction so that it is hard to pin him down as the sweeping foe of inductive procedures that he in fact seems to be. For example, he makes a belated recognition, quite at variance with the review's thrust, that "description itself is a useful enterprise" (p. 507). The review's tone and content, however, make it a one-sided obiter dictum, with some patent distortions of the book. Thus there are several peripheral points to be made before turning to the main issue.

Most serious among the distortions is on Young's page 494, where he charges inability "to find any operational indicators with which to measure political integration," and quotes a passage from the book. Since this is a major point (at least he cites the same passage four

[9] See my "A Macroscopic View of International Politics," in Vincent Davis, Maurice East, and James N. Rosenau, eds., *The Analysis of International Politics* (New York forthcoming). Some of this discussion is taken from there. See also portions of the work of Hayward Alker, Harold Guetzkow, Robert North, R. J. Rummel, J. David Singer, and Raymond Tanter, among others, for nontrivial propositions stemming in part from inductive efforts.

[10] On the four pages 489-92 Young six times describes the book as indulging in the search for empirical generalizations "as an end in itself." He cites two authorities, May Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," in Brodbeck, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (New York 1968), and Gordon Tullock, *The Organization of Inquiry* (Durham 1966), ch. 5, on the inefficiency of "puristic induction" for generating hypotheses. Neither, however, uses the term nor, so far as I can see, is really relevant. Tullock's definition of induction is narrower than the common one, yet once we agree on the need for testing all hypotheses, however they are derived, his presentation actually seems sympathetic to induction.

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times) bearing on an alleged failure to test hypotheses about linking regionalism with political integration, it would seem important to give a complete and accurate citation. But in fact he completely changes the meaning of the passage with an ellipsis: "Responsiveness is a difficult phenomenon to measure reliably at the level of international politics. . . ." "Accordingly I have not attempted to do so for the macroanalysis of this volume." Omitted were the words "and I devoted an entire previous volume (Russett, 1963)[11] to trying to do so for just the United States and Britain and relate the results to a study of their apparent causes. Even there it was far easier to measure the variables which are supposed to influence responsiveness than to get more than a rather gross measure of the dependent variable itself." The next paragraph leads immediately to a chapter-long effort to develop and test hypotheses dealing with "part of a minimal requirement of responsiveness": the avoidance of violent conflict between states whose actions are salient to each other. That chapter, and my earlier work that I cite, stand against the accusation of not having "demonstrated any theoretical links between regionalism and integration (or even any empirical correlations)."[12]

More curious than the distortion, however, is Young's understanding of the scientific endeavor. The passage from which he quoted selectively asserted that part of a very large task had been done in *International Regions*, a portion had been addressed in my earlier work, and some indeed remained for future efforts. Apparently his view of science is that one does everything in a single work—that a theory emerges full-blown in concept and in empirical evidence. Sometimes that *may* seem to be the case, but very rarely is it so. Basically, scientific work proceeds by a process of cumulation, with a researcher building explicitly on his own and others' work, and benefitting from a division of labor by method and research style.

One other misreading of the book requires correction. On page 487

[11] The reference is to *Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963).

[12] Young seems to have had some second thoughts about his objectivity. After saying in the *text* on p. 494 that the book "fails to offer any hypotheses" on the links between regionalism and integration he added a *footnote*: "One or two possible exceptions such as the link between regional ties and war are discussed in a later section of this essay. In general, however, the statement in the text seems accurate." Also, pp. 490-91, where he declares "even when empirical data are carefully arrayed to display any statistical regularities in their relationships (and Russett seldom does this)," leaves me mystified. If he is using the term statistical correctly, in the sense of rigorous inference from a sample to a population, I *never* am able to do this. As explained on p. 218, to do so "would require assumptions about random samples and the distribution of values in a universe" that are not appropriate to the data and such a goal was not part of the study. If he is merely using the word loosely, in the sense of quantitative relationships, then I am doubly perplexed.

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he notes, and laments, the abandonment of any requirement of physical contiguity in use of the term "region." Using as authority "a typical dictionary definition" of region, he implies that anyone who defines his terms otherwise is guilty of obfuscation. In fact (on my p. 12), there is an explicit note about the abandonment of the requirement of contiguity, a reference to the geographical literature as the precedent, and a clear statement that such usage corresponds to the geographers' regional types. A major purpose of the book was to inquire empirically into the degree to which contiguity is related to the other factors commonly used, in the literature of economics, geography, and politics, to identify a "region." Negative findings are here, as elsewhere in scientific inquiry, important.

Furthermore, an equally important purpose was to discover whether the other various criteria do coincide. The book is explicitly *not* devoted "to the blind alley of pinning down an aggregative definition in empirical terms," but spends substantial effort "employing a number of these variables separately" (which he accuses it of *not* having done, p. 489). Young alleges that the effort "fails to produce a viable solution even in empirical terms: "As he [Russett] himself points out, 'There is *no* region or aggregate of national units that can in the very strict sense of boundary congruence be identified as a subsystem of the international system' (p. 191). And this is the case despite several built-in biases favoring the discovery of regions. . . ." That is just the point. Many authors, Young not excluded,[13] have long engaged in elaborate "descriptions" of international systems and subsystems, descriptions that have been devoid of rigorous empirical foundation. On the basis of *International Regions*, no one can legitimately do so again. In this sense, a major (but not the sole) task of the book is indeed description. It is unabashedly in the tradition of the classifiers, of Linnaeus or of some of my colleagues at the Yale Economic Growth Center, who gather information so as to produce ordered, precise categories, based on replicable data, for the creation of typologies. Taxonomy has an important role to play in the preparation of material for later correlational analysis, or even for deductive reasoning. In this aspect the book is an effort to find out if existing geographically ordered concepts like "African state," or "Latin American nation," have any *general* empirical referent, and hence are useful in scientific analysis. In the discussion about international regions and comparative politics (pp. 7-10) this seems clear.

[13] See his "Political Discontinuities in the International System," *World Politics*, XX (April 1968), 369-92.

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The variables on which the classification was attempted are not unrelated to theory. Each empirical effort examining sociocultural patterns, UN behavior, international organization membership, trade, and proximity is explicitly derived from existing theories of international integration, both in the opening chapter (pp. 10-11) and in more extended theoretical discussions in the substantive chapters. The perspective that led to the choice of these variables is theoretically based, and reasons are given. Critics of induction too often fail to realize that the mere selection of variables for inductive analysis is necessarily based on some theory, however vague or implicit.

Induction has sometimes been likened to engaging in a fishing expedition. Although intended pejoratively, actually the term is not a bad one. Even the inductive political fisherman needs some theory to guide him. He has to know what pools and streams to fish in, how to select tackle, and how to manipulate the tackle. Some inchoate theory must specify what the most promising variables for the inductive exercise are to be, and he had better understand the kind of functional relationships that his procedures are seeking. It is hardly worthwhile to use statistical procedures that search for additive relationships among variables if an adequate theoretical system specifies multiplicative relationships. If revolutionary potential is a curvilinear function of income, he will not discover it by using only a linear regression model. And surely he needs the ability to formulate a set of alternative hypotheses so as tentatively to "explain" the results. Only with that much theory can he then go on to understand more about the relationships, to formulate further and more explicit hypotheses about what the causal mechanism is and under what circumstances it applies. Doing political analysis without theory is like fishing with a bent pin in a laundry tub, and likely in the long run to be about as profitable.

Even without good theory, inductively discovered patterns can often be used for substantial periods to predict political behavior for *policy* purposes—if we know empirically that A is associated with B, we may derive important policy benefits from predicting changes in B as a result of changes in A, without knowing *why*. I suggested in *International Regions* that such was true in the international system of the past two decades. This is a difference between prediction and explanation, or perhaps between one kind of engineering and science. And however exciting and important the discovery of high correlations may be, prediction without "understanding" is vulnerable to system changes. In this respect our present understanding of international politics is perhaps comparable to the understanding of American

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voting behavior reached by the early survey analysts. They established that certain demographic characteristics, such as religion, income, and occupation, were highly correlated with partisan choice.[14] These correlations were fairly stable over time—but sometimes enough individuals, typically less than 20 percent, changed their votes to reverse the outcome of the preceding election. Induction and knowing the gross correlations were not enough to know the dynamic elements—who would change, and whether the changes would be enough to make a major shift in the state of the system. Yet it is hard to imagine these later inquiries into the dynamics being carried out in the absence of the inductive findings of the early ones.

To examine his image of the emperor's raiment, Young sees himself as surrounded by sycophants who say what their patron wants to hear; he is the child of pure heart who speaks up because no one else will do so and "studies such as *International Regions and the International System* have tended to enjoy an immunity from searching criticism." Only he is willing "to call a spade a spade" (p. 509). In light of the innumerable and sometimes penetrating attacks made upon quantitative research in international politics, this is an interesting fantasy.[15] But this is not the time to sit in judgment upon any particular approach to the study of international politics, whether that approach be quantitative or more traditional, inductive or deductive. It is a question *not* of doubting the need for rigorous theory, but of urging students that if they write critical essays on specific empirically based works—as some people must do if the profession's standards are to be maintained and raised—they should also discover the tribulations and put their own reputations on the line by engaging in the hard work of scientific analysis. They may do modern data-gathering and manipulation, or they may learn the mathematical and formal logical skills required to practice deduction in any promising way. It is striking how many historians and philosophers of science have had formal training in the sciences. Basically, the defenders of science must also be its practitioners.

[14] Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York 1944), and Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago 1954).

[15] One attack, which Young cites twice and from which he takes his image, is that of his colleague Marion J. Levy, "'Does it Matter if He's Naked?' Bawled the Child," in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds. *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton 1969). Young protests that he does not oppose the use of quantitative data "when such data are employed in the interest of developing theory." Nevertheless there is little evidence in his publications that he feels it important enough to do much of it.

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Review Articles

THE STUDY OF FRENCH POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Toward the Revocation of Paradox

By FRED I. GREENSTEIN AND SIDNEY G. TARROW

Charles Roig and Françoise Billon-Grand, *La Socialisation Politique des Enfants: Contribution à l'Etude de la Formation des Attitudes Politiques en France*, Paris, Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques 163, Librairie Armand Colin, 1968, 186 pp., NF 28.80.

"WHEREAS in post-war Britain youth has often channelled its energies into violent self-expression, destructive or creative, in France the dominant impression left by all the varying tendencies is of a kind of docile listlessness." A competent British commentator on French politics and society had the misfortune of appearing in print with this assertion about French youth in June of 1968—that is, at precisely the time when many members of France's younger generation were participating in that violent form of self-expression that has come to be called "the Events."[1]

That *les événements* were so unexpected serves as a reminder of a profound void in our knowledge of France: there is virtually no systematic evidence on the political socialization of children and young people in that puzzling system. Such information would of course be relevant to explaining outbreaks like the student rebellion of May 1968. But there are two more basic reasons—both of which apply with special force to France—why under certain circumstances studies of political socialization ought to have especially high priority. Such research is likely to be particularly profitable (1) if the aspects of the system that interest the analyst need to be dealt with by psychological (as distinguished from "structural" or "situational") variables and (2) if these analytically interesting psychological variables are ones that seem to persist from generation to generation.[2]

[1] John Ardagh, *The New French Revolution* (London 1968), 347. Nevertheless, Ardagh provides an excellent introduction to French life in 1968.

[2] This is not to say that political socialization research is relevant *only* to studying intergenerational consistencies. An obvious further point for inquiry is those circumstances under which different generations have undergone significantly different life experiences. A further cautionary note: although political socialization data, and psychological data in general, are often necessary in order to explain individual or group

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All behavior is of course dependent upon both structural and psychological determinants, but sometimes it is mainly the "outer" factors, and sometimes the "inner," that are of analytic interest. Thus, psychological variables are not central in explaining why the voting turnout in the United States is lower than it is in Western Europe, a difference that appears to be explicable in terms of variations in voter registration and residency requirements. On the other hand, it has often been argued that the French bring distinctive configurations of political psychology (individualism, unwillingness to compromise, hostility to authority, etc.) into play in responding to their political world. And it is often held as well that the psychological style of French politics has been strikingly consistent through the years—and through the regimes.[3]

Hence there is great intrinsic interest in the volume under review, a report by Charles Roig and Françoise Billon-Grand of the University of Grenoble on the first major inquiry into the political socialization of French children. Although, as the authors point out, their investigation was exploratory rather than conclusive, it is important both as a contribution to the literature on political socialization in different systems and as a source for reflection on the psychological style of French politics. Before we discuss the Grenoble findings and their implications, it will be instructive to note a number of continuing problems in—and with—the study of French politics.

I. France as Paradox: Methodological and Substantive Problems in the Literature

No one denies that France is puzzling. Here is a nation second to none in extravagant expressions of patriotism, but one that appears persistently over the years to have harbored substantial numbers of citizens who viewed favorably the prospect that whatever constitution happened to be in force at the moment might be overthrown; a nation with achievements that might seem to be a source of pride and satisfaction,

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behavior, they rarely are sufficient. Consider, for example, the French national survey finding that President de Gaulle's popularity was *rising* during the months leading up to *les événements*. "La Crise de Mai 1968," *Sondages: Revue Française de l'Opinion Publique*, II (1968) 9. But clearly De Gaulle's aggregate national popularity was less important than his popularity in specific, politically relevant population groups. And even more important, psychological data should not be considered alone—in the absence of data on situational stimuli—in explanations of behavior. On the latter point, see the elegant formulation of M. Brewster Smith: "A Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics," *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV (July 1968), 15-28.

[3] This has been argued most forcefully by Stanley Hoffmann. See, in particular, his "Paradoxes of the French Political Community" in Stanley Hoffmann and others, eds., *In Search of France* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963) and "Heroic Leadership: The Case of Modern France," in Lewis J. Edinger, ed., *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis* (New York 1967), 108-54.

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but one that has had five republics, two monarchies, two empires, and a collaborationist government in its unoccupied area, since the demise of the old regime. Yet what is striking about analyses of these and other seeming inconsistencies of French politics is the failure often even to attempt to *explain*. The tendency is to describe, sometimes to exaggerate, and even to *celebrate* the mysteriousness of French politics.

The notion of "paradox"—a term from the lexicon of rhetoric rather than logic—is inordinately common in writings about France:

> There is a paradox in a tradition derived from a revolution which itself was a revolution against traditionalism.[4] [One suspects that revolutionary traditions are no more nor less "paradoxical" in, say, the United States or Mexico. But somehow the task of analyzing *French* politics seems especially likely to evoke references to "paradox."]
>
> The paradox of authority [in France] is that what France needs most is what she has always been least able to breed, and what she must discard is what has been most resilient.[5] [Is this a statement that is in any sense falsifiable?]
>
> In France there are a great many radical electors, a certain number of radical deputies, and a very small number of radical ministers; as for the heads of the bureaucracy, they are all reactionaries. He who properly understands this has the key to our politics.[6] [To what other political system—excepting perhaps the Soviet—is an enigmatic apothegm thought to provide a "key"?]

In part this emphasis on paradox is purely stylistic, but it also seems to result from three related intellectual practices that are common in writings on French politics:

First, much of the writing on France begins with the premise that because France is somehow different from other political systems, the analytic modes used to describe it—the concepts and the ways they are used—need also to be distinctive. This makes evaluation of findings and conclusions difficult, for, as Stanley Hoffmann writes, "the problem of comparison becomes hopeless when the scholar is faced with empirical studies that celebrate the uniqueness of each experience."[7]

An example is "the System," an indispensable concept to analysts of the Fourth Republic. This term appears in the Index of Williams' classic *Crisis and Compromise* forty-eight times, but it is only on page

[4] David Thomson, *Democracy in France since 1870* (New York and London 1964), 11. Our choice of texts is not intended to be representative but merely illustrative of some of the best writing in France.

[5] Hoffmann, "Paradoxes," 108.

[6] Alain (Emile Chartier) *Eléments d'une Doctrine Radicale* (Paris 1933), 25.

[7] Hoffmann, "Heroic Leadership," 113.

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201 that we discover that it is being used in neither its scientific nor its commonsense usage, but rather in the very special French sense of "... the System by which a Parliament of multiple parties and shifting coalitions excluded strong personalities from power, and deprived the ordinary citizen of any sense of participation in the government of his country."[8] And concepts are frequently wielded with a curious dialectic of mixed incompatibilities, a sort of Cartesian neither-nor. This mode of argument begins with two polar types like "liberalism" and "authoritarianism," and then affirms that the French style uniquely combines features of both. The difficulty with such assertions is that they cannot be disproved. If a given "style" is seen as a synthesis of two others, then empirical findings may be assigned to either half of the amalgam without invalidating the other.[9]

Second, there is a tendency to use "History" as a sufficient explanation for contemporary political patterns. Thus, one of France's most gifted political scientists writes of the period after World War I: "The weight of the pre-1914 tradition prevented the French political system from reforming itself so as to be able to handle the wholly new problems France had to face after 1914."[10] But why should the "weight of the past" inhibit change after 1914 and not in 1789? Clearly, the political scientist ignores history at his peril, but explanations of the *genesis* of a phenomenon are never sufficient to account for its *maintenance*.

Finally, and subsuming the two previous points, we may note the fundamentally unempirical nature of much writing about France. By this we refer neither to the scarcity of work reporting empirical findings, nor to the tendency of some students of French politics to employ largely deductive reasoning. Rather the difficulty appears to be the absence in much work on France of the appropriate combination of inductive inference from data and deductive predictions about data. When applied by a Tocqueville, or, more recently, a Luethy or a Wylie, unsystematic procedures for considering evidence can lead to brilliant speculations. But the speculations of such writers are too often treated as final verities, rather than being subjected to rigorous assessment.[11] In short, there is insufficient awareness that theorizing and data-

[8] Philip Williams, *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic* (Garden City, N.Y. 1966), 201.

[9] "Neither-nor" is Hoffmann's phrase; he uses it in a classic instance of polar type analysis: "Paradoxes," 8.

[10] François Goguel, "Six Authors in Search of a National Character," in *In Search of France*, 393.

[11] There seems to us to be too much of this tendency in Michel Crozier's enormously imaginative *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago 1964).

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gathering need to be employed in a continuing, self-correcting sequence of operations designed to *re*voke rather than evoke paradox.[12]

Three continuing concerns of students of French politics—concerns that have not received sufficiently systematic empirical scrutiny—bear on French patterns of partisanship, conflict, and authority. Each of these matters, as we shall show, raises interesting questions about French political socialization—questions we can now begin to answer as a consequence of the Grenoble study.

(1) PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION

Some writers on France have interpreted partisanship as being so strong that parties or tendencies form "subcultures."[13] Early writers, perhaps because they found that certain geographic regions were electorally stable over long periods, concluded there was an inbuilt *tendance* in the French voter, or even, over the generations, in the French family."[14] Apart from the fact that identification with *tendances* has a different meaning for the political system than would identification with party, and that geographical voting stability can disguise great fluidity in the voting of individuals within an area, the actual importance and meaning to individual voters of *tendance* and party was not empirically established.[15] The result was to build an implicit assumption of high politicization into many of the accepted explanations of French politics.

(2) THE CONFLICT SOCIETY

In part as a result of assuming high frequencies of partisan identification, many writers have drawn an insufficiently clarified or documented picture of the depth of ideological conflict in the French electorate. As one writer puts it, "throughout French political history . . .

[12] See, for example, Herbert Luethy, *France Against Herself* (Cleveland and New York 1968), 3. Luethy writes: "Abstractions can be exhaustively defined, but a personality never. . . . In this respect, France evades all definitions. However sharply and clearly defined her outlines may seem from a distance, she evades the hands that seek to grasp her." Needless to say, works conceived in this spirit are not likely to yield testable—much less tested—hypotheses.

[13] Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (August 1956), 391-409, and Almond and Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston 1966), 263-265.

[14] For example, the earliest and perhaps the greatest of these writers, André Siegfried, wrote; "I have observed that the voter knows very well what he wants and even better what he doesn't want . . . he almost always has a *tendance* that marks his behavior." *Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest* (Paris 1964 ed.), ix.

[15] A recent study based upon survey data builds its analysis entirely upon a fixed-choice item on *tendance*, without ever ascertaining whether "Extreme Left," "Left," etc., were salient and meaningful to the respondents. Emeric Deutsch and others, *Les Familles Politiques Aujourd'hui en France* (Paris 1966), 11-15.

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there have been two 'tempers' which may be called Jacobin or Girondin; each can be found at the same time or in rapid succession *in every sector of French opinion*."[16] There are several numerical variations on the notion of *les deux Frances*, but common to all of them is an implicit assumption about political socialization and its consequences: that France's internal divisions are profound because individuals are socialized into "ideological families" through family, church, and party, and that these socializing agencies "reinforce one another in their effects on opinion."[17]

(3) THE FRENCH STYLE OF AUTHORITY

Writing mainly in the "national character" tradition, various observers have described a uniquely French set of attitudes toward authority, including political authority.[18] Although such assertions are not of a piece, they typically stress the tightly knit, hierarchical structure of the family *foyer*, its reinforcement in the discipline of the schoolroom, its counterfoil in the peer group's reaction by forming "negative communities," and its culmination in a style of political authority that combines "limited authoritarianism" with "potential insurrection."[19] In short, these writers suggest rather direct links between socialization processes and regularities in French politics. To date, however, their assertions do not appear to have been satisfactorily transformed into falsifiable propositions and appropriately tested.

After an overview of the Grenoble study, we shall return to these three themes, indicating how political socialization research can contribute to their clarification. Certain of the Grenoble findings are relevant to establishing—if not conclusively—the empirical standing of the first two themes. The issues connected with the French style of authority would call for a quite different research design than that used in Grenoble, although a few of the Grenoble findings are germane. It must be emphasized that Professors Roig and Billon-Grand are not to be held responsible for our interpretations of their findings. By and large they present their data without very extensive analytic embellishment,

[16] Hoffmann, "Paradoxes," 18. Italics added.

[17] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton 1963) 133-34.

[18] The basic work here is, of course Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*. Also see Hoffmann "Paradoxes"; Jesse R. Pitts, "Continuity and Change in Bourgeois France," in *In Search of France*; Laurence Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse* (Cambridge, Mass. 1967, rev. ed. New York 1964); and Rhoda Metraux and Margaret Mead, *Themes in French Culture: A Preface to a Study of French Community* (Palo Alto 1954).

[19] Hoffmann, "Paradoxes," 8.

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and those interpretative observations they do make frequently take for granted explanations of French politics we are about to question.

II. The Grenoble Study: An Overview

(1) The Study and the Sample

Two influences led to the appearance of *La Socialisation Politique des Enfants*. One, as Charles Roig points out in his introduction, was a puzzling observation made in the course of his research on French local politics, and the other was the stimulus of a new body of empirical work. The puzzling observation was of the contrast, on the one hand, "between the profound socioeconomic changes affecting" these local communities and, on the other, the "stability . . . of the cleavages and political attitudes of their residents" (p. 13). The body of literature was the halting, exploratory, and sometimes fumbling efforts of American scholars to uncover the nature of children's political learning.[20]

Roig, who was joined by Billon-Grand at the data-analysis stage, was stimulated to carry out a paper-and-pencil questionnaire survey of the political orientations of French schoolchildren. In all, he was able to collect 413 usable questionnaires, administered in the classroom to children in Grenoble and its outlying areas. The children range in age from ten to fourteen, but most are between eleven and thirteen, the equivalents of sixth-, seventh-, and eighth-grade students in the United States. They tend to be from middle-class, nonfarm occupational backgrounds: about two-thirds reported nonmanual paternal occupations, less than a tenth reported farming, and only about a quarter reported manual occupations. The questionnaires were administered early in 1964—that is, in the aftermath of France's disengagement from the Algerian war.

The questionnaire, which was administered by the schoolteachers rather than the investigators themselves, was about evenly divided between fixed-choice and open-ended questions dealing with various aspects of political information and attitudes. Using this instrument and

[20] Roig was first impressed by a paper presented to the Fifth World Congress of the International Association of Political Science by David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World" (Paris 1961). Easton and Hess were reporting on a national survey of American children that has since been more fully reported in Robert Hess and Judith Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (Chicago 1967) and David Easton and Jack Dennis in *Children and the Political System: The Origins of Political Legitimacy* (New York 1969). Roig and Billon-Grand draw periodically for comparisons on various reports by these investigators and on the study of New Haven, Connecticut children reported in Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven 1965).

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procedure it was possible to establish a great deal about the political orientations of French children, although, as we shall see, there are a number of points at which much less structured procedures, probably involving direct interviewing, now appear to be desirable in order to get more precisely at the subjective aspects of political socialization in France.

The authors' findings and presentation also were affected by a pair of obstacles they encountered, which tell us something about both political psychology and the acceptance of social research in France. First, they were forced to content themselves with a smaller and far less representative sample than they had hoped to draw, because of objections that were raised to inquiries into children's partisan orientations.[21] Secondly, they were under considerable financial constraint, and this appears responsible for their failure to introduce certain standard statistical controls in reporting their data, and possibly also for their failure to test for statistical significance. (Significance tests can be useful, even in nonrandom samples, as a rule of thumb for deciding which variations are worth discussing.) Nevertheless, the reader may compute his own significance tests, and the authors do provide information on their sample which helps compensate for the lack of controls.

The information on sample-composition needs especially to be used for estimating the degree to which subgroup differences are real or spurious. The authors' typical table takes the form of a presentation of the responses of their entire sample to some item or series of items, with a further set of comparisons of boys and girls, parochial- and public-schoolchildren, and children at different school-year levels. Since the subgroups differ from each other on more than one characteristic, and since the combined effect of more than one independent variable is rarely analyzed,[22] the reader has to interpret comparisons in the light of possible artifactual biases.

The possible source of bias in the authors' sex comparisons is socio-economic status: the girls are higher than the boys in parental occupational status. The effect of the sampling deficiency would be to enhance the level of political information and involvement found in the female subsample. But in fact the French girls were *less* politicized than the boys, a convincing corroboration of the finding in the United States that adult political sex differences begin to take shape during

[21] As Professor Roig laconically puts it, there were "des pétitions émanant d'associations et de syndicats, des prises de positions diverses, etc." (p. 14).

[22] Chap. IX is an exception, but there the attempt is to discover whether patterns exist among different attitude-questions, and the independent variables of sex, age, or type of school are excluded.

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the preadolescent years.[23] Absence of a control for socioeconomic status also must be taken account of in interpreting the parochial-school–public-school comparisons: the parochial-school children were about 10 percent more likely than those in public school to come from nonmanual parental occupational backgrounds. Here again, fortunately, the bias does not preclude making use of the findings. If the standard theories about French cleavage are correct, one would expect especially sharp attitudinal differences between the *école publique* and *école privée* children, with the Republican socialization of the former reinforced by their lower socioeconomic origins, and the anti-Republicanism of the latter reinforced by higher status. But as we shall see, it is the mildness rather than the acuteness of the parochial-school–public-school differences that is theoretically interesting.

The Grenoble data on "school year" are multiply confounded by uncontrolled differences in socioeconomic status, school type, and to a lesser extent age. The French school system is partly "streamed" and, as in other such systems, the selection of "high-ability" children for university-preparatory streams at the same time involves an uneven selection of upper socioeconomic-status children into the higher streams. But in the earlier school-year levels the system is unstreamed and socially heterogeneous; furthermore, different regions are at different stages of transition from a traditional streamed to a modern semi-comprehensive system.[24] The Grenoble data are reported in the following school-year categories: (1) socially heterogeneous primary-school students of ages ten and eleven (*cours moyen*), (2) largely middle-class children of eleven and twelve in the secondary schools designed for able children—the *lycées* and *collèges*—and, (3) lower-status children in a school-terminating program (*classe de fin d'étude*). The authors occasionally use the third of these groups as an indicator of lower socioeconomic status, but we have generally avoided this temptation because this group differs from the others in age and school type as well. But we *do* occasionally refer to the older children in the *lycée-collège* category (the *cinquième*, which in the United States would be eighth grade) as a way of estimating the upper limits of preadolescent political learning in France.

[23] Another corroboration: the French girls, like adult females in several countries, are more likely to be "pacifistic" on questions about war, harsh punishment for crimes, and revolution (pp. 69-70, 115). For some American findings on sex differences and a summary of the relevant literature, see Greenstein, chap. 6, and Hess and Torney, chap. 8.

[24] For an introduction to the complexities of French school organization see W. D. Halls, *Society, Schools and Progress in France* (Oxford 1965), chap. 6.

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One striking substantive impression emerges from the various subgroup comparisons: *the within-sample variations among the Grenoble children are remarkably slight,* even though many of them are in expected directions. It is a reasonable presumption that sharp, stable, and historically continuous cleavages in adult attitudes would be at least presaged in the preadult years; conversely, it is reasonable to suspect that adult psychological differences, which do not begin to take shape during later childhood, may be of rather low intensity.[25] On the assumption that the limited internal variation in the Grenoble sample reflects a childhood political culture that for some purposes can be treated as homogeneous, we may tentatively compare the overall distribution of responses in Grenoble to overall findings in the United States.

(2) SOURCES OF POLITICAL LEARNING

As in the United States, it seems that most political learning takes place in the child's face-to-face environment and through the somewhat under-appreciated vehicle of the mass media. At the face-to-face level, four-fifths of the Grenoble respondents report having heard conversations about politics among adults. We would expect less exposure to adult political conversation in the United States.[26] There are, as we shall see, important reasons for wanting to know about the level of political communication in French families, and therefore it is unfortunate that this is one of the points at which the methodology of the Grenoble study does not permit a conclusive finding: the political-conversation item was fixed-choice, placing no inhibition on exaggeration, and the principle term—"politics"—was undefined and seems on the basis of other of the findings to be unclear to children.[27]

Television-viewing evidently is as widespread among French as among American children, with virtually every respondent reporting at least some attention to the medium, and, it would seem, to television newscasts.[28] Indeed, the infrequent nonviewing is confined to middle-

[25] For the rationale behind this assertion, see Greenstein, 78-84.

[26] Unfortunately strictly comparable American data are hard to come by, but the American surveys consistently find fewer adults who claim political interest than could possibly generate an 80 percent incidence of overheard political conversations by children. The proportion of American adults who reported that they "talked with someone and tried to persuade him how to vote" was about one-third in the Survey Research Center's 1952, 1956, 1960, and 1964 national surveys. For these and similar SRC findings see John Robinson and others, *Measures of Political Attitudes* (Ann Arbor, Michigan 1968).

[27] The item was "Avez-vous entendu des grandes personnes parler de politique? Souvent-Quelquefois-Jamais" (p. 169).

[28] For a comprehensive study of American children's exposure to television and its consequences, see W. Schramm, J. Lyle, and E. B. Parker, *Television in the Lives of Our Children* (Stanford 1961).

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class secondary-schoolchildren, while the highest proportion of viewers was in the lower-class terminal program. Since the diffusion of home television receivers is still far from complete in France, these findings suggest that a good many of the respondents may go to considerable lengths to expose themselves to the medium, a finding of political significance in a system that is ruthless about bending television to government purposes.[29]

The design of the Grenoble study, like that of all other political socialization research until the recent work of Langton and Jennings in the United States,[30] permits no assessment of the effect of formal instruction in civics. The provision for *instruction civique* in French schools appears, as Roig and Billon-Grand note (pp. 180-84), to be met only in a perfunctory way.[31] And the French child gets none of the training in free debate and self-government that is stressed in American schools. But he does receive a catechism of *civisme*—or, more properly, *gallicisme*—in the teaching of history and geography.[32] The emphasis in French schools on nationalism, combined with the lack of emphasis on the actual functioning of the political system, is interesting in that it may lead French children to identify with an abstract entity called "the State," but to have very little sense of obligation to actual governments.[33]

(3) POLITICAL INFORMATION AND PERCEPTIONS

In the United States, the one aspect of the political system that children—even very young children—are certain to be aware of is the Presidency. From this and other evidence, it has been argued that the American Presidency, because it is perceived so early and monopolizes so much of the child's initial learning, provides a basis for organizing further political perception and learning, and contributes to the adult's president-centered vision of the political system.[34] In Fifth-Republic

[29] See Henry Ehrmann's chapter on "Political Socialization through the Mass Media," in his *Politics in France* (Boston 1968), 152-68.

[30] Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Socialization and the High School Curriculum in the United States," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (September 1968), 852-67.

[31] Also see Jean-William LaPierre and Georges Noizet, *Une Recherche sur le Civisme des Jeunes à la Fin de la Quatrième République* (Aix-en-Provence 1961), 11-12.

[32] Both the francophilia and the lack of training in self-government are unforgettably described in Jean Boorsch's "Primary Education," in the number of *Yale French Studies* entitled "Why Jeannot *Can* Read," XX (Winter-Spring 1958-59), 28, 31-35.

[33] LaPierre and Noizet (pp. 86-89) present the results of interviews with older secondary-school students who exhibit idealized attitudes toward "the State" but rather tolerant views toward "gypping the government, 68-89.

[34] Greenstein, chaps. 3 and 4.

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France, it seems likely that, at least during the long tenure in office of its first incumbent, the Presidency had some of the same political socialization function. Only ten of the 413 Grenoble sample children failed correctly to name De Gaulle as the President of the Republic (p. 75);[35] no other piece of political information was so widely shared. Thus the French child of the period of the Grenoble research, like the American child, absorbed information about further aspects of the political system—for example, the legislature—into a mental set in which the Presidency already occupied a central position.

Information about other aspects of the political system was, in fact, *much* less widely distributed than was information about the President of the Republic, at the ages covered in the Grenoble study. Eighty-seven percent of the Grenoble children recognized De Gaulle as a political figure ("*homme politique*") and 82 percent were able to label Pompidou as political in response to a fixed-choice item. But, even though there was nothing in the item to restrain guessing, only 61 percent perceived Guy Mollet, 22 percent Pierre Mendès-France and a mere 9 percent Maurice Thorez as political figures.[36] Fifty-five percent applied "*homme politique*" to General Raoul Salan, who, although influential in the military politics of the late stages of the Algerian conflict, was scarcely a politician. And 11 percent named the television journalist Léon Zitrone. While it is almost axiomatic that children's political information is likely to be low, the poor recognition-rate of such partisan figures as Mendès-France and Thorez, and the identification of Salan and Zitrone as "political," raises the question of what the Grenoble children were thinking of when they reported overhearing adult political conversation. These low levels of political information, which would be no surprise in the United States, are part of a pattern of Grenoble findings that appears inconsistent with the thesis that France is a highly politicized nation.

Our skepticism about this thesis is further increased by findings on the phenomenon commonly referred to by that ubiquitous term in French political studies—"*tendance*." Apart from their inability to rec-

[35] Compare the American findings in *ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

[36] However, the largely working-class children in the terminal program have a slightly higher recognition-rate of the late Communist leader (by 6 percent) and of Socialist leader Mollet (by 7 percent) than the older secondary-school students. Partisan information tends to be lower than other types of political information in French secondary-school children. J.-W. LaPierre and G. Noizet report that, of a battery of twenty political-information questions on international affairs, institutions, current events, and parties, the three items with the highest nonresponse rate are partisan items. See their "L'information Politique du Jeunes Français en 1962," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, XIV (June 1964), 492.

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ognize Communist leader Thorez, the Grenoble children were almost totally unable to name any "*homme politique de gauche*," although they had just—in the item described immediately above—been presented with the names of Thorez, Mollet, and Mendès-France. Only 34 percent responded at all; of those who responded, De Gaulle (14 percent), Pompidou (5 percent) and Salan (5 percent) were most commonly said to be of the Left! (Thorez was mentioned by only 1 percent of the children.) If *tendance* were a stable (and highly charged) aspect of French political attitudes, would it not be reflected in greater partisan information?

(4) POLITICAL AFFECT: PREFERENCES AND IDENTIFICATIONS

The Grenoble findings on the affective content of French children's political learning point to the same conclusions as do the findings on sources of learning and levels of political information. The data convey a recognizably French portrait of the political socialization process. But by and large the findings do not appear to be what we would expect from children socialized in a society whose adults are polarized along cumulative lines of cleavage—and the data frequently are somewhat elusive on the specifics of the subjective meaning of politics to French children.

In contrast with American children, for whom the President is not only a well-known, but also a *benign*, symbol,[37] the mere 53 percent of the Grenoble children who responded to a question about the qualities of the President of the Republic were somewhat more likely to mention bad (29 percent) than good (24 percent) qualities (p. 77).[38] The readiness of French children to judge the President unfavorably is consistent with many of the standard expectations about French political culture, but the low level of response is not, unless the view is adopted that failure to respond is a sign of covert hostility. Roig and Billon-Grand advance the rather unparsimonious hypothesis that though the younger children fail to respond out of lack of political interest, the older children are unresponsive out of a desire to conceal

[37] Greenstein, chap. 3, and the citations there of the literature through 1965; Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (June 1968), 564-75; Roberta Sigel, "Image of a President: Some Insights into the Political Views of School Children," *ibid.* (March 1968), 216-26.

[38] Also, when asked whom they would like to resemble when they grow up, only 1 percent of the Grenoble children named De Gaulle; when asked whom they would *not* like to resemble, 10 percent named him (40-42), although as with American children the choice of a political figure as a negative exemplar often indicates reluctance to share the vicissitudes of his office rather than animosity. Greenstein, 142.

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their true views. In general, the authors tend to be somewhat *a priori* and *ad hoc* in attributing motives to response patterns. They do not *demonstrate* that covert hostility is behind the failure to respond of any of the children in their sample. Whether covert hostility is concealed by nonresponse needs to be resolved by appropriately open-ended future research.

Unlike the absence of agreement in evaluation of the President of the Republic, consensus was the dominant theme in responses to an item asking for the name of the individual who had done the most for France (p. 64). Out of the eight possible choices, a near majority (48 percent) chose Pasteur, on the face of it the most unpolitical figure on the list, and, we gather, an endlessly praised figure in the elementary-school history curriculum. Another 20 percent chose St. Louis and 12 percent chose Napoleon. There were very few references to past politicians of diverse *tendances* such as Colbert and Gambetta, who were on the list. To what extent does the failure to cite these men, whose names appear on streets everywhere in France, signify an apolitical or anti-political attitude? To what extent does it reflect emphasis in the teaching of history? We do not know yet, and here, again, the Grenoble research now needs to be followed up by work with more probing investigative techniques.

Consensus was also the dominant motif in responses to questions on patriotism (pp. 59-73). The results, similar to those in a number of nations,[39] show that 74 percent would like to live outside of France "only briefly" or "never"; that two-thirds think it is proper for Frenchmen to be prepared to die for their country; that only 22 percent think that traitors to "*la patrie*" should be pardoned, while 38 percent think they should be shot.[40] On the other hand, the divisions on the question "Was the Revolution of 1789 a good or an evil?" were rather striking. Although substantially more children chose good (55 percent) than evil (30 percent), the negative evaluations are impressively large on so fundamental an aspect of a nation's past. We assume that in the United States negative assessments of 1776 would be virtually nonexistent.

[39] See the exceedingly valuable review by A. F. Davies, "The Child's Discovery of Nationality," *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, IV (October 1968), 107-25.

[40] But the "il faut les fusiller" option should not be interpreted as superpatriotism; small children very commonly use hyperbole. Among the older children interviewed by LaPierre and Noizet, 56 percent thought that conscientious objection was excusable or justifiable; "Les Jeunes Français devant L'objection de Conscience," *Revue Française de Sociologie*, IV, No. 3 (July-September 1963), 259-74.

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Again, however, the subjective meaning of the responses is difficult to interpret. The authors, following tradition, tend toward an ideological interpretation, but here they do report open-ended responses, and our impression is that distaste for violence is more common, at least in the children's own explanation of their negative judgments, than are various forms of juvenile anti-republicanism. Statements like "La révolution a fait trop de morts" or "On a coupé la tête à des gens" seem more typical than statements like "Les rois n'étaient pas si mauvais."

Finally, in order to assess the extent to which Left and Right are presaged in children's "latent ideology," the authors—in one of their few cross-tabulations—use the response categories to the French Revolution item as a control for analyzing responses to a large number of other items (pp. 119-22). The findings are mixed: there are only a few items for which "opponents" of the revolution are also "conservative," and these are undramatic. For example, the supporters are eight per cent more likely to consider *laïque* a basic attribute of France, and "opponents" are 10 percent more likely to prefer one-man rule to government by an assembly and 12 percent more likely to choose St. Louis as their national hero. These findings are balanced by a rather larger number of questions on which supporters and opponents of the Revolution either do not differ ("Are there good political parties?" "Should foreigners be made to return to their countries?"), or in which pro-Revolutionary children score higher on "authoritarian" attitudes. ("Must the government always be right against its opponents?" "What should be done with traitors?") Moreover, the absence of controls to partial out third factors further makes the results difficult to interpret as ideological.

Because of these reservations, we cannot share the authors' confidence that "certain political *tendances* appear among individuals with a particular clarity from the age of eleven or twelve" (p. 124). Rather, the findings on political affect lead us to share Henry Ehrmann's general characterization of the findings in *La Socialisation Politique des Enfants*: "Although they came from widely varying family backgrounds, the children's outlook on important historical events and personalities was fairly uniform, a finding one would expect from a society high in consensus. It hardly reflected the divisiveness which historical memories and issues are known to provoke in the adult world."[41]

[41] Ehrmann, 60.

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III. French Partisanship, Social Conflict, and Authority Relations in the Light of Political Socialization Research

(1) orientations to the party system

Major social regularities are sometimes maintained in important ways by seemingly frail psychological threads. An impressive instance of this is the effect on the American political system of citizens' "party identifications." The index of this orientation used in America is deceptively simple: "Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"[42] Party identifications in America are potent, even if passionless. The University of Michigan Survey Research Center has consistently found over the past two decades that three out of every four adult Americans profess a party identification. Further, the distribution of preferences for the two major parties has proved remarkably stable over this period, with the Democrats receiving roughly a three-to-two advantage. And, finally, a matter of great importance: party identification is closely associated with electoral choice—it is the best single attitudinal variable for predicting how an individual will vote.

Party voting contributes to so much of the variation in American electoral behavior that the SRC analysts have come to conceive of a "normal vote," which is the election outcome that could be expected if the existing groups of party identifiers were to go to the polls with the frequencies predicted by their different mean social statuses. By this way of thinking, election outcomes in the United States can be analyzed in terms of the degree to which the party identifiers who make up the bulk of electorate have been led to defect from their parties by issues that are specific to the campaign, and by candidate appeal, plus the division among the small group of independent voters, many of whom are covert identifiers with one or the other of the major parties. In short, the election is a variant on the normal party vote—and ordinarily not much of a variant.

The institutional significance of such widespread party identification is considerable: the predictability of voting behavior makes for fairly stable connections between politicians and various groups in their

[42] The phrase "party identification" was introduced by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center to describe psychological membership in political parties—that is, the citizen's feeling that he *is* a Democrat or a Republican (or a Tory or a Radical Socialist). See the sources cited in Fred I. Greenstein, *The American Party System and the American People* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963), chap. 3, and Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York 1966).

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constituencies; the existence of large stable clienteles for the major parties is a major brake on new "third" parties; and the distribution of support between the parties "anchors" election outcomes—from election to election there is less variability than there would be with fewer party identifiers. The variability is especially low in elections that are not dominated by widely publicized national figures—for instance, Congressional elections.

The processes just described, or rather their absence, appear to be of the greatest importance in accounting for certain regularities of French politics—or so it was argued for American readers a number of years ago in a brilliant paper by Philip Converse and Georges Dupeux entitled "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States."[43] In particular, Converse and Dupeux pointed to the great volatility of French patterns of party support, including the "rise and fall of 'flash' parties like the R.P.F. in 1951, the Poujadists in 1956, and the U.N.R. in 1958." Although such political patterns have often been considered as evidence of a burning intensity of involvement (if a negative one) in the French electorate,[44] Converse and Dupeux point to evidence suggesting that such parties arise in France and not in the United States because the French are *less* politically involved and not *more* politically involved than Americans.[45]

The major difference between the two electorates is that the frequency of party identification is dramatically lower in France than in the United States. In contrast to the 75 percent of Americans who consider themselves party supporters, less than 45 percent of Converse and

[43] Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVI (Spring 1962), 1-23; reprinted as chap. 14 of Campbell and others. Our citations are to the original article. For an earlier treatment see R. D. Masters, "Une Méthode pour Mesurer la Mobilité des Attitudes Politiques," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, X (September 1960), 658-72. For an original application of the Converse and Dupeux analysis to comparative political analysis see James L. Payne, *Patterns of Conflict in Colombia* (New Haven 1968). In France, the fluidity of the party vote and the weakness of party identification was analyzed in several of the "Cahiers" of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. See, in particular, Georges Dupeux, "Le Comportement des Electeurs Français de 1958 à 1962," and Guy Michelat, "Attitudes et Comportements Politiques à L'automne 1962," in *Le Référendum d'Octobre et les Elections de Novembre 1962*, (Paris 1965), 173-287.

[44] This seems to be the interpretation given by Wylie to the large Poujadist vote in 1956. "Their vote for Poujade was a vote against taxation; it was an extremist vote against government; it was also a means of differentiating themselves still more radically from their neighbors." Wylie, 1964 edn., p. 329.

[45] On an index of involvement, such as following political news and attending campaign meetings, the French tend in the aggregate to be less politically involved, or no more politically involved, than Americans. Some of the lesser involvement seems to be explained by the lower mean educational level in France.

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Dupeux's French respondents identified with parties, while another 10 to 15 percent associated themselves with *tendances*. The responses could not be explained by diffidence or dissimulation; they reveal a fundamental difference "in the flavor of partisan processes in the two electorates."[46] Converse and Dupeux comment that "with a very large proportion of the electorate feeling no anchoring loyalty, it is not surprising that a new party can attract a large vote 'overnight,' or that this base can be so rapidly dissolved."[47]

But what accounts for this aspect of French political psychology? The phenomenon of very low frequency of party identification, as Converse and Dupeux point out, "cannot simply be seen as a necessary consequence of a multi-party system *per se*. Fairly comparable data from Norway, where six parties are prominent, show party attachments as widespread as those in the two-party United States."[48] Converse and Dupeux found themselves turning for an answer to the French political socialization process. They analyzed the recollections by French and Americans adults of the prevailing partisan colorations of their families during their childhood, and especially of their fathers' party preferences. Of the Frenchmen and Americans who reported knowledge of their fathers' party preferences, there was an equal likelihood of holding a party identification. But there were extraordinary differences—much larger than most differences found in surveys—between the two

[46] The authors are especially careful about describing their findings in detail. As they put it, "less than 45 percent of those who did not refuse to answer the question were able to classify themselves in one of the parties or splinter groups, while another 10 to 15 percent associated themselves with a more or less recognizable broad *tendance* ('left,' 'right,' a labor union, etc.). The cross-national differences of 20 to 30 percent are sufficiently large here to contribute to fundamental differences in the flavor of partisan processes in the two electorates. For a long time, we wrote off these differences as products of the incomparable circumstances or of reticence on the part of the French concerning partisanship . . . [but] the hypothesis of concealed partisanship was very largely dispelled by a close reading of the actual interviews. It is undeniable that nearly 10 percent of the French sample explicitly refused to answer the question, as compared with a tiny fraction in the United States. However, we have already subtracted this group from the accounting. Beyond the explicit refusals, the remarks and explanations which often accompanied statements classified as 'no party,' or as 'don't know which party,' had a very genuine air about them which made them hard to read as hasty evasions. No few of these respondents were obviously embarrassed at their lack of a party; some of them confessed that they just hadn't been able to keep track of which party was which. The phrase 'je n'y ai jamais pensé' was extremely common. Others indicated that they found it too hard to choose between so many parties; some indicated preferences for a specific political leader but admitted that they did not know which party he belonged to or, more often, had no interest in the identity of his party, whatever it might be. Others, forming a tiny minority of the non-party people, rejected the notion of parties with some hostility." Converse and Dupeux, 9-10.

[47] *Ibid.*, 1.

[48] *Ibid.*, 11.

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national populations in the ability to report a paternal party preference: 86 percent of the Americans, and only 26 percent of the French, were able to do this. Again, as in the respondents' reports of their own nonpartisanship, a close reading of the responses convinced the investigators that they were not merely the victims of some artifact of cross-cultural polling (the French respondents said: "Je n'ai jamais su"; "Je ne lui ai jamais demandé"; "Il ne disait rien à ses enfants"; etc.). And since younger respondents were no better able to report parental party preference than were older respondents, more than inability to remember the names of the mutable French parties must be involved in the lack of information about intra-family political attitudes. There seem, as Converse and Dupeux put it, to be "basic discontinuities of political socialization in the French family."[49]

Convincing as findings based on adult retrospections may be, confirmation based on direct observations of childhood political socialization is necessary. The American side of the confirmation has been available for some time, and now the Grenoble study fills in further details. The American studies all show party identification arising rather early in childhood, taking at least its general shape, although not its full intensity, for most children before adolescence. The specific findings vary somewhat with item-wordings. In New Haven, with an item that probably forces a fairly high level of response ("If you were 21 now, whom would you vote for most of the time? Mostly Democrats. Mostly Republicans. Don't Know."), roughly 60 percent of the children exhibit a party preference from age nine (fourth grade) on through thirteen (eighth grade). This is approximately the incidence of party identifiers found by the Survey Research Center among young adult voters in the United States.[50] In the national survey of American children conducted by Dennis, Easton, Hess, and Torney at the University of Chicago, an item was used that probably reduces identification with party, since the wording permits an "independent" option and also the response "I don't know what Democrat and Republican mean." The Chicago investigators find a 55 percent incidence of party identification during preadolescence, reached by about age ten (fifth grade).[51]

The Grenoble children were never explicitly asked to state a party preference, but Roig and Billon-Grand report responses to four items that together provide convincing circumstantial evidence:

[49] *Ibid.*, 14.
[50] Greenstein, *Children and Politics*, chap. 4.
[51] Hess and Torney, 90.

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1. Shortly beyond the middle of the instrument the question "Have you heard of the following groups?" is asked, and the checklist "Communistes, U.N.R., Socialistes, M.R.P." is provided (p. 94). There is no inhibition on uninformed assertions. One bit of partisan information was widely distributed: 85 percent of the sample said that they had heard of the Communists, a figure that rises to 98 percent among the middle-class thirteen-year-olds who make up the oldest *lycée* groups (the *cinquième*). This is consistent with the generally known finding that the Communist–non-Communist cleavage is widely perceived by members of the French adult population.[52] But there was a steep fall-off in awareness of the other three parties: 72 percent said that they had heard of the U.N.R. (80 percent in the *cinquième*); 65 percent said that they had heard of the Socialists (76 percent in the *cinquième*); and a mere 43 percent (57 percent in the *cinquième*) said that they had heard of the M.R.P. (The M.R.P., now defunct, had not run candidates in the Grenoble region in 1962, two years before the survey.)

2. The item immediately following sought to ascertain the child's assumptions about the nature of political parties ("A quoi servent ces groupements?"). Seventy-three percent of the sample (p. 92) was unable to respond, or produced "*divers*" responses, a category the authors use to code answers that miss the point of the question. This inability to respond appropriately is nearly universal (86 percent) among the eleven-year-olds who, along with a scattering of ten-year-olds, constitute the youngest age-group in which the Grenoble findings are reported. Even in the *cinquième*, nonresponse is high, though it goes down to 62 percent. The comparability of American data is imperfect, but the differences are so gross as to be quite convincing: by age ten the proportion of children in the American national sample who say they "don't know what Democrats and Republicans are" shrinks to below 5 percent. By age thirteen the figure is below 2 percent. Many more than 2 percent of these American thirteen-year-olds would no doubt be hard pressed to provide an open-ended description of what "these groups" do, but we assume that the great bulk would at least advance the vague statements made by the few older French children who did answer. (Parties exist "to do political things," "to take power," "they aspire to govern France.")[53]

[52] See, for example, the survey evidence presented in Monique Fichelet and others, "Les Français, la Politique et le Parti Communiste," in *Cahiers du Communisme*, No. 12 (December 1967) and No. 1 (January 1968).

[53] Actually, only 33 percent of the *cinquième* children defined "party." The residual 5 percent (and 4 percent of the total sample) made anti-party statements—for example, "ils existent à embêter la France," or "à ennuyer la France."

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3. Close to the end of the questionnaire, the question "Are there good political parties?" was asked (p. 98). Again, the incidence of nonresponse—43 percent—is striking and well over the level we would expect in a population in which party identification is common. Explicit animosity to parties, on the other hand, is relatively rare (9 percent).

4. The previous item was followed by the question, "Name one or several good political parties" (p. 99). We assume that by the age of ten or eleven half or more of a typical American sample would name the Democrats or Republicans—many of them naming both parties. Again, the French "no response" rate is massive—*79 percent*. A further 10 percent mentioned the U.N.R. and 3 percent named various other parties (with responses divided among the parties listed earlier in the questionnaire, the Socialists, Communists, and M.R.P.). Eight percent referred to rough *tendances* of one kind or another.

The Grenoble study, then, appears to corroborate the Converse and Dupeux finding that the great bulk of French children fail to acquire party identifications. It remains for further investigations to corroborate and explain their findings on family political communication.

(2) FRANCE AS A CONFLICT SOCIETY: PAROCHIAL-SCHOOL–PUBLIC-SCHOOL DIFFERENCES

We cannot deal here in detail with the "conflict society" approach to explaining French politics. What seems to be implied in the familiar argument that the ideological cleavages in the French political stratum are deeply rooted in public attitudes is, among other things, that:

1. attitudes are widely held, sharply crystallized, and intensely felt in the French mass public;

2. individuals hold internally consistent attitudes (i.e., revolutionary or reactionary attitudes on issue "a" will be matched by parallel attitudes on issue "b");

3. attitudinal disagreement is high and cumulative (i.e., disagreement on one issue is bolstered by disagreement on the next); and

4. agencies of socialization and membership inculcate and reinforce these attitudinal patterns.

It is not hard to see how propositions of this sort might be tested. To date, while there have been interesting attempts to see if France in fact is divided into homogeneous and opposed "political families,"[54]

[54] Deutsch and others conclude: "The traditional predictors of the Left and the Right have almost all disappeared." 26-29. Also see Pierre Fougeyrollas, *La Conscience Politique dans la France Contemporaine* (Paris 1963).

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with the exception of scattered findings on "Red" or "White" patches of voters,[55] the evidence that the French general public displays such a pattern of attributes has not been found.[56]

One of the principal axes along which French political cleavage is traditionally assumed to occur is that between a reactionary Catholic France and a progressive Republican France. Ehrmann, who comments that "until well into the present century, the opposition between believers and non-believers has been one of the main determinants of the political culture," points to the familiar assumption that separate Catholic education and related institutions significantly contributed to this aspect of division in France: "The Catholic subsystem existing within the republic drew its strength from a well-developed network of private education and associations."[57]

It is still true that, as Siegfried first showed, the geographical areas where *école privée* attendance is high also tend to vote for the Catholic Right, and there is survey evidence that the correlation between high levels of religious practice and right-wing voting is not just an ecological artifact.[58] But several surveys have turned up little difference in the values of religious and nonreligious youth, and Catholic organizations—formerly almost uniformly conservative—are now more ideologically heterogeneous.[59] Moreover, even when parochial- and public-school children are found to differ in political attitude—with the more obvious demographic third factors controlled—this is no sure demonstration of the

[55] On Catholic France, see the classical work of Siegfried, *Tableau*; Laurence Wylie and others, *Chanzeaux: A Village in Anjou* (Cambridge 1966); Charles Tilly, *The Vendée* (Cambridge 1964). On "Red" France, see the case studies in Gordon Wright, *Rural Revolution in France* (Stanford 1964); Edgar Morin, *Commune en France* (Paris 1967); and J.H.G. Lord, A. J. Petrie, and L. A. Whitehead, "Political Change in Rural France: The 1967 Election in a Communist Stronghold," *Political Studies*, XVI (June 1968), 153-76. Very little has been written on urban Communist strongholds like those in the *banlieue* of Paris.

[56] Occasional dissenters, like Nathan Leites, have argued that ideological cleavages are not the major source of cleavage in the political elite either. See Leites' *On the Game of Politics in France* (Stanford 1959); also see the evidence presented in Duncan McRae, Jr., *Parliaments, Parties, and Society in France 1946-1958* (New York 1967), chap. 7.

[57] Ehrmann, 47-49. In his study of western France, Siegfried commented that he knew of "an imposing number of French towns where the Republican state does not feel itself fundamentally in charge" because of the dominance of Catholic schools. Siegfried, 399. The various assertions in the literature on this basis of cleavage seem to us in general not to distinguish sufficiently between (1) past *versus* present levels of cleavage and (2) hypothesis *versus* empirical documentation.

[58] The correlation between religiosity and voting for the two parties of the Left during the Fourth Republic was never less than —.45, McRae, 247; for survey data, see, for example, Michelat and others, 13.

[59] For a summary of the youth survey findings, see Ehrmann, 53. On Catholic organizations see William Bosworth, *Catholicism and Crisis in France* (Princeton 1962) and Wright, chap. 8.

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independent effect of parochial-school education, as distinguished from the effects of other factors that preselect parochial-school children (e.g., coming from a religious family, or growing up in a Catholic subculture). A recent study of parochial education in the United States suggests that the Catholic education affects *religious* attitudes, but that it does not affect political attitudes.[60]

While the Grenoble data do not permit an estimate of the independent effect of Catholic education, they do permit comparison by type of school. Using the 5 percent significance level as a convenient way of identifying differences that warrant discussion, we have summarized in Table One a good number of the differences between the two subsamples, emphasizing those that are not likely to be a result of the slightly higher educational level of the *école privée* children.

There are three groups of comparisons in Table One. The first two items are examples of comparisons that seem to generate "real," but for the present purposes uninteresting, differences. These items show that public-school children were more likely than private-school children to list political figures of the past or present as exemplars—the famous people they hope some day to resemble. This imbalance seems to be a consequence of the more frequent references by Catholic-school children to the saints of their church. While we are aware that hagiolatry might under some circumstances become politically significant, we are not inclined to make much of this apparent consequence of different curricular emphases in the two kinds of schools.

The second kind of comparison is made in items three through nine of Table One, which report the main instances of differences that do seem at least partially consistent with the notion that a right-wing Catholic subculture exists and is perpetuated through the school system. The direction of the variance in these items illustrates that some of the kinds of political learning implied in the notion of "two Frances" appears to take place, but its lack of magnitude suggests that the French political socialization process probably does *not* generate and reinforce cumulative ideological conflict. Thus: the public-school children are 12 percent more likely than the Catholic-school children to emphasize *égalité* in defining the term "democracy"; the few children to use the term *laïque*, with its anticlerical implications, to designate France are

[60] Andrew Greeley and Peter Rossi, *The Education of Catholic Americans* (Chicago 1966), chap. 5. Approximately 20 percent of French children attend parochial schools, but such schools are still in the majority in such traditionally Catholic departments as the Vendée, the Haute-Loire and the Maine-et-Loire. Curricular differences have mainly disappeared, as Catholic schools accept government subsidies that require them to tailor their courses to the public school curriculum. See Halls, pp. 80-81.

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TABLE ONE

REPRESENTATIVE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES ($P<.05$)* BETWEEN CATHOLIC- AND STATE-SCHOOL GRENOBLE STUDY RESPONDENTS

	Catholic School	State School	Difference
	%	%	%
1. The famous person (living or dead) he would like to resemble is political	13	26	13
2. Person he would *not* like to resemble is political.	34	48	14
3. Chooses "all men are equal" as the best defining characteristic of "democracy" (rather than definitions in terms government of the people, full employment, or the absence of "bosses who direct the workers").	29	41	12
4. Considers *laïque* as the quality that best describes France (rather than *puissante, démocratique*, or *républicaine*).	1	16	15
5. A country should be directed by one man (rather than an assembly).	28	12	—16
6. Disagrees with the statement that the strong will always dominate the weak.	76	84	8
7. Disagrees with statement that the government is always right *vis-à-vis* malcontents.	47	65	18
8. The Revolution of 1789 was good.	41	66	25
9. Wouldn't want to live in the USSR.	26	14	—12
10. Traitors to *la patrie* should be shot.	30	45	15
11. There are (some) good political parties.	55	43	—12
N =	(186)	(227)	

* Chi-square test.

in public school; the Catholic-school children are about 16 percent more likely than the public-school children to assert that a country should be ruled by a single man rather than an assembly; they are less likely (though by only 8 percent) to disagree with the statement that the strong will always dominate the weak (but they also overwhelmingly disagree with this statement); and they are more likely to choose the Soviet Union as a country they would not like to live in.

Finally, children from the two kinds of schools differ the most of all (by 25 percent) on an item we have already discussed: whether the Revolution of 1789 was good. It certainly is of compelling interest (although scarcely a matter for surprise) that France has been unable

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to develop a neutral, positively valued myth of its own revolution. And it is impressive that this century-and-a-half-old event should be a matter of disagreement among elementary-school children in the 1960's. Nevertheless, the 41 percent of the *privée* children who thought the Revolution an evil were matched by another 41 percent who described it positively, and a fifth of the public-school children were also negative toward the Revolution. And we have further seen that condemnation of the Revolution did not seem to have a strongly ideological quality.

That the divided schools (and whatever else is measured by "school-type") do not socialize consistent or cumulative ideological cleavage at the mass level is further suggested by the third class of finding in Table One. The tenth and eleventh rows of the table are instances of statistically significant differences that can readily be interpreted as showing parochial-school children to have more "liberal" attitudes. These rows show that the public-school children were *more* likely to voice the view that traitors to *la patrie* ought to be shot,[61] and were less likely to approve of at least some political parties. Finally, the two groups did not differ significantly on a variety of items which "could" have generated ideological differences: questions about whether it is normal for Frenchmen to die for their country, about the functions of deputies, about whether foreigners and Arabs should leave France, and about whether the USSR is an enemy nation, among others.

Again the findings, which should be interpreted cautiously because of unmeasured "third-factor" influences, are not what we would expect in a society with deeply etched clerical versus anticlerical conflicts. It is possible that the results would have been very different in the past or in another region—for example, in parts of Western France where the influence of family, class, school, and subculture are cumulative. But those regions of France which are "neatly" Red or White are the exception rather than the rule today. Whether the situation was ever very different is a question for historical research.

(3) AUTHORITY AND SOCIALIZATION IN FRANCE: FROM PARADOX TO PARADIGM

The failure of parochial–state-school differences to produce a consistent pattern of political attitudes in French schoolchildren suggests that we should be skeptical of explanations that attempt to make in-

[61] We may be taxed with having failed to see that the apparently more "liberal" responses of the parochial-school children to this question really disguises a "conservative" response: "Why should we Catholics be willing to die for *their* (the Republicans') country?" We have considered this interpretation but think it too sophisticated to account for children's responses.

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ferences from a single agency of socialization to the whole of a nation's value system. This seems to us the major difficulty with the third theme mentioned at the outset—the amorphous, fascinating, and often maligned account of national authority style contained in the literature on "French national character."

The principal accounts in this literature appear to posit that:

1. the French family combines harmony with inequality of status in a way that leaves the child with a combination of respect for and distrust of authority;

2. this duality is reinforced in the school by the passivity expected of the child and the type of discipline—shame before the group—used as a sanction;

3. the peer group—never legitimized by either family or school—gains the child's loyalty but not his participation;

4. the child emerges as adult with the patrimony of these dovetailed experiences—he conforms on the surface, but strikes out against authority when he can; he protects his area of privacy but rejects chances to change it; he is loyal to his group but will not strive to work within it; and finally, he projects these attitudes towards life and authority onto political authority and government, a transfer that allows us to understand his political behavior in terms of the model, or template, of his childhood.[62]

The assertions that French childhood—and especially the family—is an appropriate model for understanding various aspects of political behavior are legion. For example:

On local government:

> The consensus that prevails in most French communes is reminiscent of the harmony characteristic of most French families. The resemblance is heightened by the similar authority patterns in the two units.[63]

On ideology:

> Growing up, a child learns with what symbols his family identifies itself. Beyond the limits of the family he becomes conscious of

[62] Some typical citations: Pitts, 249-61; Hoffmann "Heroic Leadership," 114-17; McRae, 17-19; Wylie, *Village*, 330-37; Metraux and Mead, 1-68; Crozier, Part III. Also see Mark Kesselman, *The Ambiguous Consensus* (New York 1967); pp. 9-12; Martha Wolfenstein, "French Parents take their Children to the Park," in Mead and Wolfenstein (eds.), *Childhood in Contemporary Culture* (Chicago 1955); and Wylie, "Social Change at the Grass Roots," in *In Search of France*, 139-234. A well-balanced blend of traditional interpretations and recent data will be found in Ehrmann, chap. 3.

[63] Kesselman, 9.

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> groups of people, of *cercles*, with which he and his family are either associated or not. . . . Within the totality of French culture, these circles are fused into still larger groups, *familles d'esprit* (ideological families).[64]

On group memberships:

> The school peer group is the prototype of the solidary groups which exist in France beyond the nuclear and extended family. They are characterized by jealous equalitarianism among the members, difficulty of admitting newcomers, and conspiracy of silence against superior authority.[65]

Finally, Crozier tries to show that in the bureaucracy the protection of personal space and dislike of face-to-face relationships lead individuals to appeal to a higher authority, thereby increasing centralization. And all of this is said to have its source in attitudes toward authority learned in childhood.[66]

Students of political psychology have tended in recent years to be suspicious on formal grounds of theories that hypothesize a chain of causality running from nonpolitical socialization of personality in the primary circles of childhood, through informal associations and memberships, to politics. We need only visualize the number of links in such a causal chain to suspect that the connections among its more remote elements would be weak, or at any rate, complex:

socialization ⟶ personality ⟶ attitudes ⟶ individual behavior ⟶ aggregate patterns of behavior.[67]

Nevertheless, such connections are more likely to be present under some circumstances than others, and whether they obtain is an empirical question.[68] The unanimity of so many talented observers of French society in drawing political conclusions from childhood experiences in France, as well as the prominence of the family in the intriguing empirical findings of Converse and Dupeux, leads us to believe that these relationships are worth exploring.

Thus our disappointment that Roig and Billon-Grand, in their study of Grenoble schoolchildren, were unable to learn a great deal about

[64] Wylie, "Social Change," 231.

[65] Pitts, 259.

[66] The argument is judiciously summarized in Hoffmann, "Heroic Leadership," 114-16.

[67] For a fuller discussion, see Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Interference, and Conceptualization* (Chicago 1969), especially the discussion of "linkage" in chapter 5.

[68] *Ibid.*, chap. 2.

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children's attitudes to authority, or even to cross-tabulate children's political attitudes with aspects of family structure.[69] Although the series of questions on the President of the Republic *might* be interpreted as evidence on general attitudes toward authority, the authors do not choose to do so, possibly because their questionnaire seems to have produced rather shallow responses. Answers to the question "What does the President of the Republic do?" cannot satisfactorily be compared with American responses to similar items, because of discrepancies in the age-categories for which data are reported and because of lack of clarity about the coding criteria used in the Grenoble study. The quotations presented by the authors suggest rather colorless, if childlike, responses: "Il organise le pays avec des aides"; "Il administre la patrie" (pp. 52-53). The children who responded unfavorably to the item asking for evaluation of the President do not seem, in the image conveyed by the literature on national character, to be sniping at authority from the safety of their "*situations acquises*"—they say, for example, "Il est orgueilleux, il a un nez trop grand"; "Il a abandonné les pieds-noirs"; "Il n'aide pas les mineurs" (p. 79).

If the Grenoble data do not permit us to advance generalizations about French children's attitudes toward authority, they do serve as a reminder of the special difficulties that may be involved in developing the operational indicators appropriate for translating the various national-character hypotheses into testable hypotheses. Since it seems to us that the presently available fixed-choice, paper-and-pencil procedures for questioning children are not promising instruments for dealing with the subtle relationships hypothesized in the national-character literature,[70] we conclude with methodological observations about alternative means of eliciting children's orientations.

IV. Concluding Methodological Observations

Students of comparative political behavior must be grateful to Roig and Billon-Grand for departing from the literary mode of commentary on France's paradoxical nature, and conducting an exploratory empirical study of French political socialization. Their achievement is the more admirable for having been made in the face of obstacles. Not the

[69] The effect of family structure upon children's attitudes is discussed in Hess and Torney, chap. 3, and in Robert E. Lane, "La Maturation Politique de L'adolescent aux Etats-Unis et en Allemagne," in the *Revue Française de Sociologie* VII (1956), 598-618.

[70] This seems to us to be a principal shortcoming of what evidently is the only effort to employ notions from the French national-character literature in political socialization research: Frank A. Pinner, "Parental Overprotection and Political Distrust," *American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals* CCCLXI (September 1965) 58-70.

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least part of that achievement is their demonstration that the obstacles are not insuperable—that research on French political socialization is both feasible and capable of contributing to the study of French politics.

The three kinds of reservations about the book and study that we have remarked on are: the design of the questionnaire, the statistical treatment of the data, and interpretations of the findings. The emphasis on a paper-and-pencil instrument, with fixed-choice items used to ascertain a number of rather elusive orientations, leaves us uncertain at various points about the precise meaning of the children's responses. The absence of controls and partial correlations makes it difficult to ascribe findings to specific causes. And finally, without making their assumptions very explicit, the authors sometimes interpret their findings in terms of inherited expectations about French politics that their data do not clearly support.

An advantage of any kind of empirical research is that it is progressive. The shortcomings of inquiries become part of their contributions, by leading to further research. From our indications of the aspects of the Grenoble study we found problematic, there follow a number of suggestions about the desiderata for further study of French political socialization. One need, of course, is for conducting such work with appropriate attention to controls, and for multivariate analysis in general. Another is for fuller sampling of the diverse groups in the French population: the Grenoble investigators were unable to study many children from the population groups that support the Communist Party or from the still vast small-town segment of the population. And by working in a single region they were unable to examine the question of whether variables such as school sponsorship have a greater or lesser effect in other parts of France. A further need is for measuring instruments that get at some of the more elusive aspects of children's orientations. In conclusion, we develop this last theme further, because of its general implications for comparative political socialization research.

Fixed-choice and other relatively structured and unprobing ways of eliciting response are more problematic in crosscultural research than in research within a single culture. The wider the cultural range of the populations being studied, the more difficult it is to know whether respondents who check the "same" questionnaire alternative in fact mean the same thing. The confusion is compounded when one studies children; because of their disposition to please adult interviewers and get the "right" answer, the investigator is in constant peril of reporting

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findings that are more a function of his instrument than of any formed aspect of the child's political thinking. Even in crosscultural political socialization research, fixed choice items have their place.[71] But, as David O. Sears points out, they are more appropriate for some purposes (such as "determining the child's affects toward political stimuli") than for others (such as "obtaining the content of his thoughts").[72]

For certain interesting analytic purposes, even the open-ended survey item as it is typically constructed ("What do political parties do?" "What are the good or bad qualities of the President of the Republic?") may be insufficiently sensitive. Thus, for example, on the question of party identification, the Converse and Dupeux data, now supplemented by the Grenoble findings, begin to give us clear evidence on French electoral psychology, but much of what is shown is negative: French voters tend *not* to have party identifications; they seem *not* to have intense, crystallized political ideologies. But we lack a sufficiently subtle and rounded *positive* account of the psychology of French voters. And there is reason to believe that at least at the exploratory stage we may need rather sensitive, quasi-clinical means of obtaining this account.

A reference to "clinical" data-gathering techniques conjures up the psychoanalytic couch, or at least such deep personality measures as the Rorschach ink blot or the Thematic Apperception picture card. But there is a great deal of only partly explored "space" between the standard survey questions and the Rorschach. This space is in part occupied by what are sometimes called the *semi*-projective techniques. Such techniques are closer to the "texture" of day-to-day life and political reality than is the full-blown projective test, but they are, as it were, more unhinged—more suitable for eliciting fantasies, images, and anticipations of behavior—than the usual survey item. The typical semi-projective item consists of a description of an episode of the sort that the individual might encounter in his day-to-day existence: for example, a description of a potentially tense encounter between friends, work associates, family members—or actors in the political arena. The respondent is asked to imagine the outcome of the episode, and, depending upon research interests, it is possible to ask further probing questions about how *he* would respond under such circumstances, about his feelings, about his perceptions of norms, and so forth.

Such techniques, by focusing on archetypical situations, can be pecu-

[71] See, for example, Jack Dennis, Leon Lindberg, Donald McCrone, and Rodney Stiefbold, "Political Socialization into Democratic Orientations in Four Western Systems," *Comparative Political Studies* 1 (April 1968), 71-101.

[72] David O. Sears, review of Hess and Torney, "The Development of Political Attitudes in Children," *Harvard Educational Review* XXXVIII (Summer 1968), 571-78.

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liarly useful for getting comparable responses to common stimuli by adults and by children, and crossculturally. The fullness of response, and the possibility through skillful interviewing of drawing out the respondent's full meaning, increases one's confidence that the findings are not merely a function of the instrument. These techniques, which are seldom utilized in political science, have been used by a variety of investigators in other disciplines. Two especially fertile applications, which deserve notice by the student of political socialization, are by Hanfmann and Getzels[73] and by Joseph Adelson[74] and of his associates. Hanfmann and Getzels used a series of episodes about work situations in highly successful comparative analysis of a matched sample of Americans and former Soviet citizens. To a remarkable degree they were able to get both at orientations that were specific to the institutional circumstances each group had encountered and at more general psychological dispositions toward interpersonal relations. Adelson and his co-workers, proceeding in the tradition of Piaget, have interviewed adolescents in a number of countries, using a schedule in which the respondents are asked to imagine the rules of an ideal political system that a group of visionaries are about to set up on a desert island. Adelson's interview schedule covers a remarkable number of the standard issues in political philosophy, in the course of asking how such a political system ought to be organized.

The present reviewers have, in a very preliminary way, used similar techniques for interviewing preadolescent children in France, as well as in the United States and Britain, with a concern for a number of the issues that have led to perennial efforts to compare these three systems. We have asked children to imagine the upshot of a variety of stories, ranging from incomplete episodes about parent-child relations to episodes about aspects of the wider political environment about which we know the children were rather uninformed, but that we wanted to treat as stimuli for imaginative speculations that might reveal implicit cultural assumptions. We have proceeded far enough to be clear that the semi-projective episode-completion stimulus is one that children respond to with interest and enthusiasm, and one that leads them to produce intriguing interview protocols. Consider, for example, the fol-

[73] Eugenia Hanfmann and Jacob W. Getzels, "Interpersonal Attitudes of Former Soviet Citizens, as Studied by a Semi-Projective Method," *Psychological Monographs*, No. 389 (1955).

[74] Joseph Adelson and Robert P. O'Neil, "Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, IV No. 3 (1966), 295-306. Lynette Beall, "Political Thinking in Adolescence," (University of Michigan 1967). Unpublished dissertation.

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lowing question about legislative-executive relations, asked of twelve-year-olds in the three nations:

Interviewer: Now I am going to ask you to complete a story about the President and a member of Congress of the President's party. Suppose the member of Congress from your part of the country were asked by the President to vote for a law the member didn't approve of. What would happen? Finish the story. (Roles are varied appropriately for Britain and France).

Boy, Middletown, Conn.: "Well he wouldn't vote for it."

Int.: "Why not?"

Boy: "Because he didn't think it was right."

Girl, Colchester, England: "They have a long talk and an argument and if the MP didn't approve of the new law, he might get chucked out or something like that . . . for being against the Prime Minister. Sometimes MP's usually get talked into it."

Girl, Les Baux, France: "The President would ask other people's opinions. They would try to come to an agreement."

Clearly, no one investigative technique, and no one investigation, will be sufficient. We hope that it will be possible a decade from now, out of the pluralism of inquiry, to look back at a long series of political socialization studies, conducted in a variety of systems by a variety of techniques. Once the findings of such studies are synthesized with what is known about the psychology of adult political behavior and about how political systems actually function, we will begin to have documented theories of political stability and change—theories that are *sans* paradox.

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TOWARD A KEYNESIAN THEORY OF SOCIAL PROCESSES

By AMITAI ETZIONI

Everett E. Hagen and Stephanie F. T. White, *Great Britain: Quiet Revolution in Planning*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 180 pp. $3.95.
Andrew Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism*, New York, Oxford University Press, 456 pp. $10.50.
J. P. Nettl, *Political Mobilization: A Sociological Analysis of Methods and Concepts*, New York, Basic Books, 216 pp. $8.50.

INCREASINGLY, the present society is coming to be viewed not as a condition but as an alternative, as one possible arrangement of a much larger set. The social sciences help provide an understanding of the factors and mechanisms that allow us to review such a society, propose alternative plans, and transform it in line with these new designs.

While totalitarian societies had similar ambitions as early as 1917, the United States has developed its interest in broad, guided societal changes for the most part in the last fifteen years. Most "Great Society" reforms, though, failed to take off. While the Nixon administration seems to approach domestic reforms with great caution, the list of goals Washington has set is long indeed. It seeks not only to eliminate the war, poverty, and riots, to reduce crime rates, to accelerate the mills of justice, and to retard inflation without increasing unemployment, but also to encourage Americans to become more "moral," engage in fewer sexual escapades and deviations, refrain from the illicit use of drugs, and eat, drink, and smoke smaller amounts. And this is far from a complete list.

Yet we can state with considerable assurance that most of these goals will not be achieved. For reasons that the three books before us help to explicate, modern societies—here we deal only with democratic ones—simply have not developed the capacity to build consensus about goals and procedures sufficient to effect significant changes (which is one reason that the Kerner report remains largely a fine paperback and is not an action program); nor have modern societies the relevant know-how, either technical or social, to do so. (Thus, we do not know how to reduce the economic and psychic costs of treatments of pollution and smoking to "acceptable" limits for the existing level of consensus and commitments, even if we assume that the industries involved would allow the government to apply such knowledge if researchers had produced it.)

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The social and political sciences do, however, provide a clearer picture than we have ever possessed of the components required (and their interrelations) if we are to evolve an active society, one able to guide its own transformation. Karl W. Deutsch's *The Nerves of Government* seems to me to provide a larger segment of the conceptual map than any other single work. My own *The Active Society* tries to add some sociological factors and analyses to Deutsch's rich formulations. Each of the three books discussed here provides significant insights for what is one of the most consequential intellectual adventures of this generation.

Shonfield's contribution is considerable. He offers a keen analysis of planning efforts in major postwar democracies, focusing on France, Britain, West Germany, and the United States. His comparative study of societal knowledge systems, as they are applied to economic planning, provides an understanding of the information and analytic tools that economic policy-makers increasingly command but that are still lacking in most other domestic sectors of policy-formation.

One of the central conclusions of Shonfield's book is that effective government guidance of societal processes is not possible without both systematic inputs of information about these processes and the effects of existing public policy on them and the systematic analysis of this information in terms relevant to the policy-makers.[1]

While this may seem to be a fairly obvious conclusion, in practice societal guidance, both in the past (e.g., in the USSR) and at present (e.g., most domestic efforts in the U.S.), has tended to be based on very inadequate knowledge about the state of the system and the effects of existing policy on it, let alone of the possible alternatives.[2]

Shonfield, it is important to keep in mind, is interested in the guidance of *economic* processes, although we suggest that his conclusions, and especially the variables upon which he focuses, are of equal importance for the guidance of societal processes. He finds it "paradoxical" that the United Kingdom and the United States, the two nations that adopted Keynesian principles first and most widely, did less well than did France, West Germany, and Holland in keeping unemployment down and the growth rate up.

Subtly, and with rich detail, Shonfield explains the varying capacity of societies to manage themselves as basically reflecting different balances between public and private authority. He does not dogmatically

[1] Efforts in this direction are now being made. For a preliminary report of attempts to develop social indicators and social analysis related to them, see *Toward A Social Report* (Washington, 1969), and B. Gross, ed., *Social Goals and Indicators for the American Society* (Boston 1969).

[2] For a recent study of decision-making over lunch at the highest level, see Chester Cooper, *The National Security Processes* (New York 1969).

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favor one over the other, but suggests that the balance needed for effective guidance has been and is changing toward one more heavily weighted on the public side. Thus, he sides with Bundy's advocacy of a more powerful government[3] as opposed to Drucker's call for "reprivitization."[4] Shonfield points out that until 1945, Britain's capitalism was largely unguided, so that it had a great advantage over the state-controlled economy of France, *during the prewar period*. After the war, however, economic prosperity came to depend on fairly active governmental guidance. West Germany, like France, provided such guidance in coalition with key banks and industries, despite an official ideology to the contrary. Britain, notwithstanding much guidance rhetoric, did not. Its government continuously "checked" with a broad range of interest-groups and allowed its desire for wide consensus almost to block policy-making and progress. In comparison, a strong public authority existed in France. There, government "consulting" agencies inspired and backed Four-Year Plans, set priorities, and exercised their power to make the priorities prevail. The development of national statistics provided necessary sophistication to the previously over-controlling French, while in Britain a similar development was not matched by a control-mechanism to utilize the new statistics.

Several comments are pertinent here. First, it is essential to note that Shonfield's analysis favors not government *intervention*, but rather the establishment of guidelines supported by the moral, tax, and credit power of the government—not by coercion. (The capacity of the French government to allocate credit is much greater than that of the American one.) The dichotomy between planning by decree and free market forces, into which the debate pro and con governmental control all too frequently lapses, at least in the public mind, obscures rather than helps the thought on this matter. There are obviously a variety of tools the government could use that are not coercive in the narrow sense of the term but are yet more potent than those now employed.

Second, the new guidance mechanisms evolving in continental Europe work largely through *extra*-parliamentary consensus-formation by semi-executive bodies, especially the planning authorities. These are composed of representatives of interest-groups and some labor unions as well as government officials; the initiative and chairmanships of these bodies are concentrated among the latter. The development of these mechanisms is in part a result of the inability of parliaments to command sufficient expertise and unity of perspective and to draw on effective representation of nationwide interest groups (as distinct from

[3] McGeorge Bundy, *The Strength of Government* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969).
[4] Peter Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity* (New York 1969).

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geographic groups)—in short, to function as the central body of modern consensus-formation.

While such extra-parliamentary consensus-building increased in De Gaulle's semi-authoritarian France, and even in West Germany, it is not accidental that Britain—more deeply committed to democratic procedures—has found it difficult to adopt this new mode of consensus-making.

Nor are the extra-parliamentary processes, at least as evolved in France, without their own difficulties. As the events of May, 1968, show, this mechanism tends to be not flexible enough to adapt to the changing power relations in the society. Maybe the fact that long-overdue university reforms were initiated only after an almost revolutionary crisis cannot be viewed as a black mark against the state-guided planning bodies, because they are mainly concerned with economic processes; even France has no equivalent agencies for guidance of social processes. But the neglect of the workers' needs and demands—resulting in their support of the students' revolt—is a more intrinsic defect. The planning mechanism is basically a business-government apparatus with very little representation and involvement of labor unions.

Hagen and White's essay-book is best described as the turning of a microscope on one portion of the much larger landscape portrayed by Shonfield. A carefully detailed account is provided, in the tradition of studies of public administration, of the mechanisms Britain developed, mainly between 1960 and 1965, to plan the economy—especially the National Economic Development Council, the National Incomes Commission, and the National Plan, a formation influenced by the example of the planning authorities in France. The authors provide a very useful chapter comparing the two planning administrations. Bertram Gross, the general editor of the National Planning Service, adds an enlightening "prefatory comment."

Reading J. P. Nettl's study of political mobilization intensifies our deep sense of loss when we learned of his death in an airplane crash. He undertook in this book a theoretical exercise in the traditional sense: he chose a concept, reflected on its components, and sought to relate it to other concepts, particularly that of political development.

He characterizes mobilization by its "definitional limitations." He sees it as a process that is induced and not merely occurring, one that has a "function" for the system, is neutral with regard to the purposes it serves, and encompasses both the attitude (the commitment to action) and the means for translating the commitment into specific actions.

In the discussion that follows the characterization of mobilization,

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Nettl traces its types ("stalactite"/"stalagmite") and their intricate relations to political development, distinguishing between mobilization that is largely elitist and that which also involves the "masses." It is here that we find the linking of Nettl's work to the evolving Keynesian theories of society.

One of the major limitations of attempts to transform pluralistic societies is the apparent weakness of the "general will." It has often been stated that the conserving forces, located in the privileged classes and elites, tend to pay little more than lip service to social reforms and to approve only "token" appropriations to the underprivileged groups. Were this class-based theory of politics completely accurate, societal changes, guided toward fundamental reforms, would be inconceivable because the overwhelming power would be that of the conserving forces. Considerable flexibility is introduced into the picture, however, once we realize that the classes are not equally mobilized toward political action. A major factor that accounts, in "normal times," for the ability of the smaller privileged classes to prevail over the larger underprivileged groupings is that the more privileged generate more power by being more politically conscious, committed, and organized, i.e., more active.

But in times of crisis or rapid societal change, minorities, students, or ethnic groups may become relatively more mobilized, altering the fundamental power balance. As the society is more than merely an aggregate of collectivities engaged in self-serving actions, this may also lead to a greater energizing of the society-wide mechanisms for fundamental reforms. The mobilization of white liberals, students, and Negroes around the civil-rights issue in the 1964-1966 period illustrates such a development. It provided both the necessary political support for a liberal "zag" in the zig-zagging policy of the country and a more powerful federal posture toward the states. It would seem that without such "extra" mobilization of the collectivities interested in basic reforms as distinct from privileged groups, only very limited reforms can be expected to be launched *and* sustained by the national guidance mechanisms, even when they are knowledgeable enough about how to effect them.

The evolution of a theory that could help make the guidance of societal processes more effective, including a conceptualization of the conditions under which the necessary political support would be available, is far from complete. These three books, each in its own way, advance us considerably, with Shonfield's leading the way.

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